This expository paper contains a list of 102 problems which, at the time of publication, are unsolved. These problems are distributed in four subdivisions of logic: model theory, proof theory and intuitionism, recursion theory, and set theory. They are written in the form of statements which we believe to be at least as likely as their negations. These should not be viewed as conjectures since, in some cases, we had no opinion as to which way the problem would go.

In each case where we believe a problem did not originate with us, we made an effort to pinpoint a source. Often this was a difficult matter, based on subjective judgments. When we were unable to pinpoint a source, we left a question mark. No inference should be drawn concerning the beliefs of the originator of a problem as to which way it will go (lest the originator be us).

The choice of these problems was based on five criteria. Firstly, we are only including problems which call for the truth value of a particular mathematical statement. A second criterion is the extent to which the concepts involved in the statements are concepts that are well known, well denned, and well understood, as well as having been extensively considered in the literature. A third criterion is the extent to which these problems have natural, simple and attractive formulations. A fourth criterion is the extent to which there is evidence that a real difficulty exists in finding a solution. Lastly and unavoidably, the extent to which these problems are connected with the author's research interests in mathematical logic.

Partial degrees are equivalence classes of partial natural number functions under some suitable extension of relative recursiveness to partial functions. The usual definitions of relative recursiveness, equivalent in the context of total functions, are distinct when extended to partial functions. The purpose of this paper is to compare the upper semilattice structures of the resulting degrees.

Relative partial recursiveness of partial functions was first introduced in Kleene [2] as an extension of the definition by means of systems of equations of relative recursiveness of total functions. Kleene's relative partial recursiveness is equivalent to the relation between the graphs of partial functions induced by Rogers' [10] relation of relative enumerability (called enumeration reducibility) between sets. The resulting degrees are hence called enumeration degrees. In [2] Davis introduces completely computable or compact functionals of partial functions and uses these to define relative partial recursiveness of partial functions. Davis' functionals are equivalent to the recursive operators introduced in Rogers [10] where a theorem of Myhill and Shepherdson is used to show that the resulting reducibility, here called weak Turing reducibility, is stronger than (i.e., implies, but is not implied by) enumeration reducibility. As in Davis [2], relative recursiveness of total functions with range ⊆{0, 1} may be defined by means of Turing machines with oracles or equivalently as the closure of initial functions under composition, primitive re-cursion, and minimalization (i.e., relative μ-recursiveness). Extending either of these definitions yields a relation between partial functions, here called Turing reducibility, which is stronger still.

We present two finitely axiomatized modal propositional logics, one between T and S4 and the other an extension of S4, which are incomplete with respect to the neighbourhood or Scott-Montague semantics.

Throughout this paper we are referring to logics which contain all the classical connectives and only one modal connective □ (unary), no propositional constants, all classical tautologies, and which are closed under the rules of modus ponens (MP), substitution, and the rule RE (from A ↔ B infer αA ↔ □B). Such logics are called classical by Segerberg [6]. Classical logics which contain the formula □p ∧ □q → □(p ∧ q) (denoted by K) and its “converse,” □{p ∧ q)→ □p ∧ □q (denoted by R) are called regular; regular logics which are closed under the rule of necessitation, RN (from A infer □A), are called normal. The logics that we are particularly concerned with are all normal, although some of our results will be true for all regular or all classical logics. It is well known that K and R and closure under RN imply closure under RE and also that normal logics are also those logics closed under RN and containing □{p → q) → {□p → □q).

In this note we define a class of properties for which the following holds: If we can prove in NF that the property holds for the universe V, then we can prove in NF that it holds for every set equipollent to its power set.

Definition. For any stratified formula A and any variable υ which does not occur in A, let Aυ be the formula obtained by replacing in A each quantifier (Qx) by the bounded quantifier (Qx ∈ SCi(υ)), where i is the type of x in A. We will say that a property P(υ) is typed when there is a stratified sentence S such that P(υ) ↔ Sυ holds in NF.

Examples of typed properties are: “υ is Dedekind-infinite”, “υ is not well-orderable”. Specker [3] proved that these typed properties hold for the universe V, and C. Ward Henson [1] extended this result to any set equipollent to its power set. We will show that such an extension holds for any typed property.

Theorem. For any typed property P(υ):

Proof. Fix a bijective map h: υ → SC(υ) and define for i = 0, 1, 2, …, n, … a bijective map hi: υ → SCi(υ) as follows:

For every formula A, let A(h) be obtained by replacing in A each atomic part (x ∈ y) by (x ∈ h(y)) and each quantifier (Qx) by (Qx ∈ υ).

Our results concern the natural models of Ackermann-type set theories, but they can also be viewed as results about the definability of ordinals in certain sets.

Ackermann's set theory A was introduced in [1] and it is now formulated in the first order predicate calculus with identity, using ∈ for membership and an individual constant V for the class of all sets. We use the letters ϕ, χ, θ, and χ to stand for formulae which do not contain V and capital Greek letters to stand for any formulae. Then, the axioms of A* are the universal closures of

where all the free variables are shown in A4 and z does not occur in the Θ of A2. A is the theory A* − A5.

Most of our notation is standard (for instance, α, β, γ, δ, κ, λ, ξ are variables ranging over ordinals) and, in general, we follow the notation of [7]. When x ⊆ Rα, we use Df(Rα, x) for the set of those elements of Rα which are definable in 〈Rα, ∈〉, using a first order ∈-formula and parameters from x.

We refer the reader to [7] for an outline of the results which are known about A, but we shall summarise those facts which are frequently used in this paper.

In this paper we investigate some of the recursion-theoretic problems which are suggested by the logical notion of independence.

A set S of natural numbers will be said to be k-independent (respectively, ∞-independent) if, roughly speaking, in every correct system there is a k-element set (respectively, an infinite set) of independent true sentences of the form x ∈ S. S will be said to be effectively independent (respectively, absolutely independent) if given any correct system we can generate an infinite set of independent (respectively, absolutely independent) true sentences of the form x ∈ S.

We prove that

(a) S is absolutely independent ⇔S is effectively independent ⇔S is productive;

(b) for every positive integer k there is a Π1 set which is k-independent but not (k + 1)-independent;

(c) there is a Π1 set which is k-independent for all k but not ∞-independent;

(d) there is a co-simple set which is ∞-independent.

We also give two new proofs of the theorem of Myhill [1] on the existence of an infinite set of Σ1 sentences which are absolutely independent relative to Peano arithmetic. The first proof uses the existence of an absolutely independent Π1 set of natural numbers, and the second uses a modification of the method of Gödel and Rosser.

The following is a classical result:

Theorem 1.1. A complete atomic Boolean algebra is isomorphic to a power set algebra [2, p. 70].

One of the consequences of [3] is: If M is a countable standard model of ZF and is a countable (in M) model of a complete ℵ0-categorical theory T, then there is a countable standard model N of ZF and a Λ ∈ N such that the Boolean algebra of definable (in T with parameters from ) subsets of is isomorphic to the power set algebra of Λ in N. In particular if and T the theory of equality with additional axioms asserting the existence of at least n distinct elements for each n < ω, then there is an N and Λ ∈ N with 〈PN(Λ), ⊆〉 isomorphic to the countable, atomic, incomplete Boolean algebra of the finite and cofinite subsets of ω.

From the above we see that some incomplete Boolean algebras can be realized as power sets in standard models of ZF.

Definition 1.1. A countable Boolean algebra 〈B, ≤〉 is a pseudo-power set if there is a countable standard model of ZF, N and a set Λ ∈ N such that

It is clear that a pseudo-power set is atomic.

In [2] Bachmann showed how a hierarchy of normal functions on the countable ordinals Ω can be constructed using certain uncountable ordinals together with appropriate fundamental sequences for limit ordinals, as indexing ordinals for the hierarchy. This method, explained in more detail in §1 below, has been generalized by Pfeiffer [6] and Isles [4] to produce larger hierarchies. Using the hierarchies constructed in this way it is possible, as an immediate consequence of the definitions, to assign ω-sequences 〈αn〉n∈ω to limit ordinals α in an initial segment I of Ω such that . Indeed this was the motivation for Bachmann's original construction. However the initial segments I constructed in this way are of interest even without the fundamental sequences because they occur naturally as the proof-theoretic ordinals associated with particular formal theories. The fundamental sequences necessary for the Bachmann method are not intrinsically of interest proof-theoretically and only serve to obscure the definitions of the associated initial segments. Feferman and Weyhrauch [9] suggested an alternative definition for a sequence of functions on the countable ordinals. This definition was generalized by Aczel [1] who showed how the new functions corresponded to those in Bachmann's hierarchy. (Independently, Weyhrauch established the same results for an initial segment of the sequence of Bachmann functions, i.e. those functions indexed by α < εΩ+1.)

An algorithm has been described by S. Burris [3] which decides if a finite set of identities, whose function symbols are of rank at most 1, has a finite, nontrivial model. (By “nontrivial” it is meant that the universe of the model has at least two elements.) As a consequence of some results announced in the abstracts [2] and [8], it is clear that if the restriction on the ranks of function symbols is relaxed somewhat, then this finite model problem is no longer solvable by an algorithm, or at least not by a “recursive algorithm” as the term is used today.

In this paper we prove a sharp form of this negative result; showing, by the way, that Burris' result is in a sense the best possible result in the positive direction. Our main result is that in a first order language whose only function or relation symbol is a 2-place function symbol (the language of groupoids), the set of identities that have no nontrivial model, is recursively inseparable from the set of identities such that the sentence has a finite model. As a corollary, we have that each of the following problems, restricted to sentences defined in the language of groupoids, is algorithmically unsolvable: (1) to decide if an identity has a finite nontrivial model; (2) to decide if an identity has a nontrivial model; (3) to decide if a universal sentence has a finite model; (4) to decide if a universal sentence has a model. We note that the undecidability of (2) was proved earlier by McNulty [13, Theorem 3.6(i)], improving results obtained by Murskiǐ [14] and by Perkins [17]. The other parts of the corollary seem to be new.

The concept of a topos as a system, or world in which mathematics could be defined and interpreted, was developed by F. W. Lawvere and M. Tierney. Much of their work is embodied in the lecture notes Elementary toposes by A. Kock and G. C. Wraith [6].

In an early paper Lawvere set forth a set of axioms for approximately such a system [8]. The topos constructed there is a set-like category that includes among its axioms an axiom of infinity and an axiom of choice.

In its final form an elementary topos is freed from any such axioms.

The most prominent example of an elementary topos is a set theory with the usual Zermelo-Fraenkel or Godel-Bernays set of axioms.

In this paper I have tried to determine what, if any, is the effect of an axiom of choice introduced in a topos, and how are some of the set-theoretic equivalents of such an axiom related in topos theory.

Since the set-theoretic membership relation ∈, the notions of an “empty” set and a “power” set are definable in topos theory, it makes sense to talk about a “choice map” that picks a single element out of every nonempty object, provided that these objects can be somehow collected into a single object or “family.” In other words, an analogue of the usual choice axiom can be formulated in elementary topos language; this is axiom AC2 of the text.

It is shown that the first-order theory ThR(A) of a countable module over an arbitrary countable ring R is ℵ0-categorical if and only if Ai finite, n ∈ ω, κi ≤ ω. Furthermore, ThR(A) is ℵ0-categorical for all R-modules A if and only if R is finite and there exist only finitely many isomorphism classes of indecomposable R-modules.

In [5] Gödel interpreted Peano arithmetic in Heyting arithmetic. In [8, p. 153], and [7, p. 344, (iii)], Kreisel observed that Gödel's interpretation extended to second order arithmetic. In [11] (see [4, p. 92] for a correction) and [10] Myhill extended the interpretation to type theory. We will show that Gödel's negative interpretation can be extended to Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory. We consider a set theory T formulated in the minimal predicate calculus, which in the presence of the full law of excluded middle is the same as the classical theory of Zermelo and Fraenkel. Then, following Myhill, we define an inner model S in which the axioms of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory are true.

More generally we show that any class X that is (i) transitive in the negative sense, ∀x ∈ X∀y ∈ x ¬ ¬ x ∈ X, (ii) contained in the class St = {x: ∀u(¬ ¬ u ∈ x→ u ∈ x)} of stable sets, and (iii) closed in the sense that ∀x(x ⊆ X ∼ ∼ x ∈ X), is a standard model of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory. The class S is simply the ⊆-least such class, and, hence, could be defined by S = ⋂{X: ∀x(x ⊆ ∼ ∼ X→ ∼ ∼ x ∈ X)}. However, since we can only conservatively extend T to a class theory with Δ01-comprehension, but not with Δ11-comprehension, we will give a Δ01-definition of S within T.