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Perceptual Knowledge and the Primacy of Judgment

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 September 2015

BARRY STROUD
BARRY STROUD*
Affiliation:
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY [email protected]
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Abstract:

Rather than asking how what we are aware of in perceptual experience can give us knowledge of the independent world, this paper asks what conditions we as knowers must fulfill, what capacities we must have, and what the ‘objects of perception’ must be in the competent exercise those capacities, if we are to have any such knowledge. It is argued that we must be capable of perceiving that such-and-such is so and thereby knowing by perception alone what is so in the world as it is independently of us.

Keywords

judgmentbeliefreasonsperceptionknowledge
Type
Articles
Information
Journal of the American Philosophical Association , Volume 1 , Issue 3 , Fall 2015 , pp. 385 - 395
Copyright
Copyright © American Philosophical Association 2015 

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