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Doing One's Reasonable Best: What Moral Responsibility Requires

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 February 2016

MARTIN MONTMINY
MARTIN MONTMINY*
Affiliation:
UNIVERSITY OF [email protected]
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Abstract:

Moral responsibility, I argue, requires agents to do what is within their abilities to act morally. This means that an agent is to blame just in case his wrongdoing is due to an underperformance, that is, to a failure to do what he can to act morally. I defend this account by considering a skeptical argument about responsibility put forth by Gideon Rosen and by Michael Zimmerman. I explain why the epistemic condition they endorse is inadequate and why my alternative epistemic condition, which directly follows from my general condition on culpability, should be preferred. I then defend my view against potential criticisms.

Keywords

ethicsresponsibilitymetaphysicsfree willagencyaction
Type
Articles
Information
Journal of the American Philosophical Association , Volume 2 , Issue 1 , Spring 2016 , pp. 55 - 73
Copyright
Copyright © American Philosophical Association 2016 

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