Published online by Cambridge University Press: 12 March 2014
A logical calculus will be presented which not only is a formulation of a “basic logic” in the sense of the writer's previous papers, but which has the additional property that no weaker calculus can be a formulation of a basic logic. A sort of minimum logical calculus is thus attained, which has nothing superfluous about it for achieving the purpose for which it is designed.
In the case of some logical calculi the question can arise as to whether certain of the postulates are really logically valid and necessary. Sometimes a test is available, such as the truth-table test, enabling us to distinguish between logically valid sentences and others, but often no such test is available, especially where quantifiers are involved. Is or is not the axiom of infinity, for example, to be regarded as logically valid? Or is the principle of double negation really acceptable, even though it satisfies the truth-table test?
1 A basic logic, this Journal, vol. 7 (1942), pp. 105–114; Representations of calculi, ibid., vol. 9 (1944), pp. 57–62. On p. 110 of the former paper omit the leftmost parenthesis of the last formula of theorem 4.11. On p. 58, line 9 of the latter paper replace the first circumflex accent by a tilde, and on p. 61, line 4 place circumflex accents over the first occurrences of ‘z’ and ‘ω’.
2 Quine, W. V., A system of logistic, Cambridge, Mass., 1934.CrossRefGoogle Scholar