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The Priority Principle

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 March 2015

ANDREW M. BAILEY
ANDREW M. BAILEY*
Affiliation:
YALE-NUS [email protected]
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Abstract:

Some philosophers say that you do not think in the primary or nonderivative sense. Rather, they say some item distinct from you (perhaps one of your parts or something of which you are a part) does your thinking for you; you inherit your mental life from that item. In this paper, I argue that this is a mistake. We do not inherit our thoughts in this way.

Keywords

personal ontologymetaphysicsphilosophy of mind
Type
Articles
Information
Journal of the American Philosophical Association , Volume 1 , Issue 1 , Spring 2015 , pp. 163 - 174
Copyright
Copyright © American Philosophical Association 2015 

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