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What's Wrong with Unhelpful Comments? Conversational Helpfulness and Unhelpfulness and Why They Matter

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 April 2022

SETH ROBERTSON Open the ORCID record for SETH ROBERTSON [Opens in a new window]
SETH ROBERTSON*
Affiliation:
HARVARD UNIVERSITY [email protected]
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Abstract

It is common to criticize certain comments as ‘unhelpful’. This criticism is richer than it might first appear. In this paper, I sketch an account of conversational helpfulness and unhelpfulness, the reasons why they matter, and the utility of calling out comments as helpful or unhelpful. First, some unhelpful comments are or easily could be demoralizing for proponents of projects, and criticizing them as such can diminish, deflect, or defend against that demoralization. Second, some unhelpful comments redirect or derail conversations away from their projects and criticizing comments as unhelpful can steer conversations back. Third, some unhelpful comments are made out of a lack of epistemic effort and criticizing them as such can help maintain epistemic standards, standards of respect for other people and their projects, and can ensure that such comments do not receive more attention and consideration than they deserve.

Keywords

virtue epistemologyvirtue ethicssocial epistemologyethicshelpfulness
Type
Article
Information
Journal of the American Philosophical Association , Volume 8 , Issue 3 , Fall 2022 , pp. 512 - 530
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the American Philosophical Association

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Footnotes

This paper benefited tremendously from comments from Wayne Riggs, Amy Olberding, Zoë Johnson King, David Gray Grant, and Meica Magnani, and from conversations with Nancy Snow, Catherine Elgin (who suggested several of the cases discussed in this paper), and Emilio Mora. The reviewers at the Journal of the American Philosophical Association for this piece were exemplary in their feedback and suggestions, and I am deeply grateful for their comments.

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