^{page 77 note 1} Toynbee, A. J., A Study of History (Oxford University Press, 1934–1954), 10 volsGoogle Scholar.

^{page 79 note 1} Toynbee, A. J., Armenian Atrocities (G. H. Doran, New York, 1915)Google Scholar.

^{page 79 note 2} Toynbee, A. J., Nationalism and the War (London: J. M. Dent and Sons, 1919)Google Scholar.

^{page 80 note 1} Lyberer, A. H., The Government of the Ottoman Empire in the Time of Suleiman the Magnificent, Harvard University Press, 1913CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Gibbons, H. A., The Foundation of the Ottoman Empire, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1916Google Scholar; Browne, E. G., A Literary History of Persia, Cambridge University Press, 1928, 4 volsGoogle Scholar.

^{page 80 note 2} Toynbee, A. J., The Western Question in Greece and Turkey (Houghton Mifflin, New York, 1923)Google Scholar.

^{page 80 note 3} Toynbee, A. J. and Kirkwood, K. P., Turkey (Scribner's Sons, New York, 1927)Google Scholar.

^{page 81 note 1} Melas, Major, Answer to a Libel, 1927Google Scholar.

^{page 81 note 2} Toynbee, A. J., Survey of International Affairs 1920–1923, vol. i (Oxford University Press, 1925)Google Scholar.

^{page 81 note 3} Cf. Samolin, William. The Turhisation of the Tarim Basin up to the Qara-Qylay, Ph.D. Dissertation (MSS.), Columbia University, 1953, pp. 16–21Google Scholar.

^{page 82 note 1} Nomads may, of course, be partly sedentary. But Toynbee ignores still another problem: the nomads influenced by sedentary peoples while still remaining beyond the periphera of a civilization. For the Near and Middle East particularly, cf. Barthold, V. V., Turkestan Down to the Mongol Invasion, 2nd ed. (Luzac and Co., London, 1958)Google Scholar, passim.

^{page 84 note 1} Lambton, E. G. A., Persian Grammar (Cambridge University Press, 1957), p. xiGoogle Scholar. Miss Lambton remarks that it is generally agreed among scholars that the best Persian poetry had been written prior to the thirteenth century.

^{page 84 note 2} Köprülü, F., “Türk Edebiyatina Umumî Bir Bakiş,” Birinci Türk Tarih Kongresi (T. C. Maarif Vekâleti, Istanbul, 1940), pp. 311–16Google Scholar.

^{page 84 note 3} Minorski, V., La Domination dts Dailamites (Librairie Ernest Le Roux, Paris), 1932, p. 1Google Scholar.

^{page 85 note 1} The Samanids, though ethnically Iranian, were under heavy Turkic influence. Toynbee's switch from a Syriac to Persian anterior culture involves him in contradictions, partly at least, because his basic argument contains the proposition that civilizations are singular and unique and cannot substantially influence one another. Thus, he is confronted with the impossible dilemma of choosing the one civilization which the Turks found when moving into the Abbasid area, whereas, in fact, they met the elements of several.

^{page 85 note 2} e.g., by Wittek, P., The Rise of the Ottoman Empire (Royal Asiatic Society, London, 1938), p. 23Google Scholar.

^{page 85 note 3} Inalcik, H., “Osmanli Tarihinin Devirleri” (MSS., Columbia University, 1958), p. 1Google Scholar.

^{page 86 note 1} Barthold, V. V., Turkestan, pp. 195 ffGoogle Scholar.

^{page 86 note 2} As quoted in Barthold, V. V., Four Studies on the History of Central Asia, (E. J. Brill, Leiden, 1956), vol. i, p. 60Google Scholar.

^{page 87 note 1} In general Toynbee ignores a basic element in dynastic politics among the Turks, namely, their tribal divisions and mutual antagonism, not to say hatreds, which often led to internecine conflicts. In this case it would be important, if not decisive, to point out that Timur was a Turki, the Ottomans were Oghuz and the Golden Horde were Kipchaq Turks.

^{page 88 note 1} Even in a Europe then remote from these circumstances, in assessing the political advantages and disadvantages of the slave system, Machiavelli could point out: “It would be difficult to acquire the state of the Turk; but having conquered it, it would be very easy to hold it. . . the causes of the difficulty of occupying the Turkish kingdom are that the invaders could not be invited by princes of that kingdom, nor hope to facilitate his enterprise by the rebellion of those near the ruler's person. . . because, being all slaves, and dependent, it will be more difficult to corrupt them, and even if they were corrupted, little effect could be hoped for, as they would not be able to carry the people with them.. . . Therefore whoever assaults the Turk. . . must rely more on his own strength than on the disorders of others; but once having conquered [the Turk]. . . nothing else is to be feared except the family of the prince, and if this be extinguished, there is no longer any one to be feared, others having no credit with the people; and as the victor before the victory could place no hope in them, so he need not fear them afterwards.” The Prince (New American Library, 1952), p. 49Google Scholar.

^{page 89 note 1} A. H. Lyberer, op. cit., and Miller, B., The Palace School of Muhammed the Conqueror (Harvard University Press, 1941)Google Scholar.

^{page 89 note 2} Gibb, H. A. R. and Bowen, H., Islamic Society in the 18th Century (Oxford University Press, 1950)Google Scholar; D'Ohsson, I., Tableau General de l'Empire Ottomane (Firmin Didot), 2 vols., 1787–1790Google Scholar.

^{page 89 note 3} The Janissaries never constituted more than a small percentage of the effective fighting force. Cf. H. I. Nalcῐk, op. cit., p. 28.

^{page 94 note 1} Hammer, J. Von, Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches (Pest, C. A. Hurtleben, 1827–1838), 10 volsGoogle Scholar.

^{page 96 note 1} Cf. Karal, E., “Tanzimattan Evvel Garphlaşma Hareketleri,” Tanzimat, Maarif Matbaasῐ, Istanbul, 1940, pp. 15–21Google Scholar; Karal takes the view that Westernization began as early as 1718, and as regards military reforms, even a generation before that.

^{page 96 note 2} Cf. Duda, H., Vom Kalifat zur Republik (Verlag für Jugend und Volk, Wien, 1948), pp. 15–50Google Scholarpassim.