The central theme of this session is the changing relationship between “orthodox” (i.e., mainstream, neoclassical) and “heterodox” economics, especially in the USA, during the past two or three decades. Economics is such a large and heterogeneous discipline that it cannot be characterized both briefly and accurately. Alongside the growth of formalization and mathematization, and the high degree of uniformity in the undergraduate and graduate curricula and in the leading textbooks, there are also within the subject a number of dissenting or deviant doctrinal schools, rival methodological approaches, and innovative developments designed to remedy its defects and/or overcome its limitations. Moreover, many of the outspoken criticisms of the status quo, proposed remedies, and innovations, originate with or are endorsed by prominent economists with impeccable professional credentials. Indeed, in some cases their contributions threaten the discipline's foundations and can, therefore, be considered a species of “orthodox subversion.”

This article argues that the self-love that motivates exchange in The Wealth of Nations (WN) can be seen as the desire for deserved approval discussed by Adam Smith in The Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS). This often overlooked desire appears in TMS as the most representative kind of self-love. Exchange motivated by this desire emerges as the way to find confirmation through others’ appraisal of one’s own self-assessment, and thus to find an agreed-upon measure for respective deserved praise. The target in this economic relationship is that equivalence that signals mutual recognition of deserved esteem. Equivalence here is the aim and not the result of exchange, unlike a tug-of-war, where both parties try to give as little and gain as much as possible regardless of the recognition each deserves.

Students of economic thought have long associated with the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the spread of attitudes in Europe more tolerant of market processes. New economic attitudes appear in a variety of literary forms during the fifteenth century (McGovern 1970). As compared to the pronouncements of a number of Patristic figures, relatively greater tolerance of commerce is expressed by medieval theologians. In fact, recent scholarly efforts suggest that by the late thirteenth century, suspicions of economic activity remained, but Scholastic thinkers increasingly recognized the importance of an impersonal market process in everyday life and sought to find ways to understand it in light of their concern with natural order (Kaye 1998a). While condemning avarice, Scholastic writers such as San Antonino of Florence and San Bernadino of Sienna explicitly endorsed trade as legitimate when practiced for the common good and when associated with modest profit (Origo 1962; De Roover 1967). Recognition of this movement in thought, especially as it applied the concerns of economic justice to trade in commodities, is explicit in the literature of preclassical economics. But until recently, less attention has been paid to more specific developments in scholastic thinking on justice in the labor market.

The year 1966 was central to the history of the Coase theorem debates, featuring the entry of the idea of a ‘Coase theorem’ into economic discourse and the eruption of the controversy over the the correctness of Coase’s negotiation result. This paper examines economists’ treatments of Coase’s result in 1966 and through the remainder of the decade, a period during which its place in the professional discourse began to solidify and three ‘camps’ began to develop around it: those who believed Coase’s result correct but of limited real-world applicability, those who found it relevant for explaining and devising policy with regard to a wide swath of externality-related phenomena, and those who argued and purported to demonstrate that this result was simply incorrect or wrong-headed on one or another grounds.

There has long been a presumption that the price-level stabilization frameworks of Irving Fisher and Chicagoans Henry Simons and Lloyd Mints were essentially equivalent. I show that there were subtle, but important, differences in the rationales underlying the policies of Fisher and the Chicagoans. Fisher’s framework involved substantial discretion in the setting of the policy instruments; for the Chicagoans the objective of a policy rule was to tie the hands of the authorities in order to reduce discretion and, thus, monetary policy uncertainty. In contrast to Fisher, the Chicagoans provided assessments of the workings of alternative rules, assessed various criteria—including simplicity and reduction of political pressures—in the specification of rules, and concluded that rules would provide superior performance compared with discretion. Each of these characteristics provided a direct link to the rules-based framework of Milton Friedman. Like Friedman’s framework, Simons’s preferred rule targeted a policy instrument.

The paper uses the data from François Quesnay's writings to derive a social table for pre-revolutionary France and estimate the level and distribution of income. It formalizes Quesnay’s thinking about the process of production and situates it within the modern national accounting framework. Quesnay’s estimates are compared with some contemporary and recent estimates of eighteenth-century French incomes and inequality.

In a study of pre-classical monopoly theory published in 1951, Raymond de Roo ver started by briefly examining the doctrines held by the medieval scholastics. His analysis met with favorable response and was confirmed and further developed by later historians. The most satisfactory statement may still be that of Barry Gordon in his monograph on early economics. The consensus of these scholars can be summarized as follows. Medieval authors looked askance at the attempts by the guilds to establish minimum prices. They recognized the expediency of government grants of monopoly and regulation of prices of certain commodities. They strongly condemned private monopolies established for personal gain, as well as collusion among sellers for that purpose, price discrimination, engrossing, forestalling, regrating, and other forms of speculation. The just price was the current, competitive market price, free of all irregularities of these kinds and free of fraud and duress. Gordon adds that the schoolmen also sometimes referred to labor and cost factors, rather than the market, as estimates of the just price. These estimates were not necessarily contradictive but mutually supportive. They applied when the market was not working smoothly and when there was no market in operation at the time and place of the sale. When an exchange is concluded in a competitive market under normal circumstances, the going price can hardly be said to be unjust. It may sometimes seem uncharitable. There will always be some who cannot afford to pay the competitive price. Poor relief in medieval society, however, was mainly a matter of almsgiving. Unlike commutative justice, charity is not a workable ethical norm in the marketplace.

Once one recognizes that many prices (and wages) are fairly sticky over short time intervals, the arbitrariness of the path of nominal prices (in the sense of their under-determination by real factors alone) implies that the path of real activity and the associated path of equilibrium real interest rates are equally arbitrary. It is equally possible, from a logical standpoint, to imagine allowing the central bank to determine, by arbitrary fiat, the path of aggregate real activity, or the path of real interest rates, as it is to imagine allowing it to determine the path of nominal interest rates. In practice, it is easiest for central banks to exert relatively direct control over overnight nominal interest rates, and so they generally formulate their short-run objectives (their operating target) in terms of the effect that they seek to bring about in this variable rather than in one of the others.

This article investigates John Maynard Keynes’s understanding and use of the concept of ‘animal spirits’ by tracing how he conceived of related ideas such as human nature, instinct, and intuition, and how they connect to the rational economic agent usually assumed by mainstream economic theory. It also considers the notion of Money-of-Account as proposed in A Treatise on Money in relation to the concept of reciprocal altruism as developed in the field of evolutionary biology, and documents Keynes’s knowledge of Charles Darwin on natural selection and sexual selection. It then uses these threads of analysis to evaluate how Keynes conceived of mental reasoning processes more widely, and deduces his own answer to the question of whether the human mind is formed as a ‘blank slate.’ It concludes by suggesting that Keynes should be regarded as one of the first contributors to the field of evolutionary economic psychology.

According to the folklore of economics, H. L. Moore (1869–1958) in Economic Cycles: Their Law and Cause (1914) mistakenly called his estimates of the supply of pig iron the demand for pig iron. The reviews of Economic Cycles by R. A. Lehfeldt (1915) and P. G. Wright (1915) initiated the folklore, which G. J. Stigler (1962) repeated in his obituary of Moore. Recently the folklore reappeared in histories of economics by M. Blaug (1986), K. Kim (1988), R. J. Epstein (1989), and M. S. Morgan (1990). Morgan, who was particularly critical of Moore, wrote that his empirical work “produced a relationship which he interpreted as a positive demand curve for pig-iron. This, of course, contradicted the negative relationship between the price and quantity stipulated by standard economic theory…. Moore's approach was a mixture. At its worst, it involved both the unthinking application of theory to data and the adoption of empirically derived relationships without reference to theory” (Morgan 1990, pp. 28, 141).

“Iwas born in 1902 in Görlitz, a small provincial town in Germany, and raised in Vienna, the great city of the multinational Austro-Hungarian empire. On my father's side, my family goes back to about 1530 in Saxony, my Lutheran forebears having been farmers, church wardens, judges, and businessmen. My mother was a natural daughter of Frederick III of Germany …”

Yet another account of myself, for yet another encyclopaedia. Italian, this time. Once again, I put pen to paper and collapse the events of fifty years ago to a few familiar milestones. Now what shall I tell these Italians?

“I finished the Gymnasium and took my Dr. Rer. Pol. at the University of Vienna in 1925. Awarded a Rockefeller Memorial Fellowship, I spent the next three years in England, the United States, France and Italy. Returning to Vienna, I soon became Docent, later Professor, at the University, and Director of the Austrian Institute for Business Cycle Research …”

And then there will be the doctoral thesis, Wirtschaftsprognose, the other Institute, Princeton, and so on. It is remarkable really, the rehearsed inevitability of it all … So often have I gone through exercises of this kind that there are times when I even begin to believe them myself.

The year 2003 marked the 100th anniversary of the birth of John von Neumann (1903–1957), one of greatest geniuses of the last century. Beyond contributing to fields as diverse as set theory, quantum mechanics, atomic energy, and automatic computing, von Neumann has also had a decisive influence upon modern economics. From the invention of game theory to the axiomatization of expected utility, from the introduction of convex analysis and fixed-point techniques to the development of the balanced growth model, the von Neumann heritage can be clearly traced in several areas of our discipline. The aim of this paper is to clarify the relationship between the two concepts of rationality he devised in his classic 1944 book Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, written with the collaboration of the Austrian economist Oskar Morgenstern (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1953).

Arthur Pigou introduced the iconic two-road model in the first edition of The Economics of Welfare (1920), and it has been thought that this model was intended to demonstrate the need for Pigouvian taxes to mitigate traffic congestion. However, Pigou’s intention was to show that efficient output for industries subject to decreasing returns required a tax on output. Pigou was incorrect, but the two-road model (correctly considered) became the starting point for the analysis of traffic congestion in the 1950s. This paper recounts the doctrinal history of decreasing returns industries and the two-road model.

This paper explores the history of the first economics film, made by Michael Polanyi. It traces the evolution of the film from the first idea to the latest version. It portrays Polanyi’s motives for making the film, the contexts in which the film was embedded, and its perception by various individuals and communities. The paper demonstrates the novelty of both the content and the presentation of Polanyi’s economic ideas through the eyes of his contemporaries. It discusses why it was important for Polanyi to make a film about the circulation of money and the principle of neutrality, and comments on what historiographers of economic thought might learn if they put a stronger emphasis on visual representations in their pursuits.