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A Defense of Substance Causation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 February 2016

ANN WHITTLE
ANN WHITTLE*
Affiliation:
UNIVERSITY OF [email protected]
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Abstract:

That there is no substance causation is often treated as the default position. My aim in this paper is primarily one of burden shifting: opponents of substance causation must do more to defend their position. After outlining the thesis I wish to defend, I present a simple argument for substance causation, arguing that opponents of substance causation owe us an explanation of why this argument is unsound. I end by answering objections to the view that substances can be causes.

Keywords

substance causationcausal powersrelata of causation
Type
Articles
Information
Journal of the American Philosophical Association , Volume 2 , Issue 1 , Spring 2016 , pp. 1 - 20
Copyright
Copyright © American Philosophical Association 2016 

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