^{page 856 note 1} Strauss, O., VOJ. xxvii, p. 257Google Scholar, gave a lead in this direction but did not follow up the implications latent in the points he made and no one else has pursued the line further. The references I give were collected and my views worked out in complete independence of his. I would argue on these lines against Edgerton's, thesis, AJP. xlv, p. 32 ff.Google Scholar, that the term Sāṁkhya has no definite philosophical significance in the Upaniṣads and the epics. I use puruṣa for soul without prejudice to the question whether there was a radical difference between the doctrines of early and classical Sāṁkhya on this subject.

^{page 857 note 1} So Roer and Hauschild; read ṣaḍbhir.

^{page 857 note 2} The eightfold buddhi of MBh. iii, 64, a lateish passage, is presumably a reference to the latter group; but otherwise I know no reference which does not seem to be certainly later than the SK.

^{page 859 note 1} For further references see Jacob's Concordance.

^{page 860 note 1} Cf. Jacobi, loc. cit., p. 605, on the originaf meaning of praṇidhāna.

^{page 861 note 1} The expression recurs at MBh. i, 6881, and vii, 4685; for my interpretation, cf. the similar idea, detailed explicitly, at vii, 9499; should nimitta not have the same meaning in the passage from Vācaspati translated by Jacobi, loc. cit., p. 600?

^{page 862 note 1} As srotas is also used of the secretions of the body, the alternative explanation is possible that the reference is to the idea that from each organ of sense proceeds an imperceptible essence which effects contact with the object of perception and transmits to its organ a corresponding sensation, but this would not affect the point under discussion.

^{page 865 note 1} The theory of the antaḥkaraṇa was perhaps adopted by Iśvarakṛṣṇa from Yoga sources; cf. Jacobi's discussion of citta, loc. cit., p. 587.

^{page 866 note 1} The explanation of the Ṣaṣṭitantra as consisting of the group of fifty already mentioned plus ten maulikārihas (authorities discussed by Jacobi, loc. cit., p. 586, n. 4) seems to me grossly improbable. The summary in this Pañcarātra work is apparently older than any of the sources for the other view and is on the face of it quite possible, though proof of its correctness is lacking. See Keith, op. cit., ch. v.

^{page 868 note 1} The wording of Nyāyasūtra, i, 15, suggests this, not the later, theory as being laid down there.

^{page 868 note 2} See O. Strauss, loc. cit., p. 273, on this passage.

^{page 869 note 1} Vyāsa, and Miśra, Vācaspati on Yogasūtra, ii, 19Google Scholar, call the eleven senses and the gross elements viśeṣa as being only vikāra, while ahaṁkāra and the subtile elements are classed as aviśeṣa on the ground of their being a cause of vikāra. Earlier literature does not support this use of the word.

^{page 869 note 2} For these views see Oldenberg, , Die Weltanschauung der Brahmaṇa texts, 1919, pp. 32–99Google Scholar, and in particular pp. 58–62, and for Chāndogya Up., vi, Jacobi, , Die Entwickelung der Gottesidee bei den Indern, 1923, pp. 11 ff.Google Scholar Cf. also Jacobi's explanation of the origin of the Mimāṁsaka, doctrine of the eternity of the conneetion between śabda and artha, Indian Studies in Honour of C. R. Lanman, p. 158Google Scholar; similarly Strauss, O., ZDMG. 81, p. 150Google Scholar.

^{page 870 note 1} But otherwise Jacobi, , Ueber das ursprüngliche Yogasystem, p. 608 ff.Google Scholar, who holds this to be one of the original points of distinction between the two schools.

^{page 871 note 1} Cf. Mahābhāṣya, i, 246, 2=ii, 198, 5, and ii, 366, 14.

^{page 873 note 1} Cf. Jacobi, loc. cit., p. 593 ff., for the history of the kleśa group and my remarks above on pañcaparvām. Similarly in the Pali canon no kilesa group occurs till the time of the Abhidhamma literature and the word is practically unknown to the Nikāyas.

^{page 874 note 1} Cf. W. D. P. Hill's and R. Garbe's translations. I incline to think that adhiṣṭhāna stands for buddhi, which is often described as the adhiṣṭāna of puruṣa, kartṛ for ahaṁkāra and karaṇa for mind and the ten senses. If this is correct, ceṣṭā would stand for the objects of the senses and daiva for the elements. Otherwise Edgerton, , AJP. xlv, 18Google Scholar.

^{page 875 note 1} Is the thoroughness with which Iśvarakṛṣṇa applies the guṇa theory throughout the range of evolution an original feature of Sāṁkhya philosophy? Did not the gunas at first play a more modest part? The answer to these questions lies outside the scope of the present paper.

^{page 877 note 1} Cf. Pāṇini, 2, 3, 21.

^{page 878 note 1} Note also the parallelism with these passages of Pali vijanavāta, which simply means “solitary and windless”.