When I first began the serious study of the history of economic thought, my presumption was that one should always start at the beginning. This was some thirty-five years ago and I have been finding so much interesting material that I have had a hard time getting past Adam Smith. The search for the beginning, of course, led me to the question of what do we mean by economic thought and how do we define it for the purpose of identifying its origin?.

William Stanley Jevons (1835–1882) was one of the great Victorian polymaths. His published writing spans chemistry, meteorology, geology, astronomy, geometry, physiology, political economy, sociology, logic and the philosophy of science. The extraordinary range and volume of this output was not the result of dabbling in the tradition of the Victorian “gentleman scientific amateur.” Dependent in large part on extensive experimental practice, Jevons's work was published in prominent physics journals and his Principles of Science (1874) was considered by one physicist to be a state of the art summary of scientific method and principles (Clifford, 1875, p. 480). Jevons's versatility was evident throughout his life. His article on “reflected rainbows,” which drew on a controversy in art and optics, was published in the month of his death.

This article examines the literature on the periodical recurrence of economic crises up to the 1840s, illustrating how awareness of this phenomenon was far more widespread than the few existing histories of business cycle theories indicate, that observations of this phenomenon began much earlier than previously documented, and also that early writers were more interested in emphasizing the intermittent return of crises rather than their precise timing.

Does neoclassical economic theory embody a specific politics? A century of uneasy bromides have done little to seriously clarify the issue, perhaps because of a tendency to confuse the various levels of specificity at which an answer might be tendered and defended. At its most abstract and general, the response must surely be: a few equations imperfectly cribbed from rational mechanics need have no special affinity with any political position whatsoever, as long as sufficient ingenuity is expended in their interpretation and elaboration. Yet, at a slightly less elevated level, the question as to whether individual neoclassical economists put forth arguments that supported various political programs cannot be answered in any other manner but the airmative. Walras thought it underwrote a limited conception of state ownership of land; Pareto thought it resonated with a sour cynicism about the circulation of elites; Hayek began by thinking it helped explain an anti-statist position; Milton Friedman believed it the economics of Dr. Pangloss. But this raises the further question: Is there anything intrinsic to the doctrine that biases it toward one political orientation or another? This question can only be addressed at the very specific level of individual cultural formations at well-demarcated historical junctures.

There are three different interpretations of Adam Smith’s trade theory in modern literature: first, the neoclassical theory of absolute advantage; second, an interpretation based on increasing returns; third, an interpretation of uneven development. These interpretations come to widely different conclusions, especially considering the development of the pattern of trade in Smith’s theory. I discuss how these three interpretations emerged. They do not stem from a more detailed analysis of Smith’s works itself but reflect changes within international trade theory. They all result from the fact that economists have imposed nineteenth- and twentieth-century modes of thoughts on Smith’s theory, forcing his writings into later-developed theoretical frameworks. In contrast to classical economists in the nineteenth century, these subsequent interpretations misrepresent Smith’s trade theory in order to portray him as a forerunner of later theories. The differing interpretations can thus be explained only against the backdrop of the development of international trade theory.

Jean-Baptiste Say’s notion of débouchés has not been correctly understood, due to the lack of proper context within the framework of his broader political economy. We revisit Say’s writings on this topic, retrace the concept’s evolution, and lay out a framework that better illustrates the essence of Say’s thinking. We argue that Say’s theories on money and economic crises are much richer and more sophisticated than the traditional interpretation of Say’s Law would suggest. Say himself acknowledged that his monetary theory contradicted his initial articulations of the law, a point often missed by contemporary observers. This essay paints a more complete picture of Say’s work, showing how monetary changes could, under his framework, affect real variables. In so doing, it cuts against the many simplistic interpretations that pervade the existing literature on the subject.

Spanning sixty years, from 1927 to 1987, Gunnar Myrdals work is both extensive and diversified. Aside from theoretical economics, it embraces many other fields such as sociology,

The Modern Archives, King's College, Cambridge University contain a carbon copy of a three-page single spaced manuscript with the title “A Passage From The Autobiography of an Analytical Economist” (RFK/16/2/134–139, hereinafter “Autobiography”). Joan Robinson's initials are typed at the end of the document, which is dated October 1932.

In October 1932, Heffer, the Cambridge University student bookstore, published Joan Robinson's methodological pamphlet, Economics is a Serious Subject, and she delivered the manuscript of The Economics of Imperfect Competition to Macmillan (Joan Robinson to Richard Kahn, October 30, 1932, RFK/13/90/1/19). The Autobiography was apparently drafted shortly after these two projects were completed. The typescript in Modern Archives, which seems to be the only extant copy, was not made until some months later. In a letter of March 2, 1933, Kahn suggested adding “a long section to your secret document if you can do so without spoiling it,” regretting that he had not asked her for a copy (RFK/13/90/1/162–67). She replied somewhat mysteriously, alluding to a superstitious reluctance to having it typed but admitting that eventually it would have to be done (March 23, 1933, RFK/13/90/1/205–208). Since the carbon copy refers to page 275 of her book, the Autobiography was not typed until she had seen the final set of page proofs, and perhaps not until the book had appeared.

More than England and other states, the German principalities were, in the pre-industrial period, hampered by silver outflow and persistent pressures on the balance of payments, which led to idiosyncratic models and strategies of economic development usually but not entirely helpfully called “Cameralism.” It is less well understood how Cameralism, as a policy of order and development, and monetary theory went together. The present paper will sketch these working mechanisms as well as provide a few angles for new perspectives and future research. A first section after the brief introduction studies general issues of development in relation to balance-of-payment constraints (II), followed by the discourses on whether the domestic currency ought to remain stable in terms of intrinsic (silver) value (III), or whether it may be debased so as to raise domestic exports and competitiveness (IV). Both options were considered, at times and by varying actors, as valid strategies of promoting economic development, especially export-led growth, although most contemporaries viewed coin debasement as harmful to the economy. A fifth section discusses an alternative to the aforementioned strategies, that of raising effective monetary mass through increasing velocity. Since the Middle Ages and into the nineteenth century, the German economic tradition had a clear understanding of how velocity could be managed and the common weal stimulated by an increase in “vivacity” of circulation (V). In hindsight, it appears that we find here a powerful program towards promoting economic development and Europe’s rise towards capitalism. A conclusion will offer some thoughts for further research (VI).

Here is a fact that seems to surprise many deeply learned scholars. The term “dismal science” was applied to British political economy as the 1840s ended because of its role bringing about the emancipation of West Indian slaves in the 1830s. This paper addresses the consequences that follow from our ignorance of the role of classical economic theory in the anti-racial slavery coalition of Biblical literalists and utilitarians.

Free trade and protectionist doctrines have long had ambiguous relationships to bilateral trade deals, known throughout the nineteenth century as “reciprocity” arrangements. Henry C. Carey, “the Ajax of Protection” in the nineteenth-century United States, embodies the ambiguity from one side of the controversy. Carey’s early adulthood in the mid- to late 1820s was a time when the forerunners of the Whig Party pursued reciprocity at least partly as a means of fostering protection. In the 1830s, Carey, too, endorsed reciprocity—because he stood for free trade and believed reciprocity would promote it. In the 1840s and 1850s Carey changed his mind, decided that protection was the real “road to perfect freedom of trade,” and for that reason opposed reciprocity with Canada. In the 1870s he remained a protectionist but reconciled his doctrine with reciprocity. This article attempts to explain the changes in the disposition toward reciprocity of America’s foremost protectionist thinker from the Second Party System to the generation after the Civil War.

The prevailing opinion among John Maynard Keynes's interpreters is that, in writing The General Theory, Keynes ignored the other “revolution” which was taking place in Cambridge at the time, the critique of Marshallian microeconomics which led to the development of the notion of imperfect competition.

The resurgence of neo-Schumpeterian theories and models of technological innovation and development1 is an enduring sign of the historical significance of Joseph A. Schumpeters theoretical works on the dynamics of economic change as a result of long-term technological change.

Smith was influenced by Newton’s method. Nonetheless, he introduced elements that led him far from the Newtonian perspective. The present essay analyzes how historical dimensions, contingencies, institutions, and conflicting human inclinations modify a Newtonian horizon. Finally, the paper focuses on how, in Smith’s view, institutions determine “unintended outcomes,” which are sometimes opposed to those of the market. In this sense, the “invisible hand” is not only the result of the behavior of myopic individuals trying to improve their conditions; it is also the outcome of the work of institutions that operate as structures autonomous with respect to individuals.

In promoting spontaneous orders—orders that evolve in a process of cultural evolution—as “efficient,” “beneficial,” and “advantageous,” Friedrich A. Hayek (1899–1992) has often been attributed the belief that there is something desirable about them. For this reason, he has been accused of committing the naturalistic fallacy, that is, of trying to derive an “ought” from an “is.” It appears that Hayek was quite aware of the charge, and vigorously disputed it: “I have no intention to commit what is often called the genetic or naturalistic fallacy” (1988, p. 27).

An early post-WWII debate concerned the most desirable demand and inflationary pressures at which to run the economy. Context was provided by Keynesian theory devoid of a full employment equilibrium and containing its mainly forgotten, but still relevant, microeconomic underpinnings. A major input came with the estimates provided by the original Phillips curve. The debate seemed to be rendered obsolete by the curve’s expectations-augmented version with its natural rate of unemployment, and associated unique equilibrium GDP, as the only values consistent with stable inflation. The current behavior of economies with the successful inflation targeting is inconsistent with this natural-rate view, but is consistent with evolutionary theory in which economies have a wide range of GDP-compatible stable inflation. Now the early post-WWII debates are seen not to be as misguided as they appeared to be when economists came to accept the assumptions implicit in the expectations-augmented Phillips curve.

One of the significant contributions of the The Wealth of Nations was to bring to the consciousness of economists the centrality of the pursuit of self-interest in economic affairs. Following the publication of the The Wealth of Nations, economists increasingly assumed that the pursuit of self-interest was the prime psychological drive of mankind. As economics developed, modifications of the self-interest postulate occurred. Economists began to formally model the pursuit of self-interest and a specific form of the pursuit of self-interest ultimately came to dominate economists' thinking. Specifically, economists have taken a methodologically individualistic approach to this question. With rare exception, economists presume that the individual pursues self-interest more or less in “isolation.” As Frank Knight pointed out, the purely rational action of the economic man requires the complete absence of personal relations, in effect requiring persons to treat each other as vending machines (Knight 1960, p. 73). Robinson Crusoe alone on his island is thus the epitome of the economic man assumed by neoclassical economic theory.

Until around 1950, the German émigré Ernst Friedrich Schumacher (1911–1977) was a relatively conventional economist, believing in progress based on economic growth and developments in science and technology. Then, as he turned forty, he went through a period of prolonged self-examination and spiritual quest, which, amongst other things, led him to become critical of Western modernity. Developing a great interest in Buddhist spirituality and culture, in 1955 he travelled to Burma, where he spent three months as a United Nations consultant. His encounter there with the encroachment of Western development upon a traditional society proved pivotal for him, confirming his skepticism about modernity and stimulating him to write a renegade essay, “Economics in a Buddhist Country.” This experience in Burma shaped his work thereafter, as contributor to debates on development both East and West, as promoter of intermediate technology, and as author of the prophetic, popular book of 1973 Small Is Beautiful: A Study of Economics as if People Mattered.

This topic is more in contemporary economics than in the history of economics, but in this case an historical perspective does help us to understand the present day. Roger Backhouse and Sheila Dow have approached the progress of heterodox economics mainly through the philosophy and methodology of the discipline. I take a more sociological approach. I see the issue as external to the discipline at least as much as internal.