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Hume’s Scepticism and Kant’s Transcendental Deduction

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 February 2025

Paul Tulipana  and
Dustin King
Paul Tulipana*
Affiliation:
University of California Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA, USA
Dustin King
Affiliation:
Independent Scholar
*
Corresponding author: Paul Tulipana; Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

Kant’s aim in the Transcendental Deduction is to prove that the a priori categories of the understanding necessarily apply to objects of experience. He claims that he will do this simply by explaining how they could so apply. But the idea that a mere explanation of this possibility should provide a defence of the categories’ actual (let alone necessary) applicability is surprising. We argue that it can be understood by attending to the source of the scepticism that the Critique’s Analytic is supposed to overcome: Hume’s inability to explain causal knowledge in the Enquiry.

Keywords

David HumeTranscendental Deductionscepticism
Type
Article
Information
Kantian Review , First View , pp. 1 - 21
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Copyright
© The Author(s), 2025. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Kantian Review

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