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Conversion, Causes, and Closed-Mindedness

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 March 2020

JOSHUA DIPAOLO
JOSHUA DIPAOLO*
Affiliation:
CALIFORNIA STATE UNIVERSITY [email protected]
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Abstract

‘You just believe that because you were raised to believe it!’ is a familiar criticism. Many converts, however, believe the opposite of what they were raised to believe. Does this make them immune to these challenges? I scrutinize this ‘conversion defense’. If these challenges only concern belief genealogy, a certain kind of convert is immune to them. However, these challenges often concern closed-mindedness rather than genealogy. Seen in this light, the convert who is immune to the genealogical critique may be more susceptible to these challenges due to her conversion. Her conversion may make her more likely to engage in ‘epistemic self-licensing’ akin to the empirically documented phenomenon of ‘moral self-licensing’.

Keywords

conversionclosed-mindednessself-licensinggenealogyepistemic virtue and vice
Type
Articles
Information
Journal of the American Philosophical Association , Volume 6 , Issue 1 , Spring 2020 , pp. 74 - 95
Copyright
Copyright © American Philosophical Association 2020

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Footnotes

Thanks to audiences at the Central States Philosophical Association; University of North Carolina at Greensboro; Kansas State University; California State University, Sacramento; and California State University, Fullerton. For extended discussion and comments, I am grateful to Michael Brooks, Nevin Climenhaga, Amy Coplan, John Davis, Luis Pinto de Sa, Scott Hill, Andrew Howat, Daniel Immerman, Hilary Kornblith, Emily Lee, JeeLoo Liu, Ryan Nichols, Luis Oliveira, several anonymous referees, and the associate editor and editor of this journal. Special thanks to Robert Simpson for all the help and generous support.

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