Published online by Cambridge University Press: 12 March 2014
In my American Academy paper of 1937 I gave a mathematical clarification and extension of C. I. Lewis's theory of strict implication using as the base (K, T, ×, ′, ≣). In that paper the element a⊰b (read “a hook b”) was defined by (a⊰b) = (ab′=cc′). The main purpose of the present paper is to show that this definition may be replaced by the simpler definition (a⊰b) = (ab≣a), provided Postulate 15 is replaced by two simpler postulates, 15a and 15b (see below). The paper may also serve to throw further light on the essential difference between Lewis's theory of “strict” implication and the more familiar theory of “material” implication. This paper and the earlier one, when read together, are entirely self-contained, all proofs (including proofs of independence) being given in full and no reference to earlier literature being required.
We begin by reviewing briefly the rôle which logical deduction plays in the writing of any scientific book.
Suppose you sit down to write. What do you actually do? In the last analysis, your activity as an author is a process of voluntary selection, restricted by certain inescapable rules. From an indefinite number of possible propositions which may occur to your imagination, you voluntarily select certain propositions which you accept as being worthy of being written down, one after another, in your book. Every proposition which occurs to you is either accepted, or rejected, or laid aside for further consideration.
1 Postulates for assertion, conjunction, negation, and equality, Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, vol. 72 (1937), pp. 1–44CrossRefGoogle Scholar; published in pamphlet form by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 28 Newbury St., Boston, Mass.
2 Lewis, and Langford, , Symbolic logic, 1932Google Scholar.
3 On the postulates for material implication, see Huntington, E. V., The inter-deduci-bility of the new Hilbert-Bernays theory and Principia Mathematics, Annals of Mathematics, ser. 2, vol. 36 (1935), pp. 313–324CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Quine, W. V., Completeness of the propositional calculus, The journal of symbolic logic, vol. 3 (1938), pp. 37–40CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
4 For an essential suggestion in regard to thè proof of this theorem I am indebted to one of my students, Mr. George W. Brown.
5 See Huntington, E. V., Effective equality and effective implication in formal logic, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 21 (1935), pp. 266–271CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed; and Bennett, A. A. and Baylis, C. A., A calculus for propositioned concepts, Mind, n. s., vol. 44 (1935), pp. 152–167CrossRefGoogle Scholar.