For a fixed set A. the number of queries to A needed in order to decide a set S is a measure of S's complexity. We consider the complexity of certain sets defined in terms of A:

and, for m > 2,

where #nA. (x1….. xn) = A(x1) + A(xn)(We identify with , where χA is the characteristic function of A.)

If A is a nonrecursive semirecursive set or if A is a jump, we give tight bounds on the number of queries needed in order to decide ODDnA and MODmnA:

• ODDnA can be decided with n parallel queries to A, but not with n − 1.

• ODDnA can be decided with ⌈log(n + 1)⌉ sequential queries to A but not with ⌈log(n + 1)⌉ − 1.

• MODmnA can be decided with ⌈n/m⌉ + ⌊n/m⌋ parallel queries to A but not with ⌈n/m⌉ + ⌊n/m⌋ − 1.

• MODmnA can be decided with ⌈log(⌈n/m⌉ + ⌊n/m⌋ + 1)⌉ sequential queries to A but not with ⌈log(⌈n/m⌉ + ⌊n/m⌋ + 1)⌉ − 1.

The lower bounds above hold for nonrecursive recursively enumerable sets A as well. (Interestingly, the lower bounds for recursively enumerable sets follow by a general result from the lower bounds for semirecursive sets.)

In particular, every nonzero truth-table degree contains a set A such that ODDnA cannot be decided with n − 1 parallel queries to A. Since every truth-table degree also contains a set B such that ODDnB can be decided with one query to B, a set's query complexity depends more on its structure than on its degree.

For a fixed set A,

Q(n, A) = {S: S can be decided with n sequential queries to A}.

Q∥ (n, A) = {S : S can be decided with n parallel queries to A}.

We show that if A is semirecursive or recursively enumerable, but is not recursive, then these classes form non-collapsing hierarchies:

• Q(0,A) ⊂ Q (1, A) ⊂ Q(2, A) ⊂ …

Q∥ (0, A) ⊂ Q∥ (1, A) ⊂ Q∥ (2, A) ⊂ …

The same is true if A is a jump.

We show that for every enumeration degree a < 0′e there exists an e-degree c such that a ≤ c < 0′e, and all degrees b, with c ≤ b < 0′e, are properly Σ20.

Until very recently, it was thought that there couldn't be any current interest in logicism as a philosophy of mathematics. Indeed, there is an old argument one often finds that logicism is a simple nonstarter just in virtue of the fact that if it were a logical truth that there are infinitely many natural numbers, then this would be in conflict with the existence of finite models. It is certainly true that from the perspective of model theory, arithmetic cannot be a part of logic. However, it is equally true that model theory's reliance on a background of axiomatic set theory renders it unable to match Frege's Theorem, the derivation within second order logic of the infinity of the number series from the contextual “definition” of the cardinality operator. Called “Hume's Principle” by Boolos, the contextual definition of the cardinality operator is presented in Section 63 of Grundlagen, as the statement that, for any concepts F and G,

the number of F s = the number of G s

if, and only if,

F is equinumerous with G.

The philosophical interest in Frege's Theorem derives from the thesis, defended for example by Crispin Wright, that Hume's principle expresses our pre-analytic conception of assertions of numerical identity. However, Boolos cites the very fact that Hume's principle has only infinite models as grounds for denying that it is logically true: For Boolos, Hume's principle is simply a disguised axiom of infinity.

In modules many ‘positive’ versions of model-theoretic concepts turn out to be equivalent to concepts known in classical module theory—by ‘positive’ we mean that instead of allowing arbitrary first-order formulas in the model-theoretic definitions only positive primitive formulas are taken into consideration. (This feature is due to Baur's quantifier elimination for modules, cf. [Pr], however we will not make explicit use of it here.) Often this allows one to combine model-theoretic methods with algebraic ones. One instance of this is the result proved in [Rot1] (see also [Rot2]) that the Mittag-Leffler modules are exactly the positively atomic modules. This paper is parallel to the one just mentioned in that it is proved here, Theorem 3.1, that the pure-projective modules are exactly the positively constructible modules. The following parallel facts from module theory and from model theory led us to this result: every pure-projective module is Mittag-Leffler and the converse is true for countable (in fact even countably generated) modules, cf. [RG]; every constructible model is atomic and the converse is true for countable models, cf. [Pi].

It is proved that Vaught's conjecture is true for modules over an arbitrary countable serial ring. It follows from the structural result that every module with few models over a (countable) serial ring is ω-stable.

There is a comeager set contained in the set of 1-generic reals and a first order structure such that for any real number X. there is an element of which is recursive in X if and only if there is a presentation of which is recursive in X.

In this paper, we show within RCA0 that weak König's lemma is necessary and sufficient to prove that any (separable) compact group has a Haar measure. Within WKL0, a Haar measure is constructed by a non-standard method based on a fact that every countable non-standard model of WKL0 has a proper initial part isomorphic to itself [10].

We derive a Mal'cev condition for congruence meet-semidistributivity and then use it to prove two theorems. Theorem A: if a variety in a finite language is congruence meet-semidistributive and residually less than some finite cardinal, then it is finitely based. Theorem B: there is an algorithm which, given m < ω and a finite algebra in a finite language, determines whether the variety generated by the algebra is congruence meet-semidistributive and residually less than m.

Let θ, θ′ be two multiplicatively independent Pisot numbers, and let U, U′ be two linear numeration systems whose characteristic polynomial is the minimal polynomial of θ and θ′, respectively. For every n ≥ 1, if A ⊆ ℕn is U-and U′ -recognizable then A is definable in 〈ℕ: + 〉.

§1. Introduction. Russell's type-theory can be seen as a theory of properties, relations, and propositions (PRPs) (in short, a property theory). It relies on rigid type distinctions at the grammatical level to circumvent the property theorist's major problem, namely Russell's paradox, or, more generally, the paradoxes of predication. Type theory has arguably been the standard property theory for years, often taken for granted, and used in many applications. In particular, Montague [27] has shown how to use a type-theoretical property-theory as a foundation for natural language semantics.

In recent years, it has been persuasively argued that many linguistic and ontological data are best accounted for by using a type-free property theory. Several type-free property theories, typically with fine-grained identity conditions for PRPs, have therefore been proposed as potential candidates to play a foundational role in natural language semantics, or for related applications in formal ontology and the foundations of mathematics (Bealer [6], Cocchiarella [18], Turner [35], etc.).

Attempts have then been made to combine some such property theory with a Montague-style approach in natural language semantics. Most notably, Chierchia and Turner [15] propose a Montague-style semantic analysis of a fragment of English, by basically relying on the type-free system of Turner [35]. For a similar purpose Chierchia [14] relies on one of the systems based on homogeneous stratification due to Cocchiarella. Cocchiarella's systems have also been used for applications in formal ontology, inspired by Montague's account of quantifier phrases as, roughly, properties of properties (see, e.g., Cocchiarella [17], [19], Landini [25], Orilia [29]).

We present a variety of (ω, ∞)-distributive forcings which when applied to models of Martin's Maximum separate certain well known reflection principles. In particular, we do this for the reflection principles SR, SRα (α ≤ ω1), and SRP.

We present two different types of models where, for certain singular cardinals λ of uncountable cofinality, λ → (λ, ω + 1)2, although λ is not a strong limit cardinal, We announce, here, and will present in a subsequent paper, [7], that, for example, consistently, and consistently, .

Suppose λ is a singular cardinal of uncountable cofinality κ. For a model of cardinality λ, let No() denote the number of isomorphism types of models of cardinality λ which are L∞λ-equivalent to . In [7] Shelah considered inverse κ-systems of abelian groups and their certain kind of quotient limits Gr()/ Fact(). In particular Shelah proved in [7, Fact 3.10] that for every cardinal Μ there exists an inverse κ-system such that consists of abelian groups having cardinality at most Μκ and card(Gr()/ Fact()) = Μ. Later in [8, Theorem 3.3] Shelah showed a strict connection between inverse κ-systems and possible values of No (under the assumption that θκ < λ for every θ < λ): if is an inverse κ-system of abelian groups having cardinality < λ, then there is a model such that card() = λ and No() = card(Gr()/ Fact()). The following was an immediate consequence (when θκ < λ for every θ < λ): for every nonzero Μ < λ or Μ = λκ there is a model , of cardinality λ with No() = Μ. In this paper we show: for every nonzero Μ ≤ λκ there is an inverse κ-system of abelian groups having cardinality < λ such that card(Gr()/ Fact()) = Μ (under the assumptions 2κ < λ and θ<κ < λ for all θ < λ when Μ > λ), with the obvious new consequence concerning the possible value of No. Specifically, the case No() = λ is possible when θκ > λ for every λ < λ.

We prove that each Σ20 set which is hypersimple relative to ∅′ is noncuppable in the structure of the Σ20 enumeration degrees. This gives a connection between properties of Σ20 sets under inclusion and and the Σ20 enumeration degrees. We also prove that some low non-computably enumerable enumeration degree contains no set which is simple relative to ∅′.

In this paper we discuss several generalization of theorems from stability theory to simple theories. Cherlin and Hrushovski, in [2] develop a substitute for canonical bases in finite rank, ω-categorical supersimple theories. Motivated by methods there, we prove the existence of canonical bases (in a suitable sense) for types in any simple theory. This is done in Section 2. In general these canonical bases will (as far as we know) exist only as “hyperimaginaries”, namely objects of the form a/E where a is a possibly infinite tuple and E a type-definable equivalence relation. (In the supersimple, ω-categorical case, these reduce to ordinary imaginaries.) So in Section 1 we develop the general theory of hyperimaginaries and show how first order model theory (including the theory of forking) generalises to hyperimaginaries. We go on, in Section 3 to show the existence and ubiquity of regular types in supersimple theories, ω-categorical simple structures and modularity is discussed in Section 4. It is also shown here how the general machinery of simplicity simplifies some of the general theory of smoothly approximable (or Lie-coordinatizable) structures from [2].

Throughout this paper we will work in a large, saturated model M of a complete theory T. All types, sets and sequences will have size smaller than the size of M. We will assume that the reader is familiar with the basics of forking in simple theories as laid out in [4] and [6]. For basic stability-theoretic results concerning regular types, orthogonality etc., see [1] or [9].

The (modal) μ-calculus ([14]) is a very powerful extension of modal logic with least and greatest fixed point operators. It is of great interest to computer science for expressing properties of processes such as termination (every run is finite) and fairness (on every infinite run, no action is repeated infinitely often to the exclusion of all others).

The power of the μ-calculus is also evident from a more theoretical perspective. The μ-calculus is a fragment of monadic second-order logic (MSO) containing only formulae that are invariant for bisimulation, in the sense that they cannot distinguish between bisimilar states. Janin and Walukiewicz prove the converse: any property which is invariant for bisimulation and MSO-expressible is already expressible in the μ-calculus ([13]). Yet the μ-calculus enjoys many desirable properties which MSO lacks, like a complete sequent-calculus ([29]), an exponential-time decision procedure, and the finite model property ([25]). Switching from MSO to its bisimulation-invariant fragment gives us these desirable properties.

In this paper we take a classical logician's view of the μ-calculus. As far as we are concerned a new logic should not be allowed into the community of logics without at least considering the standard questions that any logic is bothered with. In this paper we perform this rite of passage for the μ-calculus. The questions we will be concerned with are the following.

It is consistent that there is a set mapping from the four-tuples of ωn into the finite subsets with no free subsets of size tn for some natural number tn. For any n < ω it is consistent that there is a set mapping from the pairs of ωn into the finite subsets with no infinite free sets. For any n < ω it is consistent that there is a set mapping from the pairs of ωn into ωn with no uncountable free sets.

Can one extend crisp Peano arithmetic PA by a possibly many-valued predicate Tr(x) saying “x is true” and satisfying the “dequotation schema” for all sentences φ? This problem is investigated in the frame of Łukasiewicz infinitely valued logic.

Using the Lascar inequalities, we show that any finite rank δ-closed subset of a quasiprojective variety is definably isomorphic to an affine δ-closed set. Moreover, we show that if X is a finite rank subset of the projective space ℙn and a is a generic point of ℙn, then the projection from a is injective on X. Finally we prove that if RM = RC in DCF0, then RM = RU.