When the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was founded in 1967 one of its stated objectives was “to promote South-East Asian studies.” The Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand as members of ASEAN in their call for “a strong and resilient Southeast Asia” realize the validity of the regional concept and the consequent need to advance studies on the area. In fact they are emphasizing the indigenous component of the concept.

The history of the Malay world in the eighteenth century is characterised by a constantly shifting balance of power, extreme flexibility in the political patterns, and an ongoing search for strong friends and advantageous allies. Malay and European sources relating to the period contain an often overwhelming amount of information concerning seemingly endless conspiracies, broken treaties, negotiations, and re-alignments. Yet from this maze of detail distinct themes emerge, one of which concerns the activities of various Malay anak raja (sons of kings and pirates) and anak baik (sons of nobles). Existing material allows for the compilation of a number of interesting biographies. We can, for instance, follow the career of Perak's Raja 'Alim, who might have successfully unseated his cousin and become ruler himself had it not been for Dutch intervention. The wandering life led by a Siak prince, Raja Ismail, and his unceasing efforts to rally support for a triumphant return to his homeland are similarly described in both Malay chronicles and the missives of Dutch governors. Such accounts make for absorbing reading and undoubtedly have their own intrinsic historical value. On the other hand, it is perhaps more fruitful to regard anak raja like Raja 'Alim and Raja Ismail not so much as individuals as representatives of a distinct social category within what has been called the “ruling class.” If viewed in this light, the activities of many anak raja mentioned in the records take on a new dimension, and comments concerning their role in Malay history assume a wider application.

One of the most obscure periods in modern Burmese history comprises the reigns of King Tharrawaddy (1837–1846) and his eldest son, Pagan Min (1846–1852). Historians have relied, to varying degrees, on Colonel Henry Yule's unsympathetic and inaccurate retelling of court gossip which portrays the two monarchs as bestial lunatics who murdered and plundered at will. This assessment is as exaggerated as it is simplified and ignores the very real structural problems the Burmese nation experienced between the first and second Anglo-Burmese Wars.

Recent developments have made the Thai Government increasingly uneasy about the continuing disturbances in various parts of the country. The vexing problem of Communist subversion and Vietnamese minorities in the Northeast appears to be matched by growing anxiety over the increase in banditry, assassinations, and the activities of several illegal organized groups in the extreme South. Concern is mounting particularly over reports of alarming agitation by resentful elements in the southern Thailand-Peninsular Malaysia border region. Perhaps the most unpleasant strand in the pattern of unrest, and the most serious threat to national integrity, is the tendency to irredentism among the Muslim Malays in the provinces of Pattani, Yala, Setul and Narathiwat in southern Thailand.

One of the more recent drop-outs from the world's electoral club was the Philippines, a nation with a remarkably stable two-party system stretching, in the years since independence, over some twenty-five years. With the imposition of martial law in September 1972, the curtain was drawn, at least temporarily, on the longest running democracy in Southeast Asia. The purpose of this study is neither to praise nor bury the pre-1972 Philippine electoral system, but rather to look more closely at some recurring patterns which emerged during this period—patterns which, it will be argued, conform to a “machine model” of politics.

The decade of the 1950s constituted a turning-point in the history of Malayan rubber. This was marked by a changed world rubber market, along with incipient changes in Malayan economic aspirations and policies. Internationally, the creation of a large synthetic rubber industry in the main consuming country, the United States, posed a challenge to the competitive position and long-run prospects of Malayan plantation rubber. While coping with this challenge, the rubber industry, as the mainstay of the Malayan economy, had to simultaneously satisfy emergent claims for domestic development. Indeed, Malayan rubber was itself confronted with two coterminous developmental issues: its own internal development towards more efficient forms of production; and the provision of a resource base for the development of other economic and social sectors. By way of response to these cumulative challenges, a transformation occurred with respect to the government's role in Malaya's rubber economy, with rubber emerging as the lynchpin of an evolving development strategy. In the process, the Malayan rubber plantation industry was to undergo a fundamental and wide-ranging structural transfiguration.

In August 1953, Dr Ali Sastroamidjojo formed his first Cabinet in Indonesia. In doing so, he heralded the beginning of some major changes in Indonesian policies, both domestic and foreign. It is the purpose of this paper to examine certain aspects of the latter policy, particularly with respect to the United Nations.