^{469 note 1} For Gotama or Gautama as the founder of Tarka-śāstra, see Naiṣadhacarita, bk. xvii, verse 75; Padma-purāṇa, Uttara-khaṇḍa, ch. 263; and Skanda-purāṇa, Kālikā-khanḍa, ch. xvii.

^{469 note 2} Some philosophical doctrines of the third and fourth centuries a.d. were incorporated into the Nyāya-sūtra of Akṣapāda by Vātsyāyana, the first commentator (about 400 a.d.), through the introduction of certain sūtras of his own making fathered upon Akṣapāda.

^{470 note 1} Pañcāvayava - yuktasya vākyasya guṇa - doṣavit (Mahābhārata, Sabhāparva, adhyāya 51, verse 5).

^{470 note 2} Auṣṇīkānantavāsāṁśca Romakān puruṣādakān (Mahābhārata, Sabhāparva, adhyāya 51, verse 16).

^{470 note 3} Vide the concluding verse of the Nyāya-bhāṣya (about 400 a.d.), the opening verse of the Nyāya-vārttika (about 630 a.d.), and the opening lines of the Nyāya-vārttika-tātparya-ṭīkā (about 976 a.d.).

^{470 note 4} Padma-purāṇa, Uttara-khaṇḍa, ch. 263.

^{470 note 5} Vide Weber, 's History of Indian Literature, p. 85.Google Scholar

^{470 note 6} Nyāya-koṣa, 2nd ed., Bombay.

^{471 note 1} The Brahmāṇḍa-purāṇa, published under the name of Vāyu-purāṇa by A. S. B., adhyāya 23, verses 201–3.

^{471 note 2} Seeing that the Greek word “Syllogismos” and the Sanskrit word “Saṁkhyā” or “Sāṁkhya” are identical in signification, one may say that Aristotle derived his doctrine of the Syllogism from the Sāṁkhya Philosophy of Kapila. But the Sāṁkhya Philosophy is not known to have dealt with the doctrine of the Syllogism at all.

^{471 note 3} Concerning the date of the Caraka-saṁhitā see Journal Amitique, torn, viii, pp. 447–51, 1896Google Scholar, where M. Sylvain Lévi maintains on the authority of Chinese books that Caraka, the author of the Carakasaṁhitā, lived at the Court of Kaniṣka [in Jālandhara, Punjab]. I provisionally take the date of Kaniṣka to be 78 a.d.

^{474 note 1} Concerning the age of Akṣapāda vide introduction to Daśapadārthī, translated by Mr. Ui and edited by Dr. F. W. Thomas (in the press).

^{477 note 1} Vide Vidyabhusana, S. C.'s Medieval School of Indian Logic, pp. 68, 73.Google Scholar

^{478 note 1} It is perhaps the view of Nāgārjuna and Maitreya, and surely also of Dignāga, that is referred to under the name of “Bauddha” in the Nyāya-vārttika, , 1, 1, 37.Google Scholar

^{478 note 2} Grote, George, in his Aristotle, vol. i, Analytica Priora, ii, ch. vi, p. 275Google Scholar, observes in a footnote as follows: “If we turn to ch. xxvii, p. 70, a. 30–4, we shall find Aristotle on a different occasion disallowing altogether the so-called sllogism from example.”

^{478 note 3} Sugiura, 's Hindu Logic as preserved in China and Japan, p. 32.Google Scholar

^{479 note 1} Vide Vidyabhusana, S. C.'s “Vātsyāyana, author of the Nyāyabhāsya” in the Indian Antiquary for 04, 1915.Google Scholar

^{479 note 2} Nyāyāvatāra (verse 20), edited by S. C. Vidyabhusana and published by the Indian Research Society, Calcutta. Siddhasena Divākara flourished about 500–33 a.d.Vide Vidyabhusana, S. C.'s Medieval School of Indian Logic, p. 15.Google Scholar

^{479 note 3} Vide Vidyabhusana, S. C.'s Medieval School of Indian Logic, p. 80.Google Scholar

^{480 note 1} Ran-don-ni

Tshul-gsum-rtag-las don-mthon-waho

(Pramāṇa-samuccaya, ch. ii, Tangyur, Mdo, xcv, fol. 5).

Gshan-gyi-don-gyi-rjes-dpag-ni

raṅ-gis-mthoṅ-don-gsal-byed-yin

(Pramāṇa-samuccaya, ch. iii, Tangyur, , Mdo, xcv, fol. 9).Google Scholar

^{480 note 2} Vide Tangyur, , Mdo, xcv, fol. 7.Google Scholar

^{480 note 3} Sādhyābhyupagamaḥ pakṣah (Nyāyāvatāra, verse 14, edited by S. C. Vidyabhusana). Sandigdha - sādhya - dharmatvam pakṣatvam (quoted in the Tattva-cintāmaṇi, anumāna-khaṇḍa, p. 407, Bibliotheca Indica).

^{481 note 1} Phyogs-kyi-chos-ñid-daṅ, (2) Mthun-pahi-phyogs-ñid-la-yod-par-ṅespa-daṅ, (3) Mi - mthun - pahi - phyogs - la-med - pa - ñid-du-ṅes - pa - yaṅ - ṅo (Dignāga's Nyāya-praveśa, Tangyur, , Mdo, xcv, fol. 183bGoogle Scholar).

^{482 note 1} Vide Vidyabhusana, S. C.'s Medieval School of Indiayi Logic, pp. 103–5.Google Scholar

^{482 note 2} Trīṇyeva ca liṅgāni, anupalabdhih svabhāva-kāryye ceti (Nyāyabindu, , ch. ii, p. 164Google Scholar, Bibliotheca Indica).

^{483 note 1} Dharmakīrti and his followers, who say that non-existence is inferred and not perceived, assume non-perception as a middle term (sign). But the majority of Indian logicians maintain that non-existence of a thing is perceived by the same sense by which the thing itself is perceived. Hence non-perception is not acknowledged by them as a middle term (sign).

^{484 note 1} Vide S. C. Vidyābhusana's “Uddyotakara, a contemporary of Dharmakīrti”, in JRAS., 07, 1914.Google Scholar

^{484 note 2} Liṅga-liṅgi-sambandha-darśanānantaraṁ liṅga-darśana-sambandhasmṛtibhir liṅga-parāmarśo viśiṣyate … Smṛtyanugṛhīto liṅga-parāmarśo 'numānam bhavati (Nyāya-vārttika, , 1, 1, 5, p. 47Google Scholar, Bibliotheca Indica).

^{484 note 3} DrGrote, George, in his Aristotle, vol. i, Analytica Priora, ch. vi, pp. 291–2Google Scholar, gives a lucid explanation of a sign.

^{484 note 4} DrGrote, George, in his Aristotle, vol. i, Analytica Priora, ch. vi, p. 292Google Scholare, states in a footnote as follows: “Aristotle throws in the remark (a. 24) that, when one premiss only of the Enthymeme is enunciated, it is a sign; when the other is added, it becomes a syllogism. In the examples given to illustrate the description of the Enthymeme that which belongs to the first figure has its three terms and two propositions specified, like a complete and regular syllogism.”

^{485 note 1} Tasmāt smṛtyanugṛhīto liṅga-parāmarśo 'bhīṣṭārtha-pratipādako bhavatīti (Nyāya-vārttika, , 1, 1, 5, p. 47Google Scholar, Bibliotheca Indica).

^{485 note 2} Tad idam antimam pratyaksam pūrvābhyām. Pratyakṣābhyāṁ smṛtyanugṛhyamāṇam parāmarśa-rūpam anumānam bhavati (Nyāyavārttika, , 1, 1, 5, p. 46Google Scholar, Bibliotheca Indica).

^{485 note 3} The Risalah Shamsyyah was published under the name of “The Logic of the Arabians” in the Bibliotheca Indica series by Dr. A. Sprenger.

^{485 note 4} Vide Huart, C.'s Arabic Literature, pp. 137, 280.Google Scholar

^{485 note 5} DrGrote, George, in his Aristotle, vol. i, Analytica Priora, i, ch. v, p. 206Google Scholar, says that Aristotle includes in a syllogism the two premises as well as the conclusion. But on the same page he quotes in a footnote the opinion of Julius Pacius (ad. Analyt. Prior i), who said that the syllogism consisted of the two premises alone, and the conclusion was not a part thereof, but something distinct and superadded.

^{486 note 1} Encydopœdia Britannica, 9th ed., vol. i, p. 498.Google Scholar

^{486 note 2} Ibid., vol. xviii. p. 599.

^{487 note 1} Vide Huart, 's Arabic Literature, p. 137.Google Scholar

^{488 note 1} SirGrant, Alexander's article on Aristotle in the Encyclopædia Britannica, 9th ed., vol. ii, p. 512.Google Scholar

^{488 note 2} Encyclopœdia Britannica, 9th ed., vol. i, p. 498.Google Scholar