Field studies in many domains have found evidence of decision fatigue, a phenomenon describing how decision quality can be impaired by the act of making previous decisions. Debate remains, however, over posited psychological mechanisms underlying decision fatigue, and the size of effects in high-stakes settings. We examine an extensive set of pretrial arraignments in a large, urban court system to investigate how judicial release and bail decisions are influenced by the time an arraignment occurs. We find that release rates decline modestly in the hours before lunch and before dinner, and these declines persist after statistically adjusting for an extensive set of observed covariates. However, we find no evidence that arraignment time affects pretrial release rates in the remainder of each decision-making session. Moreover, we find that release rates remain unchanged after a meal break even though judges have the opportunity to replenish their mental and physical resources by resting and eating. In a complementary analysis, we find that the rate at which judges concur with prosecutorial bail requests does not appear to be influenced by either arraignment time or a meal break. Taken together, our results imply that to the extent that decision fatigue plays a role in pretrial release judgments, effects are small and inconsistent with previous explanations implicating psychological depletion processes.

In this paper, we show that the presence of numbers in a problem tempts people to perform mathematical operations even when the correct answer requires no math, which we term “mindless math”. In three pre-registered studies across two survey platforms (total N = 3,193), we investigate how mindless math relates to perceived problem difficulty, problem representation, and accuracy. In Study 1, we show that increasing the numeric demands of problems leads to more mindless math (and fewer correct answers). Study 2 shows that this effect is not caused by people being wary of problems that seem too easy. In Study 3, we show that this effect is robust over a wider range of numeric demands, and in the discussion we offer two possible mechanisms that would explain this effect, and the caveat that at even harder levels of numeric demands the effect may invert such that much harder math increases accuracy relative to moderately hard math.

Do people think that there is such a thing as too much money? The present research investigated this question in the context of hypothetical lottery wins. By employing a mental simulation approach, we were able to examine how people respond to increasing envisioned jackpot amounts, and whether there are individual differences in people’s reactions. Across five empirical studies (total N = 1,504), we consistently found that, overall, the relationship between imagined lottery wins and expected happiness is characterized by an inverted U-shaped curve, with expected happiness being highest around an envisioned win of roughly 10 million pounds. Both lower and higher envisioned wins reduced participants’ overall expected happiness. In addition to this overall pattern, we identified three clusters of participants who react differently to expected increases in wealth. These clusters mainly differed in terms of how soon the top of the expected happiness curve was reached, and if and when the curve started to drop. Finally, we also found some interesting cluster differences in terms of participants’ prosocial and proself motivations.

How do people make everyday decisions in order to achieve the most successful outcome? Decision making research typically evaluates choices according to their expected utility. However, this research largely focuses on abstract or hypothetical tasks and rarely investigates whether the outcome is successful and satisfying for the decision maker. Instead, we use an everyday decision making task in which participants describe a personally meaningful decision they are currently facing. We investigate the decision processes used to make this decision, and evaluate how successful and satisfying the outcome of the decision is for them. We examine how well analytic, attribute-based processes explain everyday decision making and predict decision outcomes, and we compare these processes to associative processes elicited through free association. We also examine the characteristics of decisions and individuals that are associated with good decision outcomes. Across three experiments we found that: 1) an analytic decision analysis of everyday decisions is not superior to simpler attribute-based processes in predicting decision outcomes; 2) contrary to research linking associative cognition to biases, free association generates valid cues that predict choice and decision outcomes as effectively as attribute-based approaches; 3) contrary to research favouring either attribute-based or associative processes, combining both attribute-based and associates best explains everyday decisions and most accurately predicts decision outcomes; and 4) individuals with a tendency to attempt analytic thinking do not make more successful everyday decisions. Instead, frequency, simplicity, and knowledge of the decision predict success. We propose that attribute-based and associative processes, in combination, both explain everyday decision making and predict successful decision outcomes.

It is a widely held view that people rely on incomplete information to find a relationship partner, resulting in non-compensatory choice heuristics. However, recent experimental work typically finds that partner choice follows compensatory choice strategies. To bridge this gap between theory and experimental evidence, we characterize the mate choice problem by distinguishing the information search process from the evaluation process. In an eye-tracking experiment and a MouseLab experiment, we show that people display strong value-directed search heuristics in response to all types of cues and that the magnitude of value-directed searches increases with cue primacy. Cue primacy also explains the interaction effect of cue type and participant sex on the extent of valued-directed search. We further argue that value-directed searching does not necessarily lead to non-compensatory choice rules but may serve compensatory decision-making. Our results demonstrate that people may adopt remarkably smart search heuristics to find an ideal partner efficiently.

This study compares Chinese people’s trust and trustworthiness, risk attitude, and time preference before and after the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in China. We compare the preferences of subjects in two online experiments with samples drawn from 31 provinces across mainland China before and after the onset of the pandemic. We test two competing hypotheses regarding trust and trustworthiness. On the one hand, the outbreak as a collective threat could enhance in-group cohesion and cooperation and thus increase trust and trustworthiness. On the other hand, to the extent that people expect their future income to decline, they may become more self-protective and self-controlled, and thus less trusting and trustworthy and more risk averse and patient. Comparing before and after the onset, we found that the subjects increased in trustworthiness. After the onset, trust and trustworthiness (and risk aversion and present bias too) were positively correlated with the COVID-19 prevalence rate in the provinces. Subjects with more pessimistic expectations about income change showed more risk aversion and lower discount rates, supporting the speculation concerning self-control.

We propose the concept of ‘scientific contagion’ — a mental heuristic through which any form of scientific treatment transfers some essence of ‘science’ to the processed substance, thereby affecting its nature and social acceptability. This was tested regarding the potential treatment of water from natural sources before it is used for religious purposes, as many such sources have dangerous pollutants. For an ancient natural well having a religious narrative, most participants judged that the acceptability of water would be reduced for religious purposes but not for drinking if local officials scientifically treat the water. That is not the case if religious rituals are conducted on the water instead (Study 1). If water from a “holy river” is processed scientifically, most participants predicted that it would reduce acceptability for religious use while increasing acceptability for drinking (Study 2). Potential scientific treatment without altering the composition of water from a natural spring also decreased acceptability for religious use but there was no effect on acceptability for drinking or on willingness to pay money for the water (Study 3). A follow-up study comparing acceptability for different kinds of water sources — from a holy well, natural spring, and household tap water sourced from either underground wells or rivers found lower acceptability for religious usage compared to drinking after potential scientific treatment for all these waters, but more so for holy and natural waters (Study 4). These studies establish the phenomena of scientific contagion that could have significant social implications and open future directions.

According to the positive time-discounting assumption of intertemporal decision-making, people prefer to undergo negative events in the future rather than in the present. However, negative discounting has been identified in the intertemporal choice and loss domains, which refers to people’s preference to experience negative events earlier rather than later. Studies have validated and supported the "anticipated dread" as an explanation for negative discounting. This study again explored the effect of anticipated dread on intertemporal choice using content analysis; that is, having participants identify anticipated dread among reasons for negative discounting. This study also validated the effect of anticipated dread on negative discounting by manipulating anticipated dread. This study adds empirical and direct evidence for the role of anticipated dread in negative discounting.

People often choose the option that is better on the most subjectively prominentattribute — the prominence effect. We studied the effect of prominence inhealth care priority setting and hypothesized that values related to healthwould trump values related to costs in treatment choices, even when individualsthemselves evaluated different treatment options as equally good. We conductedpre-registered experiments with a diverse Swedish sample and a sample ofinternational experts on priority setting in health care (n = 1348).Participants, acting in the role of policy makers, revealed their valuation fordifferent medical treatments in hypothetical scenarios. Participants weresystematically inconsistent between preferences expressed through evaluation ina matching task and preferences expressed through choice. In line with ourhypothesis, a large proportion of participants (General population: 92%, Experts84% of all choices) chose treatment options that were better on the healthdimension (lower health risk) despite having previously expressed indifferencebetween those options and others that were better on the cost dimension. Thus,we find strong evidence of a prominence effect in health-care priority setting.Our findings provide a psychological explanation for why opportunity costs(i.e., the value of choices not exercised) are neglected in health care prioritysetting.

Individuals often assess themselves as being less susceptible to common biases compared to others. This bias blind spot (BBS) is thought to represent a metacognitive error. In this research, we tested three explanations for the effect: The cognitive sophistication hypothesis posits that individuals who display the BBS more strongly are actually less biased than others. The introspection bias hypothesis posits that the BBS occurs because people rely on introspection more when assessing themselves compared to others. The conversational processes hypothesis posits that the effect is largely a consequence of the pragmatic aspects of the experimental situation rather than true metacognitive error. In two experiments (N = 1057) examining 18 social/motivational and cognitive biases, there was strong evidence of the BBS. Among the three hypotheses examined, the conversational processes hypothesis attracted the greatest support, thus raising questions about the extent to which the BBS is a metacognitive effect.