R. E. Vesley. A palatable substitute for Kripke's schema. Intuitionism and proof theory, Proceedings of the summer conference at Buffalo N.Y. 1968, edited by A. Kino, J. Myhill, and R. E. Vesley, Studies in logic and the foundations of mathematics, North-Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam and London 1970, pp. 197–207. | The Journal of Symbolic Logic

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R. E. Vesley. A palatable substitute for Kripke's schema. Intuitionism and proof theory, Proceedings of the summer conference at Buffalo N.Y. 1968, edited by A. Kino, J. Myhill, and R. E. Vesley, Studies in logic and the foundations of mathematics, North-Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam and London 1970, pp. 197–207.

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R. E. Vesley. A palatable substitute for Kripke's schema. Intuitionism and proof theory, Proceedings of the summer conference at Buffalo N.Y. 1968, edited by A. Kino, J. Myhill, and R. E. Vesley, Studies in logic and the foundations of mathematics, North-Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam and London 1970, pp. 197–207.

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R. E. Vesley. A palatable substitute for Kripke's schema. Intuitionism and proof theory, Proceedings of the summer conference at Buffalo N.Y. 1968, edited by A. Kino, J. Myhill, and R. E. Vesley, Studies in logic and the foundations of mathematics, North-Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam and London 1970, pp. 197–207.

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