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A Moral Argument for Substance Dualism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 January 2016

GERALD K. HARRISON
GERALD K. HARRISON*
Affiliation:
MASSEY [email protected]
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Abstract:

This paper presents a moral argument in support of the view that the mind is a nonphysical object. It is intuitively obvious that we, the bearers of conscious experiences, have an inherent value that is not reducible to the value of our conscious experiences. It remains intuitively obvious that we have inherent value even when we represent ourselves to have no physical bodies whatsoever. Given certain assumptions about morality and moral intuitions, this implies that the bearers of conscious experiences—the objects possessing inherent value—are not physical objects. This moral evidence is corroborated by introspective evidence.

Keywords

substance dualismmindmoral realismintuitionsinherent value
Type
Articles
Information
Journal of the American Philosophical Association , Volume 2 , Issue 1 , Spring 2016 , pp. 21 - 35
Copyright
Copyright © American Philosophical Association 2016 

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