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Belief contraction in the context of the general theory of rational choice

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 March 2014

Hans Rott
Hans Rott*
Affiliation:
Fachgruppe Philosophie, Universität Konstanz, Postfach 5560, D-78434 Konstanz, Germany, E-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

This paper reorganizes and further develops the theory of partial meet contraction which was introduced in a classic paper by Alchourrón, Gärdenfors, and Makinson. Our purpose is threefold. First, we put the theory in a broader perspective by decomposing it into two layers which can respectively be treated by the general theory of choice and preference and elementary model theory. Second, we reprove the two main representation theorems of AGM and present two more representation results for the finite case that “lie between” the former, thereby partially answering an open question of AGM. Our method of proof is uniform insofar as it uses only one form of “revealed preference”, and it explains where and why the finiteness assumption is needed. Third, as an application, we explore the logic characterizing theory contractions in the finite case which are governed by the structure of simple and prioritized belief bases.

Keywords

Theory changebelief revisionrational choicepreferencepartial meet contractionbase contraction
Type
Research Article
Information
The Journal of Symbolic Logic , Volume 58 , Issue 4 , December 1993 , pp. 1426 - 1450
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 1993

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References

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