The demarcation of boundaries is an important feature of the Sundanese social and geographical landscape. Markers indicating the limits of territories, ceremonial areas and the like abound. Linguistic markers indicate interpersonal social boundaries. Boundaries are generally regarded as places of danger and various supernatural entities are said to guard those between any two spheres in general. On Java generally, regularly recurring anniversaries, such as Idul Fitri and 1 Sura, the Javanese new year are marked with significant ceremonies such as bersih desa or petik laut or, in the past, rampok macan protecting the village or realm from evil.

Less immediately obvious are boundaries in time, marking the transition between zaman, or eras. A change in era is of a different kind from the cyclical changes since by its very nature it is a non-repeating event. The topic of this paper is one such change in West Java, the change from Hindu rule to Islamic hegemony, and the mythology which consequently arose, providing a supernatural explanation for this quite powerful event.

The island of Borneo has maintained until fairly recently a number of tropical rainforest hunting-gathering groups, generally referred to as Punan or Penan (though other local ethnonyms are found). Today, a large proportion of them have switched to a partly settled way of life and some form of agriculture, but even these groups still rely heavily on the forest, collecting jungle products for trade and, often, processing the wild sago palms for their subsistence while collecting. The Bukat, one of these partly settled groups, are found (see Map 1) in Indonesia's West Kalimantan (three hamlets, totalling 300 persons) and East Kalimantan (one hamlet of 150), and in Malaysia's Sarawak (one hamlet of 150).

I. The Philippine Scripts

In 1593, there was printed in Manila a most remarkable xylographic (wood-block) book, comprising Juan de Plascenia's Doctrina Christiana in Spanish, romanized Tagalog and Tagalog script (see Fig. 1). While there is still some debate as to whether this was the first book to be published in the Philippines, there appears little doubt that it constitutes the earliest extant printed example of any Philippine script.

By any measure, Trương Định (1820–64) was one of the leading figures of nineteenth-century Vietnamese resistance to French colonialism. As such, he has received a good deal of scholarly attention in Vietnam, France, the United States, and elsewhere. This article analyses the anti-colonial movement led by Trương Định in southern Vietnam during the years 1859–64, focusing on the questions of Trương Định's relationship to the Vietnamese imperial government at Huế and his motivation for continuing the anti-French struggle after Huế had made peace with France in 1862. Its organization is as follows: first, the historical context is summarized; second, Trương Định's resistance movement and its relationship to the Huế court are analyzed; third, various explanations of Trươg Định's motivation are considered and my own hypothesis is offered.

The writing of Lao history presents peculiar problems, not because of the quantity and quality of sources available (though these leave much to be desired for certain periods), but because of the difficulty in deciding what is meant by “Lao history”. There is a problem in identifying the object of study. Is Lao history the history of those territories inhabited by ethnic Lao, or of the state of Laos as it has existed at various times under various names? The Lao have spread far beyond the geographical boundaries of present-day Laos: many more ethnic Lao live in Thailand than in Laos. Moreover the Lao state ceased to exist as a unitary entity in the early eighteenth century. What was reconstructed by the French nearly two centuries later and exists today is but a fragment composed of territories belonging to former principalities inhabited by diverse peoples, many of whom are not ethnic Lao. They are divided into three broad groups: the Lao Loum, or Lao of the valleys, comprise not only ethnic Lao but also upland Tai and account for about 65 per cent of the population; the Lao Theung, or Lao of the mountain slopes, speaking Mon-Khmer languages, account for around 25 per cent; while the Lao Soung, or Lao of the mountain tops, speaking Tibeto-Burman languages, number perhaps 10 per cent. The terms Lao Loum, Lao Theung and Lao Soung will be used to refer to these groups in this paper.

While the organization of the Philippine sugar industry evolved to promote and balance the short-term interests of planters, millers and traders, it now undermines the industry and threatens the economic fortunes of those who depend upon it. By perpetuating inefficiency and fostering a frenzy of trading that affords inordinate profits for the least productive sector, this structure has become the major obstacle to restoring the Philippines to its former status as one of the world's most efficient and technologically advanced producers of cane sugar. As efficiency falls further behind that of other sugar producing countries, and as industrial consumers become more disgruntled with paying high prices for sugar, the nation risks the collapse of an industry that has already proven vulnerable to intermittent crises. The last time a crisis occurred — in the mid-1980s — planters faced foreclosure, mills stood idle, and workers and their families suffered malnutrition and dislocation, leading commentators to refer to Negros, the nation's premier sugar-growing island, as “Asia's Ethiopia” and a “social volcano”. While conditions have improved since the EDSA Revolution, the structure that has emerged does little to encourage productivity, efficiency and fairness. Since the industry continues to employ 500,000 workers, with as many as three million dependents, a collapse would lead to mass displacement, hunger, and political upheaval.

This paper will outline the history of the Philippine sugar industry, examine its current structure, and describe the political and economic forces that sustain it. My first contention is that the institutional organization, rather than government policy, cultural attitudes, or neo-colonial dependency, is fundamentally responsible for the poor performance of the industry in recent decades and, unless major changes are forthcoming, will be mainly responsible for its ultimate demise.