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Permissible Promise-Making Under Uncertainty

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 November 2019

ALIDA LIBERMAN
ALIDA LIBERMAN*
Affiliation:
SOUTHERN METHODIST [email protected]
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Abstract

I outline four conditions on permissible promise-making: the promise must be for a morally permissible end, must not be deceptive, must be in good faith, and must involve a realistic assessment of oneself. I then address whether promises that you are uncertain you can keep can meet these four criteria, with a focus on campaign promises as an illustrative example. I argue that uncertain promises can meet the first two criteria, but that whether they can meet the second two depends on the source of the promisor's uncertainty. External uncertainty stemming from outside factors is unproblematic, but internal uncertainty stemming from the promisor's doubts about her own strength leads to promises that are in bad faith or unrealistic. I conclude that campaign promises are often subject to internal uncertainty and are therefore morally impermissible to make, all else being equal.

Keywords

Promisespromise-makinguncertaintysinceritycampaign promises
Type
Articles
Information
Journal of the American Philosophical Association , Volume 5 , Issue 4 , Winter 2019 , pp. 468 - 486
Copyright
Copyright © American Philosophical Association 2019

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Footnotes

Thanks to Joshua Crabill, Berislav Marušić, and Carolyn McLeod for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. Thanks also to audiences at the University of Richmond and the University of Indianapolis in 2016, to two anonymous referees for this journal, and to my fellow 2015–2016 postdocs at the Rotman Institute of Philosophy at the University of Western Ontario (Tommaso Bruni, Lucas Dunlap, Alkistis Elliott-Graves, Robert Foley, Elina Pechlivanidi, and Catherine Stinson), all of whom provided me with valuable feedback as I began developing these ideas.

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