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Two puzzles of judicial wagers

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 October 2021

Harald Wiese Open the ORCID record for Harald Wiese [Opens in a new window]
Harald Wiese*
Affiliation:
University of Leipzig, Postfach 920, D-04009 Leipzig, Germany Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

This paper is about an Old Indian judicial institution called paṇa (“wager”). Within a court proceeding, a judicial wager is a certain sum of money that a conflicting party offers to pay if he ends up losing his case. This paper explains the rationale of judicial wagers by showing that they may signal truthfulness.

Keywords

judicial wagerevidenceordealspooling equilibriumseparating equilibrium
Type
Article
Information
Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society , Volume 33 , Issue 1 , January 2023 , pp. 73 - 85
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of The Royal Asiatic Society

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