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Stance and Being

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 December 2020

JOSEPH ROUSE
JOSEPH ROUSE*
Affiliation:
WESLEYAN [email protected]
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Abstract

This essay builds upon Rebecca Kukla's constructive treatment of Dennettian stances as embodied coping strategies, to extend a conversation previously initiated by John Haugeland about Daniel Dennett on stances and real patterns and Martin Heidegger on the ontological difference. This comparison is mutually illuminating. It advances three underdeveloped issues in Heidegger: Dasein's ‘bodily nature’, the import of Heidegger's ontological pluralism for object identity, and how clarification of the sense of being in general bears on the manifold senses of being. It more sharply differentiates Kukla's and Dennett's understandings of stances and the real. Finally, it allows for further development of Kukla's account of Dennettian stances as embodied. These developments show greater complexity than what Kukla calls ‘the wide and counterfactually flexible repertoire of bodily positions’ that make up an embodied stance. They also show how different stances are compared and assessed even though Kukla rightly denies the possibility of a normative or explanatory philosophical ‘meta-stance’.

Keywords

Intentional stanceembodied cognitionontologyMartin HeideggerQuill Rebecca Kukla
Type
Article
Information
Journal of the American Philosophical Association , Volume 7 , Issue 1 , Spring 2021 , pp. 20 - 39
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Copyright
Copyright © American Philosophical Association 2020

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Footnotes

Thanks to Quill R. Kukla, participants in the 2019 meeting of the International Society for Phenomenological Studies, the audience at the University of California at Santa Cruz, and two anonymous reviewers for comments on earlier versions.

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