^{page 137 note 1} Works, vol. i. pp. 139–150. See also Prof. Monier Williams, J.R.A.S. Vol. XIV. N.s. p. 304.

^{page 137 note 2} As the different systems are arranged in the Sarva D. S. according to their respective relation to the Vedânta, we can easily understand why Mâdhava there places these two systems so low down in the scale, and only just above the atheistic schools of the Chârvâkas, Buddhists, and Jainas.

^{page 138 note 1} No date is given.

^{page 138 note 2} Dr. Banerjea has quoted and translated several stanzas in his ‘Dialogues on Hindu Philosophy.’

^{page 139 note 1} B.

^{page 139 note 2} B.

^{page 139 note 3} B.

^{page 139 note 4} A.

^{page 139 note 5} A.

^{page 139 note 6} A.

^{page 140 note 1} B.

^{page 140 note 2} B.

^{page 141 note 1} B. (but not C.).

^{page 141 note 2} So A. C.; B.

^{page 141 note 3} B.

^{page 141 note 4} B.

^{page 141 note 5} B.

^{page 142 note 1}

^{page 142 note 2} B.

^{page 142 note 3} B.

^{page 142 note 4} B.

^{page 142 note 5} B.

^{page 143 note 1} A.

^{page 143 note 2} A.

^{page 143 note 3} A.

^{page 143 note 4} B.

^{page 144 note 1} A.

^{page 144 note 2} A.

^{page 144 note 3} B.

^{page 144 note 4} B.

^{page 144 note 5} B.

^{page 145 note 1} B.

^{page 145 note 2} A.; C.

^{page 145 note 3} A.

^{page 146 note 1} B.

^{page 147 note 1} B.

^{page 147 note 2} B.

^{page 147 note 3} A.

^{page 147 note 4} B.

^{page 148 note 1} B.om. sl. 74.

^{page 148 note 2} B.

^{page 148 note 3} B.

^{page 149 note 1} B.

^{page 149 note 2} A.

^{page 149 note 3} B.

^{page 149 note 4} B.

^{page 149 note 5} A.B.C. but in one Calcutta Ms. D. and in the Calcutta edition.

^{page 149 note 6} A.

^{page 150 note 1} B.

^{page 150 note 2} B.

^{page 150 note 1} B.

^{page 151 note 1} B.

^{page 151 note 2} B.

^{page 151 note 3} A.

^{page 151 note 4} A.; C.

^{page 151 note 5} Sic A.B.C.D.; (Qu. ).

^{page 152 note 1} A.

^{page 152 note 2} A.

^{page 152 note 3} A.

^{page 152 note 4} B.

^{page 152 note 5} B.

^{page 152 note 6} A.

^{page 153 note 1} A.

^{page 153 note 2} B.

^{page 153 note 3} B.

^{page 153 note 4} A.

^{page 153 note 5} B.

^{page 153 note 6} B.

^{page 154 note 1} B.

^{page 154 note 2} A.

^{page 154 note 3} A.

^{page 154 note 4} A.

^{page 154 note 5} A.

^{page 154 note 6} B.C.

^{page 154 note 7} So A.C.; but B. The reading muktâ seems more likely to be the original and yuktâ the later alteration.

^{page 154 note 8} B.C.

^{page 155 note 1} The Bengali translation explains these as the internal powers (antarangû) Hlâdinî, etc., and the external (bahiraṅgâ) Prahvâ, etc.

^{page 155 note 2} There is a favourite Naiyâyik example of a kevalânvayi middle term, “a jar is nameahle because it is cognizable as a web is.”

^{page 155 note 3} Or vedavishaye may perhaps simply mean vede, cf. śl. 112.

^{page 155 note 4} The author here explains the sentence tat tvam asi, as really meaning tasya tvam asi “thou art Its.”

^{page 155 note 5} In “Thou art that,” ‘thou’ and ‘that’ would refer to the same subject (sâmûnâdhikaranya).

^{page 156 note 1} This is often used as an illustration in Vedânta works, as e.g. Brihad Ârany. Up. ii. 1. 20, “as the spider proceeds with his web, as the little sparks proceed from fire, so from this Soul proceed all vital airs, all worlds, all gods, all beings.”

^{page 156 note 2} This is another suggested method of interpreting the words “I am Brahman.” It may be only a common case of “qualified superimponent indication,” as “the man of the Panjâb is an ox” (cf. Kâvya Prakâśa, ii. 10–12). Cf. the definition of upacâra in the Sâhitya Darpana: upachâro hi nâmâtyantam viśakalitayoh śâdriśyâtiśayamahimnâ bhedapratîlisthaganamâtram.

^{page 157 page 1} DrBanerjea, (Dialogues, p. 379)Google Scholar reads kadâpy atyayajñânam, i.e. vyabhichâra; but all the MSS. which I have compared read na kadâ vyatyaya (or vyatyayam) iñûnam; kadâ seems irregularly used for kadâpi, as it is also in śl. 113, c.

^{page 158 note 1} In such sentences as “That art thou,” “I am Brahman,” etc., the primary power of the words, i.e. “Denotation” (abhidhâ), could not express the unconditioned Brahman destitute of all attributes; for Denotation rests upon the ordinary conventional meaning, and how could this take in an idea so far removed from ordinary experience? Nor could it be the secondary power “Indication” (lakshanâ), as in the well-known instance of “the herd-station on the Ganges,” where the Ganges, by “indication,” means the shore and not the stream. For “indication” must be based on some connexion between the primary and the indicated secondary meaning; but how can that which is “without a second” be connected with anything?

^{page 158 note 2} I supose that these are (1) the incompatibility of the primary sense; (2) the common currency of the secondary meaning, e.g. when “Europe” is used to imply its inhabitants in the phrase “Europe makes war;” (3) a motive, as in “a herd-station on the Ganges,” where “Ganges” is used instead of “the bank of the Ganges,” in order to imply the coolness and purity of the spot.

^{158 note 3} Cf. the Bengali proverb mâthâ nâi târ mâthâbyathâ, “he has no head and yet he has a headache.”

^{page 159 note 1} In the first ex. there is śuddha-sâropa-lakshaṅâ or “pure superimponent indication,” in the second there is śuddha-sâdhyavasâna-ī. or “pure introsusceptive indication,” where the ghî is swallowed up in the “life.” Most writers, however, disallow upachâra in śuddha-lakshanâ.

^{page 159 note 2} He seems to imply that each of these three requisites fails in the present case,—there is no primary meaning, and still less a secondary, and there is no connexion with any other object.

^{page 159 note 3} He now proceeds to declare his own opinions.

^{page 159 note 4} Taitt. Upanish. ii. 4.

^{page 160 note 1} Cf. the Katha Up. vi. 12, “The soul is not to be reached by speech nor by the mind nor by the eye.”

^{page 160 note 2} For skhaladguli, cf. Kâvyaprakâśa, ii. 16.

^{page 160 note 3} This line is quoted from S'ruti in the Maitri Upanishad, vi. 22.

^{160 note 4} Cf. Sâhityadarpana, ii. “On the old man's saying, when giving directions to the middle-aged man,” etc. The Sâhitya D. uses the terms âuâpoddhârau, the Siddhântamuktâvalî (p. 80) uses âeâpodvâpau.

^{page 160 note 5} This is one of the tenets of Râmânujas as well as Pûrṇaprajñas.

^{page 160 note 6} The vyâpâra or intermediate agency is defined as taj-janyatve sati taj-janyajanako hi vyâpârah.

^{page 161 note 1} Compare the memorial line, S'okamohau jarâmrityûu kshutpipâse shadûrmayaḥ.

^{page 161 note 2} With this curious use of akartum (extending the analogy of such forms as akurvan, akṛitvâ, etc.) cf. Theognis, 621:

πς τις πλοσιον ἄνδρα τίɛι ατίɛι δ πɛνιχρν

Cf. Shilleto, , Cambridge Journ. of Philology, 1876, p. 161Google Scholar.

^{page 161 note 3} Could loke mean that it will hold good “of the world” as his body?

^{page 161 note 4} Cf. “Whose body nature is and God the soul.”

^{page 161 note 5} I.e. he creates the world to give their deserts to the different souls.

^{page 161 note 6} The objector urges “why should our good or evil deserts oblige God to act in a certain way?” He answers by referring to the well-known legend given in the Bhâgavata Purâna, viii. ch. 2–4. A certain king, named Indradyumna, became an elephant through Agastya's curse. One day, while drinking in a lake, he was seized by a crocodile, and the struggle lasted for a thousand years. At last, in despair, he prayed to Vishya, who came down mounted on Garuda and killed the crocodile. Thus we see that, although in one sense the deserts of one being cannot attach themselves to another, still they must cause certain actions in another being, or it would be impossible that each should receive its due reward or punishment.

^{page 162 note 1} These six qualities, according to the Commentator on the Bhâgavata P. i. 3. 36, are sovereignty, knowledge, glory, prosperity, dispassion, and virtue; a different list is given in the Sarva Darś. S. p. 54,1. 22 (but cf. p. 69,1. 18). See also infra in s'l. 95.

^{page 162 note 2} Rig V. i. 164, 20, “Two birds associated together, two friends, take refuge in the same tree; one of them eats the sweet fig; the other, abstaining from food, merely looks on.”

^{page 163 note 1} Another reading is brahmany âtwianirîkshanât.

^{page 163 note 2} I.e. it would be always videre videniem.

^{page 163 note 3} Cf. Hitopadeśa, Introd. śl. 45.

^{page 163 note 4} In Vedânta S. i. 2. 4, it is shown that certain passages in the Upanishads refer to Brahman and not the embodied soul, “because of the aplication therein of the terms object and agent;” as e.g. in the passage of the Chhândogya Upan. iii. 14, “I shall attain it when I have departed from hence.” These words imply an agent who attains and also an object which is attained, i.e. Brahman. S'ankara in his comment on i. 2. 11 illustrates this by the passage in the Katha Upanishad iii. 1, “The two, drinking the due reward from their works, in this world entered the cave, in the highest place of the supreme soul” (sc. the heart).

^{page 163 note 5} Cf. Vedânta Sûtras i. 2. 6, where S'ahkara quotes the passage from the Bhagavad Gîtâ (xviii. 61), “The Lord of all beings abides in the region of the heart,—causing all beings to revolve by his illusion as though mounted on a machine.”

^{page 163 note 6} He uses this very expression upâsyopâsakalâva in his Comment, on i. 2. 4.

^{page 164 note 1} I.e. in the word jívâtmâtmânau.

^{page 164 note 2} I supose that this means that the dvandva compound drishadupala has some analogy to one like jîvâtmânau, which involves identity, as the uper and lower millstone form one instrument; hut there (in accordance with Pân. 2. 2. 34, vârtt.) the less important word meaning the uper and smaller stone (upalâ) is placed last (of. 2. 2. 31).

^{page 164 note 3} But jîvâimanâu is a dvandva, not a karmadhâraya compound.

^{page 164 note 4} Brihad Âranyaka Upan. v. 12. 1.

^{page 164 note 5} I.e.this is one of the modes of worshiping Brahman by meditating on him in some lower visible form, not as really expressing his real nature.

^{page 166 note 1} Colebrooke's Essays, vol. i. p. 359.

^{page 167 note 2} This is an attack on Râmânuja's system, as oposed to that of Pûrnapraifña or Madhva, cf. Sarva-darśana S. p. 52,1. 20, “What is the real truth? The real truth is plurality, unity, and both. Thus unity is admitted in saying that Brahman alone subsists in all forms as all is its body; both unity and plurality are admitted in saying that one only Brahman subsists under a plurality of forms, diverse as soul and non-soul; and plurality is admitted in saying that the essential natures of soul, non-soul, and the Lord are different and not to be confounded.” This doctrine is oposed by the followers of Madhva, see ibid., Purnaprajña-darś. p. 61, 1. 11.

^{page 167 note 1} I.e. those affecting the three “humours” of the body, i.e. vâyu ‘wind,’ pitta ‘bile,’ and kapha ‘phlegm.’ Certain flavours of the honey counteract one disorder and others another. The Suśruta thus describes honey (vol. i. p. 185): “When cooked it removes the three-fold disorders, but when raw or sour it causes them; when used in various aplications it cures many disorders; and since it is composed of many different things it is an excellent medium for mixing. But as it consists of the juices of flowers which are mutually contrary in the action, potency, and qualities of their various ingredients, and it may haven that poisonous insects may be included, it is only good as a remedy for cold diseases.”

^{page 167 note 2} In allusion to Muṇḍ. Upan. iii. 2. 8.

^{page 167 note 3} Most of the MSS. and the Benares Paṇḍit read kshîroda; but the Calcutta ed. and one of the two MSS. in the Library of the Calcutta Sanskrit College read kshâroda, which seems preferable. If we read kshîroda, the. line would require to be rendered, “but from the difference between milk mixed with water and pure water,” or perhaps “from the difference between the milk-ocean and the water-ocean.”

^{page 167 note 4} Cf. S'akunt. ś1. 165.

^{page 168 note 1} Bhâg. Pur. iii. 28. 41.

^{page 168 note 2} The name śûnyavâda is generally alied to Buddhism; here it is alied by way of reproach to the Vedânta, which is called in the Padma-purâṇa “secret Buddhism” (prachchhonnaṃ Bauddham).

^{page 168 note 3} Mahâbh. xii. 9690.

^{page 168 note 4} This dialogue occurs in Mahâbh. xii. 9604, ff.

^{page 168 note 5} The Râmânujas and the Mâdhvas deny that the Supreme Being is nirguṇa, — thus there is a quotation in the Sarva Darśana S. p. 54, “Vâsudeva is the supreme Brahman, endowed with auspicious attributes” (cf. p. 69,1.18; p. 73,1. 2).

^{page 169 note 1} This is the prastara or bundle of sacred grass, which plays an important part in the sacrificial ritual, cf. Taittirîya S. i. 7. 4, “yajamânarah prastarah,” where Sâyana remarks, “yajamânavad yâgasâdhanatvÂt prastare yajamânatvopaehârah.” This description of the grass as the sacrificer is really only meant as metaphorical praise, since the actual attributes of the sacrificer are evidently absent from the grass. (Cf. Mîmâmsâ Sûtras, i. 4. 23.)

^{page 169 note 2} Clearer insight abolishes imagined attributes, as e.g. the suosed snake in the rope; but real attributes remain untouched, and we hold Brahman's attributes to be real.—I read abâdhaḥ in 1. 2.

^{page 170 note 1} I do not know where this passage occurs, but the kindred word satyadharman is applied to several deities in the Rigveda.

^{page 170 note 2} The Vedântins hold that nothing exists besides Brahman; and yet, although they thus deny the existence of any other thing or quality, they hold that certain qualities are imagined to exist in him, forgetting that only one who has seen silver can imagine rajatatva in nacre.

^{page 170 note 3} It is a favourite doctrine of the Vedânta that ignorance, as being imagined by ignorance, is itself false.

^{page 170 note 4} Manu, i. 80, “There are numberless Manvantaras, creations and destructions numberless; the being supremely exalted performs all this, as in sport, again and again.”

^{page 171 note 1} Or this may mean “since Vishnu has accepted it as the instrument of his sport.”

^{page 171 note 2} ‘The prasâda is any article of food that has been consecrated by previous presentation to an idol, after which it is distributed among the worshi ers on the spot, or sent to persons of consequence at their own houses” (Wilson's Works, vol. l. p. 116). Cf. also the legend in p. 134, where “Râm Dâs at noon halted and bathed the god, and prepared his food, and presented it, and then took the prasâd, and put it in a vessel, and fed upon what remained.” (The food consecrated at the temple of Puri is especially called the Mahâprasâda.) There is a distich current among the Bhâktas:

jñânain nirâkṇitir, Brahmâ tyalttvâ bhaktyâ bhajâehyutam |

yatra prasûdsevâpi bhaktir anyasya kû kathâ ∥

“Knowledge is rejection; abandon Brahman and worship Vishnu. Here where even the homage paid to the prasâda counts as faith, what need to mention anything besides?” Thus the devotee does everything by faith, and dispassion and enjoyment are to him alike swallowed up in faith.

^{page 171 note 3} But the true devotee is neither devoted to enjoyment nor to dispassion, is equally apart from and superior to both.

^{page 172 note 1} Cf. Sarva D.S. p. 52, 1. 8 infr. “The statements that the Supreme Spirit is devoid of qualities, are intended to deny his possession of phenomenal qualities [such as liking, disliking, etc.].”

^{page 172 note 2} Cf. the śloka in the prologue of the Mâlatîmâdhava.

^{page 173 note 1} Or “the necklace of the pearls of truth.”