Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-t7fkt Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-25T04:25:54.482Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

The truth is never simple

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 March 2014

John P. Burgess
John P. Burgess*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey 08540
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

The complexity of the set of truths of arithmetic is determined for various theories of truth deriving from Kripke and from Gupta and Herzberger.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Journal of Symbolic Logic , Volume 51 , Issue 3 , September 1986 , pp. 663 - 681
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 1986

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

REFERENCES

[1]Belnap, N. D. Jr., Gupta's rule of revision theory of truth, Journal of Philosophical Logic, vol. 11 (1982), pp. 103–116.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[2]Blamey, S., Partial logic, Handbook of philosophical logic (Gabbay, D. and Guenthner, F., editors), vol. 3, Reidel, Dordrecht, 1986, pp. 1–70.Google Scholar
[3]Gupta, A., Truth and paradox, Journal of Philosophical Logic, vol. 11 (1982), pp. 1–60.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[4]Hellman, G., Review of [7], [8], [3], [5], this Journal, vol. 50 (1985), pp. 1068–1071.Google Scholar
[5]Herzberger, H., Notes on naive semantics, Journal of Philosophical Logic, vol. 11 (1982), pp. 61–102.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[6]Kleene, S. C., Introduction to metamathematics, Van Nostrand, New York, 1952.Google Scholar
[7]Kripke, S., Outline of a theory of truth, Journal of Philosophy, vol. 72 (1975), pp. 690–716.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[8]Martin, R. L. and Woodruff, P. W., On representing ‘true-in-L” in L, Philosophia vol. 5 (1975), pp. 217–221.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[9]McGee, V., Technical notes on three systems of naive semantics (unpublished).Google Scholar
[10]Moschovakis, Y. N., Elementary induction on abstract structures, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1974.Google Scholar
[11]Moschovakis, Y. N., Descriptive set theory, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1980.Google Scholar
[12]van Fraassen, B. C., Formal semantics, Macmillan, New York, 1971.Google Scholar
[13]Visser, A., Semantics and the liar paradox, Handbook of philosophical logic (Gabbay, D. and Guenthner, F., editors), vol. 4, Reidel, Dordrecht (to appear).Google Scholar