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On Humean Explanation and Practical Normativity

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 March 2015

GRAHAM HUBBS
GRAHAM HUBBS*
Affiliation:
UNIVERSITY OF [email protected]
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Abstract:

If Hume is correct that the descriptive and the normative are ‘entirely different’ matters, then it would seem to follow that endorsing a given account of action-explanation does not restrict the account of practical normativity one may simultaneously endorse. In this essay, I challenge the antecedent of this conditional by targeting its consequent. Specifically, I argue that if one endorses a Humean account of action-explanation, which many find attractive, one is thereby committed to a Humean account of practical normativity, which many find unattractive. The key to this argument is showing that the justificatory base of any anti-Humean normative view is a generic representation of ideal rationality, which precludes any such view from combining coherently with a Humean account of action-explanation. If my arguments are successful, they demonstrate a way in which one's views in action theory can both limit and be limited by the ethical views one endorses.

Keywords

actionagencyethicsmoral psychologyphilosophy of mindpractical rationality
Type
Articles
Information
Journal of the American Philosophical Association , Volume 1 , Issue 1 , Spring 2015 , pp. 78 - 95
Copyright
Copyright © American Philosophical Association 2015 

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