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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 29 March 2022
Consciousness is a central topic in Hindu philosophy. This is because this philosophy understands reality in terms of brahman or atman (typically translated as the self), and consciousness is conceived as the essential marker of self. The prominent Hindu text Bhagavad Gita offers an exception. Self is conceived in the Gita not in terms of its essential identity with pure or transcendental consciousness. But the question remains, does the Gita still offer us a theory of consciousness? The goal of my paper is to show that the Gita can be taken as offering an interesting empirical theory of consciousness. My paper focuses on determining the nature of attention in the Gita's understanding of yoga, and to articulate the role of such attention in the Gita's theory of consciousness. My working conclusion is that what differentiates an ordinary person's consciousness from a yogi's consciousness is the nature of their attention both in terms of its manner and its object. I argue, further, that exploring the Gita's theory of consciousness, especially in conjunction with the nature of attention, is immensely fruitful because it allows us to see the Gita's potential contribution to our contemporary philosophical discussion of consciousness and attention. This is because bringing the Gita into discussion allows us to appreciate a dimension of the metaphysics of attention–namely, the dimension of manner of attending and its cultivation, and the moral and social implications in the proposed redirection of one's attention--not often recognized in the contemporary Western discussion.
Earlier versions of this paper were presented at Wofford College, Harvard Conference on ‘Mind and Attention in Indian and Contemporary Western Philosophy’, Indian Institute of Technology, Delhi, Towards a Science of Consciousness Conference in Tucson, AZ, and as the Grover Alumni lecture at the University of Connecticut. My ideas benefitted from audience questions and interactions at each of these venues. Special thanks are due to Nico Silins who was the commentator for my paper at the Harvard conference and provided the most pressing, thought-provoking and constructive comments that an author can hope for. My sincere thanks to Miranda Fricker, Paula Droege, Helen Beebee, and Erik Anderson for their insightful and helpful comments on an earlier draft. The remaining errors are mine.
This article is the ninth in a special series of commissioned articles on non-Western philosophies. The eighth article, ‘Thought Experiments and Personal Identity in Africa’, by Simon Beck and Oritsegbubemi Anthony Oyowe, appeared in Volume 7, Issue 4, pp. 439–452.