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Kant and the ‘Monstrous’ Ground of Possibility: A Reply to Abaci and Yong

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  31 January 2014

Andrew Chignell
Andrew Chignell*
Affiliation:
Cornell University Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

I reply to recent criticisms by Uygar Abaci and Peter Yong, among others, of my reading of Kant's pre-Critical ‘possibility proof’ of God's existence, and of its fate in the Critical period. Along the way I discuss some implications of this debate for our understanding of Kant's modal metaphysics and modal epistemology generally.

Keywords

KantSpinozaexistence of Godground of possibilitymodalitynecessity
Type
Articles
Information
Kantian Review , Volume 19 , Issue 1 , March 2014 , pp. 53 - 69
Copyright
Copyright © Kantian Review 2014 

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