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Apriority, Metaphysics, and Empirical Content in Kant's Theory of Matter
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 27 January 2012
Abstract
This paper addresses problems associated with the role of the empirical concept of matter in Kant's Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, offering an interpretation emphasizing two points consistently neglected in the secondary literature: the distinction between logical and real essence, and Kant's claim that motion must be represented in pure intuition by static geometrical figures. I conclude that special metaphysics cannot achieve its stated and systematically justified goal of discovering the real essence of matter, but that Kant requires this failure for his larger philosophical presentation of the dialectic that ‘irremediably attaches to human reason’ (A298/B354).
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