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Metaphysical Constraints, Primitivism, and Reduction

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 October 2019

MICHAEL BERTRAND Open the ORCID record for MICHAEL BERTRAND [Opens in a new window]
MICHAEL BERTRAND*
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AUBURN [email protected]
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Abstract

The argument from absence of analysis (AAA) infers primitivism about some x from the absence of a reductive analysis of x. But philosophers use the word ‘primitive’ to mean many distinct things. I argue that there is a robust sense of ‘primitive’ present in the metaphysics literature that cannot be inferred via the AAA. Successfully demonstrating robust primitivism about some x requires showing two things at once: that a reduction of x is not possible and that an explanatorily deep characterization of x is not available. In order to secure this second explanatory claim, the AAA must wrongly assume that reductive analysis is our only source of explanatory characterization. I argue that this is false by offering a distinct way of providing explanatory characterizations backed by suitably understood metaphysical constraints. While there remains a minimal sense of ‘primitive’ inferable via the AAA, this sense is exhausted by the denial of reduction. With minimal primitivism as its target, the AAA is uninteresting.

Keywords

reductionexplanationessenceprimitivepersonal identity
Type
Articles
Information
Journal of the American Philosophical Association , Volume 5 , Issue 4 , Winter 2019 , pp. 503 - 521
Copyright
Copyright © American Philosophical Association 2019

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Footnotes

For helpful discussion and advice, thanks to audiences at the Auburn Philosophical Society and the Work in Progress series at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. I am particularly thankful to LA Paul, Marc Lange, Thomas Hofweber, Robert Smithson, Finnur Dellsen, Scott Hill, Michael Watkins, and several anonymous referees. Special thanks to Ram Neta for the interesting conversation that originated this paper.

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