Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 July 2020
This article aims to build a bridge between two areas of philosophical research: the structure of kinds and metaphysical modality. Our central thesis is that kinds typically involve super-explanatory properties, and that these properties are therefore metaphysically essential to natural kinds. Philosophers of science who work on kinds tend to emphasize their complexity, and are generally resistant to any suggestion that they have essences. The complexities are real enough, but they should not be allowed to obscure the way that kinds are typically unified by certain core properties. We show how this unifying role offers a natural account of why certain properties are metaphysically essential to kinds.
We thank Alexander Bird, Ned Block, Paul Boghossian, Michael Devitt, Julien Dutant, Jani Hakkarainen, Paul Horwich, Markku Keinänen, Muhammad Ali Khalidi, Boris Kment, Jaakko Kuorikoski, Jessica Leech, Tim Lewens, Matteo Mameli, Caterina Marchionni, Ruth Millikan, Stephen Neale, Daniel Nolan, Graham Priest, Jesse Prinz, Samuli Reijula, Jonathan Schaffer, Martin Smith, Nick Shea, Barry Smith, Michael Strevens, Anand Vaidya, and two anonymous referees for the Journal of the American Philosophical Association for helpful feedback and conversation.