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Well-Being: Reality's Role

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 September 2016

ANDREW T. FORCEHIMES  and
LUKE SEMRAU
ANDREW T. FORCEHIMES
Affiliation:
NANYANG TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY [email protected]
LUKE SEMRAU
Affiliation:
VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY [email protected]
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Abstract:

A familiar objection to mental state theories of well-being proceeds as follows: Describe a good life. Contrast it with one identical in mental respects, but lacking a connection to reality. Then observe that mental state theories of well-being implausibly hold both lives in equal esteem. Conclude that such views are false. Here we argue this objection fails. There are two ways reality may be thought to matter for well-being. We want to contribute to reality, and we want our experience of the world to be veridical. Yet, if one accepts that reality matters in either of these ways, one must posit differences in well-being where no such differences exist.

Keywords

well-beingmental state theoryexperience machinehedonism
Type
Articles
Information
Journal of the American Philosophical Association , Volume 2 , Issue 3 , Fall 2016 , pp. 456 - 468
Copyright
Copyright © American Philosophical Association 2016 

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