^{page 307 note 1} 1–23 leaves, of which 5, 8–14 and 22 are missing.

^{page 307 note} There is a commentary on our text by Ajitamitra, to be found in the same volume of the bsTan agyur.

^{page 308 note 1} In the course of this paper, the following abbreviations are used: TSP. = Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā, of Kamalaśīla (Gaekwad's Oriental Series); PP. = Prasannapadä by Candrakīrti the commentary upon the Mūlamādhyamikakārikā (Bibliotheca Buddhica); BCAP. = Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā (Bibliotheca Indica).

^{page 308 note 2} Ekāntakalyāṇa means, as the commentator explains, that it is ādimadhyāntakalyāṇa that is propitious from beginning to end.

2 b. restored after the Tibetan rgyal po k'yod la c'os bsgrub pai p'yir.

^{page 308 note 3} The way to salvation is represented by the Transcendental Wisdom, prajñā, the teaching of which cannot be imparted to those who are not yet ripe to receive it. The puṇya-saṃbhāra, or moral purification, must therefore always precede the investigation of the śūnyatā, viz. the doctrine of the non-existence of independent things. Later schools of Mahāyāna will also state that the path to salvation is twofold, in so far as it consists of upāya praxis and prajñā. For Nāgārjuna, the upāya is not yet karuṇā, as in the mystic sects alluded to, but chiefly śraddhā, faith, upon which he largely insists in his Ta che tu lun, the big commentary upon the Prajñā-pāramitā. We have in either case a single path divided into two moments differently called:—

^{page 309 note 1} Tatra mokṣo restored from Tibetan: de la mṅon mt'o bde ba ste ṅes par legs pa t'ar par adod. As suggested by the commentator, the real meaning is that abhyudaya is not happiness, nor is naiḥśreyasa final emancipation, but rather happiness and emancipation are to be understood as the result of them.

^{page 309 note 2} From here up to verse 24, śraddhā, viz. its effect, I mean the practice of the law is described, which coincides with abhyudaya. Chanda, dveṣa, bhaya and moha are symbolized by the four Māras who keep away men from the observance of the moral rules as laid down in the law.

^{page 310 note 1} The parīkṣa consists in examining whether a certain karman is moral, kuśala, immoral, akuśala, or indifferent, avyākṛta. Then the man is in a state of complete consciousness and presence of spirit, which is called the saṃprajanya or apramāda. This parīkṣā is expounded in the following ślokas.

^{page 310 note 2} Up to adultery, the author enumerates the three bodily actions to be avoided; then the four vāk-karman, and, in the first half of śloka 9, the three mental actions, altogether the ten abstentions from immoral deeds.

^{page 310 note 3} Tibetan:—

c'ags daṅ gnod sems med pa la |

ñid kyi lta ba yoṅs spaṅ ba ||

adi dag las lam dkar bcu ste |

^{page 310 note 4} The secondary injunctions are here enumerated.

^{page 311 note 1} MS. not clear. Tibetan:—

lus gduṅ byed pa aba'žig las |

c'os med adi Itar de yis ni ||

This śloka is directed against the yoga-practices of those sects in whose minds dharma consisted chiefly in severe asceticism and penances, viz. Ājīvakas and Nirgranthas.

^{page 311 note 2} Having thus expounded the very essence of the law, the author shows the vipāka or consequence of karman, so that everybody may be careful about the parīkṣa of what he is doing; śloka 13, a, b.

Restored from Tibetan:—

ak'or bai abrog ni mi bzad pai |

mt'a' yas skye ba ŝin can du |;

godaṇḍaka is for: gokaṇṭaka

^{page 311 note 3} Restored from Tibetan: byi bo byed pas dgra daṅ bcas. This śloka expounds the vipāka of immoral bodily actions; the śloka 14th, that of actions derived from one's own speech, the 15th, that of mental actions.

^{page 312 note 1} Bad conditions of existence are: rebirth in the hells, among beasts and ghosts. According to the Abhidharma the effect of our actions is, in fact, triple: the first is rebirth in the various conditions of existence according to the karman of a previous life; the second is an effect of compensation, viz. the necessity of undergoing the same experiences of which we have been the cause to others; the third effect affects the entourage and the physical surroundings in which we shall have a rebirth. “Colour” means also “caste”.

^{page 313 note 1} Now Nāgārjuna expounds what is salvation and the way which leads to it, viz. prajñā, whose essence consists in the doctrine of the voidness of everything and which, on account of its depth, is likely to fill with fear those who are not yet fit to hear it. Therefore the teaching of Buddha is always based upon the knowledge of the moral and mental preparation of his disciples and hearers, upāya-kauśalya.

25, c. is restored from Tibetan: byis pa t'os daṅ mi Idan pa. So in the commentary, while the text of the kārikās has wrongly daṅ mig Idan pa.

^{page 314 note 1} This verse is quoted in TSP., p. 866, and BCAP., p. 449.

^{page 314 note 2} For the wise man there is no fear, because, having realized the truth of this doctrine, he gets over any attachment to the idea of the personality or of something belonging to it, and therefore the saṃsāra, which is the first cause of fear, vanishes for him. But for the others—as explained in the following śloka—the saṃsāra will continue to exist, in so far it is a mere creation of their wrong assumption of a personality and of the existence of things.

^{page 314 note 3} The sentence: “From the point of view of the absolute truth” implies that the ego, etc., may be said to exist only from the point of view of the conventional worldly truth, samvṛti, loka, vyavahāra-satya.

^{page 314 note 4} The five groups are, as known, rūpa, vedanā, saṃjñā, saṃskāra, and vijñāna. Arthataḥ is, according to the commentator, to be taken in the sense of paramārthataḥ. The verse is quoted, as taken from the Ratnāvalī, by Candraḳīrti PP., pp. 346 and 458. The author wants to demonstrate that the notion of the groups is dependent upon that of personality and vice versa, so that neither is self-existent.

^{page 315 note 1} This śloka is also quoted in PP., pp. 346 and 458. Verses 31–4 are quoted by Candrakīrti in PP., p. 345.

^{page 316 note 1} It is not produced by itself on account of two laws admitted by Nāgārjuna and his followers, viz. that of abhūtvā abhāva and that of svātmani virodhāt. Whatever was in a previous moment non-existent is devoid of self-existence and therefore cannot come to existence by its own agency; nor can existence be active upon itself. It cannot be produced by another, because the idea of cause is equally an antinomy; in fact the cause is such, only in relation to its effect. But, then, as long as the effect is not produced it is absurd to speak of cause, and, if this cause is non-existent, a fortiori the effect will be non-existent.

The third antinomy: “neither by itself nor by another,” is evident, being the consequence of the two others. To the refutation of the idea of time Nāgārjuna has dedicated the second chapter of his Mādhyamikakārikās. The meaning is that it is not produced in the past, because whatever is past is no longer active, nor in the future, because it would be like the birth of a child from a barren woman, nor in the present because the present has no duration. The conclusion of this is that it is impossible to demonstrate either that there is a producer or that there is a thing produced.

^{page 317 note 1} The place where there is nothing to be feared is nirvāṇa, which is suppression of the personality.

^{page 317 note 2} The sentence: “All this” is the whirl of cause and effect. The nirvāṇa referred to is evidently the aupaniṣadic nirvāṇa. The author asks supposed opponent why, though going after the aupaniṣadic nirvāṇa, which is suppression of every personality, is he, nevertheless, unwilling to accept this doctrine which makes the realization of nirvāṇa possible in this very life.

^{page 317 note 3} Now Nāgārjuna, having referred to nirvāṇa, states, in order to avoid any misunderstanding, that nirvāṇa which he describes is not like the nirvāṇa of the other schools, but it is beyond the notion of existence and non-existence. The verse is quoted in PP., p. 525.

^{page 318 note 1} Up to this point Nāgārjuna has denied the existence of every thing; so. the objection of the opponent, viz. that his doctrine is simple nihilism must be expected. The author therefore meets this argument and after defining what are, according to him, nihilism and realism, shows that his system is neither of them.

^{page 318 note 2} Of course, the notion of cause belongs to the saṃvṛtisatya, viz. to the relative truth, because, as stated in the following verse, from the paramārtha point of view, viz. from the point of the absolute truth, the notion of cause is absurd.

^{page 319 note 1} Since the cause is called a cause in so far as it produces an effect, if it exists before the production of this effect, that cause cannot be the cause of this effect, because it would have no relation to it.

^{page 319 note 2} a, b is quoted in PP., p. 10, where we read: hrasve dīrghaṃ yathā sati; the Tibetan supposes dīrghe hrasvaṃ yathā sati. riṅ po yod pas t'uṅ du bžin. c, d—almost effaced; Tibetan: adi skyes pas na adi skyes dper. Here Nāgārjuna states that if the notion of cause and effect is antinomical, the origin of things can only be explained according to the law of the pratītyasamutpāda, viz. of relativity.

^{page 319 note 3} The same must be understood as regards the notion of “short” and that of “lamp”. In the sphere of material experience things are interrelated, though, from the standpoint of the absolute truth, they are devoid of any essence.

^{page 320 note 1} The verses 52–4 are quoted by Candrakīrti, PP., p. 347, as from the Ācāryapāda, the verses 55–6 are quoted by Candrakīrti as taken from the Ratnāvalī, PP., p. 188.

^{page 320 note 2} Because he did not yet realize that it was a mirage which he saw, and water, therefore, is out of question.

^{page 321 note 1} That is, it is impossible to affirm existence or non-existence, because this affirmation implies logically its contrary.

^{page 321 note 2} Of course, all this from the standpoint of absolute truth, not from that of conventional truth. Nihilism is in fact, affirmation of a negation, but for Nāgārjuna truth is beyond either negation or affirmation.

^{page 321 note 3} Quoted in PP., p. 275, as taken from the Ratnāvalī.

^{page 323 note 1} Verses 68–70 are quoted, as taken from the Madhyamakasiddhānta, by Candrakīrti in PP., p. 546.

If things are always changing, they have no time to become old; if there is no change, there is also no oldness, but things would be eternally new.

^{page 323 note 2} Tri is not in the quotation by Candrakīrti, but is found in the Tibetan text as well as in the commentary thereon; tri refers to beginning, middle, and end.

^{page 323 note 3} This verse meets the possible objection, viz. that, if there is no instant, as it is not simple, but complex as being composed of three moments, then the instant would be implicitly represented by these three moments, into which the instant has been decomposed. The answer of Nāgārjuna is that they also, if they are something real, must be composed of other moments, and so there would be regressus in infinitum. Moreover, the fact or the condition of being beginning, middle, and end is, from the absolute point of view, illogical because it is not by itself, which would be contradictory, nor by another cause, because, in this way, there would not be the necessary connection between the cause and its effect, which is the fundament of the causal relation. So, as demonstrated in the following śloka, everything has only a relative existence.

^{page 324 note 1} Having shown that the atom or the instant cannot be conceived as being composed of more elementary moments or as having a dimension, the author shows that they cannot be also considered to be a unity, because unity is not conceivable without relation to plurality, and plurality is not conceivable without relation to unity. Therefore, since existence and non-existence are, in fact, impossible to be conceived, even nirvāṇa cannot be considered as the non-existence of this world.