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The formalization of mathematics1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 March 2014

Hao Wang
Hao Wang*
Affiliation:
Oxford University
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Extract

Zest for both system and objectivity is the formal logician's original sin. He pays for it by constant frustrations and by living ofttimes the life of an intellectual outcaste. The task of squeezing a large body of stubborn facts into a more or less rigid system can be a painful one, especially since the facts of mathematics are among the most stubborn of all facts. Moreover, the more general and abstract we get, the farther removed we are from the raw mathematical experience. As intuition ceases to operate effectively, we fall into many unexpected traps. The formal logician gets little sympathy for his frustrations. He is regarded as too rigid by his philosophical colleagues and too speculative by his mathematical friends. The life of an intellectual outcaste may be a result partly of temperament and partly of the youthfulness of the logic profession. The unfortunate lack of wide appeal of logic may, however, be prolonged partly on account of the fact that very little of the well-established techniques of mathematics seems applicable to the treatment of serious problems of logic.

The axiomatic method is well suited to provide results which are both exact and systematic. How attractive would it be if we could get an axiom system in which all the axioms and deductions were intuitively clear and all theorems of mathematics were provable? Such a system would undoubtedly satisfy Descartes who admits solely intuition and deduction, which are, for him, the only “mental operations by which we are able, wholly without fear of illusion, to arrive at the knowledge of things.” Indeed, according to Descartes, intuition and deduction “are the most certain routes to knowledge, and the mind should admit no others. All the rest should be rejected as suspect of error and dangerous.”

Type
Research Article
Information
The Journal of Symbolic Logic , Volume 19 , Issue 4 , December 1954 , pp. 241 - 266
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 1954

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Footnotes

1

I wish to thank the referee and Professor Max Black for useful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

References

2 The rules for the direction of the mind, Rule III.

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12 Compare Prolegomena to any future metaphysics, § 52, c.

13 Ibid, §57.

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