Most discussions of how one should write the history of economics are conducted at a very abstract level. They debate the merits of alternative approaches without relating them to specific problem-situations or specific periods. The literature uses terms such as “absolutism,” “relativism,” “Whig history,” “thick history,” “historical reconstructions,” “rational reconstructions,” and “presentism,” frequently arguing that one of these approaches is better than one or more of the others. In warning historians of economics against sin, they typically define sin in absolute terms. This is particularly true of those who argue for “relativism,” “thick history,” “historical reconstructions” and the like. There is a simple reason for this. Terms such as “absolutism,” “Whig history,” and “presentism” all carry negative connotations, with the result that their advocates usually feel impelled to qualify them. On the other hand, supporters of “historical reconstruction,” “thick history” and so on feel much less pressure to offer such qualifications—the words used have the sound of “real” history. The terminology itself is value-laden.