1 The royal imaginary is an important symbolic element connected to Buddhist ethics and cosmology as a medium of politics in Burma. See Thett, Ko Ko, ‘Kowtowing holds up political progress in Burma’, Irrawaddy, 27 Nov. 2009, pp. 1–3Google Scholar, http://www.irrawaddy.org/opinion_story.php?art_id=17300. The three famous kings are Anawratha, Bayinnaung and Alaùnghpayà. The first introduced Buddhism in Pagan; the second conquered Ayutthaya, capital of Siam; and the last annexed the Mon kingdom of Pegu.

2 James C. Scott's concept of a non-state space is broad: it can be a zone of refuge, of cultural refusal, of resistance and rebellion against state and rulers, egalitarian, yet also a zone of emulation of monarchical rule. See Scott, James C., The art of not being governed: An anarchist history of upland Southeast Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009)Google ScholarPubMed. On the Karen and the state, see Jørgensen, Anders B., ‘Karen natural resources management and relations to state polity’, in Facets of power and its limitations: Political culture in Southeast Asia, Uppsala Studies in Cultural Anthropology, no. 24, ed. Trankell, Ing-Britt and Summers, Laura (Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, 2001), pp. 213–38Google Scholar; and Gravers, Mikael, ‘Cosmology, prophets, and rebellion among the Buddhist Karen in Burma and Thailand’, Moussons, 4 (2001): 1–31Google Scholar.

3 Taylor, Charles, Modern social imaginaries (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005)Google Scholar discusses the collective imaginary in relation to modernity, disenchantment and individualism. He emphasises the sense of a legitimate moral order. See also Appadurai, Arjun, Modernity at large: Cultural dimensions of globalization (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), pp. 30–1Google Scholar. He considers the imaginary to be a key concept of the new global order. The imaginary is derived from the French imaginaire and is close to Durkheim's collective representation. The term has been used by Lacan, Althusser, Sartre and others. See, for example, Sartre, Jean-Paul, The imaginary: A phenomenological psychology of the imagination (London: Routledge, 2004)Google Scholar.

4 Eric Wolf, in his discussion of power and cosmology, argues that power is enhanced by rooting it in primordial cosmological arrangements. Rulership is anchored in a cultural structure of imagining. These imaginings postulate cosmologies, and cosmologies articulate ideologies whereby wielders of power act as executors on behalf of the cosmic order and its forces. Wolf, Eric, Envisioning power: Ideologies of dominance and crisis (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), pp. 283–4Google Scholar.

5 On religion and memory, see Halbwachs, Maurice, On collective memory, ed. trans., and with an introduction by Coser, Lewis A. (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1992)Google Scholar. On Karen identity and religion, see Hayami, Yoko, Between hills and plains: Power and practice in socio-religious dynamics of the Karen (Kyoto: Kyoto University Press and Melbourne: Trans-Pacific Press, 2004)Google Scholar.

6 Collins, Steven, Nirvana and other Buddhist felicities: Utopias of the Pali imaginaire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 41CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

7 The anthropologist becomes part of the imaginary and memory when he calls them to mind among his informants during conversation and may further sustain them in his writings.

8 See Gravers, Mikael, ‘The making of a Karen nation’, in Asian forms of a nation, ed. Tönnesson, Stein and Antlöv, Hans (Richmond: Curzon, 1996), pp. 237–69Google Scholar; and ‘Conversion and identity: The formation of Karen ethnic identity in Burma’, in Exploring ethnic identity in Burma, ed. Gravers, Mikael (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2007), pp. 227–58Google Scholar.

9 On Karen rebellions in Burma, see Gravers, ‘Cosmology, prophets and rebellion’.

10 Jenkins, Richard, ‘Disenchantment, enchantment and re-enchantment: Max Weber at the millennium’, Max Weber Studies, 1 (2000): 11–32Google Scholar.

11 Touraine, Alain, A new paradigm for understanding today's world (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007)Google Scholar.

12 See Stern, Theodore, ‘Ariya and the Golden Book: A millenarian sect among the Karen’, Journal of Asian Studies, 27, 2 (1968): 297–328CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Hinton, Peter, ‘The Karen millennialism and the politics of accommodation to lowland states’, in Ethnic adaptation and identity: The Karen on the Thai frontier with Burma, ed. Keyes, Charles F. (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1979), pp. 81–98Google Scholar.

13 Koening, William J., The Burmese polity, 1752–1819: Politics, administration, and social organization in the early Kon-baung period (Ann Arbor: Center for South and Southeast Asian Studies, University of Michigan, paper no. 34, 1990)Google Scholar.

14 On King Taksin, see Wyatt, David K., Thailand: A short history (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), pp. 139–45Google Scholar. On the modern discourse of royalty, see Gray, Christine, ‘Royal words and their un-royal consequences’, Cultural Anthropology, 7, 4 (1999): 448–63CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Michael Connors, Democracy and national identity; and Jackson, Peter, ‘“Virtual divinity'”: A 21st-century discourse of Thai royal influence’, in Saying the unsayable: Monarchy and democracy in Thailand, ed. Ivarsson, Soren and Isager, Lotte (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2010), pp. 29–60Google Scholar.

15 See the important analysis of parami by HRH Princess Sirindhorn, Maha Chakri, ‘Parami: A Buddhist concept in the Thai context’, in Buddhist legacies in Mainland Southeast Asia: Mentalities, interpretations and practices, ed. Lagirade, F. and Koanantakool, P. Chalermpow (Bangkok: Princess Maha Chakri Sirindhorn Anthropology Centre and Paris: École française d'Extrême-Orient, 2006), pp. 19–31Google Scholar. Parami means the complete achievements necessary to obtain enlightenment. It was originally used in Thailand as qualities (phra parami) of a monarch. Today it refers to power accumulated by a virtuous person, a charismatic person. For a detailed analysis of Buddhist concepts, see Tambiah, Stanley J., World conqueror, world renouncer: A study of Buddhism and polity in Thailand against historical background (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

16 Kyi, Aung San Suu, Freedom from fear and other writings (London: Penguin, 1991)Google Scholar. On parami in recent political events in Thailand, see Winichakul, Thongchai, ‘Toppling democracy’, Journal of Contemporary Asia, 38, 1 (2008): 11–37CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

17 In the colonial documents his name is spelled Duai Gow. However, Duai is pronounced Dwae and since Gwae is part of the name of other mìn laùng leaders, Dwae might be either a misspelling in the British dispatches or a variant of the same name. Buddhism among Eastern Pwo is very much influenced by Mon tradition.

18 Ongsakul, Sarasawadee, History of Lanna, trans. Tanratanakul, Chitraporn (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 2005)Google Scholar.

19 His identity is obscure. British documents say he was from Bassein or Tongoo and a former Christian. However, there may have been two leaders, one in Bassein and one in Papun. The messages and proclamations were identical and there seems to have been coordination between the hills and the delta. ‘Karens Political Future’, India Political and Foreign Proceedings 1856–58, Oriental and India Office: M/4/3023, British Library, London.

20 Ibid.; Smith, Martin, Burma: Insurgency and the politics of ethnicity (London: Zed Books, 1991), p. 437Google Scholar.

21 Lehman, F.K., ‘The relevance of the founders' cult for understanding the political systems of the peoples of northern Southeast Asia and its Chinese borderlands’, in Founders' cults in Southeast Asia: Ancestors, polity, and identity, ed. Tannenbaum, Nicola and Kammerer, Cornelia A. (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, Monograph 52, 2003), pp. 15–39Google Scholar. Lehman has shown that the Kayah had a similar royal cult. They emulated the Shan saopha or sawbwa (‘prince’) rule. Mìn laùngs such as Gwae Gau allied with the sawbwa (ruler) of Eastern Kayah State and retreated here. See Lehman, F.K., ‘Kayah society as a function of the Shan–Burma–Karen context’, in Contemporary change in traditional societies, vol. 2, ed. Steward, Julian H. (Urbana: University of Illinois, 1967), pp. 3–103Google Scholar; and Hlaing, F.K.L. Chit, ‘Some remarks upon ethnicity theory and Southeast Asia with special reference to the Kayah and the Kachin’, in Exploring ethnic diversity in Burma, ed. Gravers, Mikael (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2007), pp. 107–48Google Scholar.

22 The following account is based on Lieberman, Victor, Burmese administrative cycles: Anarchy and conquest, c. 1580–1760 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Relationship with Burma, part I: Selected articles from the Journal of the Siam Society (Bangkok: Siam Society, 1959)Google Scholar; Toshikatzu, Ito, ‘Karens and the Kon-baung polity in Myanmar’, Acta Asiatica, 92 (2007): 89–108Google Scholar, as well as in documents in the Oriental and India Office, British Library: India Political and Foreign Proceedings 1856–58.

23 See Brailey, Nigel, ‘A re-investigation of the Gwe of eighteenth century Burma’, Journal of Southeast Asian History, 1, 2 (1970): 33–47CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Lehman, F.K., ‘Who are the Karen, and if so why? Karen ethnohistory and a formal theory of ethnicity’, in Ethnic adaptation and identity, ed. Keyes, (Philadelphia: Institute for the Studies of Human Issues, 1979), pp. 215–53Google Scholar; the exact meaning of the word remains disputed.

24 Gabaung means vessel or boat. Kwanchewan Buadaeng, ‘Letters of contestation: Leke religious cults of the Karens in Thailand and Myanmar’ (Paper presented at the Centre for Southeast Asian Studies [hereafter CSEAS], Kyoto University, 23 Mar. 2007), p. 36, provides an interesting description of the syncretic Leke movement near the mountain where they construct their temples in the shape of boats. Karen from this area are still called Gwae Gabaung people. A company established in the 1990s by the Karen non-governmental organisation (NGO), the Karen Peace Committee in Rangoon, is called Kwe Ka Bau (Gwae Ga Baung). It runs a hospital in Insein and clinics in Karen areas.

25 There are many stupas around the mountain as well as one on the top; one is called Dong Yin (Doung Yaung). According to Yoko Hayami, the Gwae Gabaung Mountain is considered the founding place of Karen Buddhist culture. It is still a ritual centre. A young Karen religious leader, Puu Ta Ki (or Phu Dakhè: ‘grandfather morality’), has gained a large following and is building stupas. He claims he was a Karen King of Doung Yang in his former life and a bodhisatta (Hayami, Between hills and plains, p. 13).

26 Kwanchewan Buadaeng, ‘Continuation and disruption of Karen religious movements: A case of the Myitta Byamasoe in Burma’ (paper presented at the International Conference on ‘Southeast Asia: A global crossroads’, Chiang Mai, 8–9 Dec. 2007), p. 21. Prager, Susanne, ‘Coming of the “future king”. Burmese min laung: Expectations before and during the Second World War’, Journal of Burma Studies, 8 (2003): 1–32CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

27 Carpenter, C.H., ‘A tour among the Karen in Siam’, Baptist Missionary Magazine, 53 (1873): 9–16Google Scholar.

28 See Renard, Ronald D., ‘The role of the Karens in Thai society during the early Bangkok period, 1782–1873’, Contributions to Asian Studies, 15 (1980): 15–28Google Scholar; Renard, Ronald D., ‘The integration of Karen in northern Thai political life during the nineteenth century’, in Anuson Walter Vella, ed. Renard, Ronald D. (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1986), pp. 229–48Google Scholar; and Sarasawadee, History of Lanna.

29 According to Keyes, Charles, ‘Millennialism, Theravada Buddhism, and Thai society’, Journal of Asian Studies, 36, 2 (1977): 283–302Google Scholar, symbols of the king and the Buddha are linked in rituals and legitimise both king and rebel Phu Mi Bun or future king. See also Wilson, Constance M., ‘The Holy Man in the history of Thailand and Laos’, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 28, 2 (1997): 345–64CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

30 Falla, Jonathan, True love and Bartholomew: Rebels on the Burmese border (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. On religion and Karen nationalism, see Gravers, ‘The making of a Karen nation’. On the image of the orphan, see Hayami, Yoko, ‘Karen tradition according to Christ or Buddha: The implications of multiple reinterpretations for a minority ethnic group in Thailand’, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 27, 2 (1996): 334–49CrossRefGoogle Scholar; for recent Pwo Karen orphan tales, see Hinton, Elisabeth, Oldest brother's story: Tales of the Pwo Karen (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 1999)Google Scholar.

31 Po, San C., Burma and the Karens (London: Elliot Stock, 1928)Google Scholar. San C. Po was a prominent Karen political leader. Hovemyr, Anders, In search of the Karen king (Uppsala: Studia Missionaria Uppsaliensia, 1989)Google Scholar, emphasised the Karen self-identification as underprivileged orphans, but with a sense of moral superiority. However, his sources are mainly missionary texts, resulting in a somewhat biased interpretation.

32 The poems were trans. by missionary Mason, Francis and printed in ‘Traditions of the Karen’, Baptist Missionary Magazine (Missionary Register), 14 (1834): 382–93Google Scholar; and in Mason, Ellen B., Civilizing mountain men (London: James Nisbet & Co, 1862)Google Scholar. My emphasis.

33 See Gravers, , ‘Cosmology, prophets and rebellion’, and ‘Conversion and identity: The formation of Karen ethnic identity in Burma’, in Exploring ethnic diversity in Burma, ed. Gravers, Mikael (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2007), pp. 227–58Google Scholar, for a critical assessment of missionary interpretations of Karen cosmology.

34 On the concepts, see Aung-Thwin, Michael, ‘Divinity, spirit, human: Conceptions of classical Burmese kingship’, in Centers, symbols, and hierarchies: Essays on the classical states of Southeast Asia, ed. Gesick, Lorraine (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, Monograph 26, 1983)Google Scholar. For a fine discussion of the mandala concept, see Chutintaranond, Sunait, On both sides of the Tenasserim range: History of Siamese Burmese relations (Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University, Institute of Asian Studies, Monograph 50, 1995)Google Scholar. Royal states were segmentary systems based on tributary and marriage alliances, that is, personal networks where rebellion and fragmentation often occurred.

35 There are several other denominations in Burma and Thailand based on the same ideas but with ritual variations such as Du Wae, Lu Wa and Wi Maung. See Stern, ‘Ariya and the Golden Book’; Gravers, ‘Cosmology, prophets and rebellion’; Andersen, Kirsten Ewers, ‘Two indigenous Karen religious denominations’, Folk, 23 (1981): 251–61Google Scholar; Yoko Hayami, ‘Stupas and wedding vows: Buddhist and sectarian practices in Karen state’ (Kyoto: University of Kyoto, CSEAS Working paper no. 8, G-COR series 6, 2008), p. 35; and Kwanchewan, ‘Letters of contestation’. On the Talakhoung (Ta-la-ku) movement, see Buadaeng, Kwanchewan, ‘Constructing and maintaining the Ta-la-ku community: The Karen along the Thai–Myanmar border’, in Imagining communities in Thailand: Ethnographic approaches, ed. Tanabe, Shigeharu (Chiang Mai: Mekong Press, 2008), pp. 83–106Google Scholar.

36 See Stanley J. Tambiah, World conqueror, world renouncer. For a northern Thai version of Buddhist apocalyptic imaginary, see Swearer, Donald K., Premchit, Sommai and Dobuakaew, Phaithoon, Sacred mountains of northern Thailand and their legends (Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 2004)Google Scholar. During the ‘dark age’ (Kala Yuga) monks will be immoral, people will do evil things, there will be war and suffering, sexual morality degenerate and Buddhist wisdom will disappear. Karen share this imaginary with Burmese and Thai, but perhaps with a more literal interpretation.

37 The origin of the movement is not certain. It is one of a long line of movements existing before British colonisation (see Stern, ‘Ariya and the Golden Book’; Gravers, ‘Cosmology, prophets, and rebellion’). Th' Soeng Ne Dje was probably a former monk. No information about the person was known to Pwo Karen informants in 1970.

38 See Hayami, Between hills and plains, for a detailed description of aung hrae (au xae) among the Sgaw Karen. The sacrifices are for the family spirits in order to protect the soul of the living against illness.

39 The Karen have often been disappointed in their search for leaders. Christian missionaries consider the Karen especially prone to following leaders who are termed ‘false prophets’ in Christian cosmology.

40 This popular legend was narrated and recorded in Pwo Karen villages in 1971–72 by Anders Baltzer Jørgensen, Kirsten Ewers Andersen and the author. It was meticulously trans. by Theisa Say (Charoen Pachee) in co-operation with the three ethnographers. Burmese words are used in the text, and the original author is from Pa-an in Burma, a centre of Pwo Karen culture. The Pa-o have a similar legend of a Pa-o king.

41 On the myth of the lost book, see Falla, True love and Bartholomew. He relates missionary versions of Karen legends and myths and their role among exiled Karen. The white foreigner shall return with the Golden Book of Knowledge in the version recounted by missionary Francis Mason — a proof of the Lost Tribe of Israel waiting for the Messiah and the Bible. Significantly, in the Buddhist version the book is given and returned by Ga Cha Glong, the Lord of the Stupa (Ariya). See Gravers, ‘Conversion and identity’.

42 See Scott, James G. (Shway Yoe), The Burman: His life and notions, 2 vols. (London: Macmillan, 1882), vol. 1, p. 186Google Scholar, for a similar Burmese legend of two brothers who received a hair from The Buddha. A northern Thai version is related in Swearer et al., Sacred mountains of northern Thailand. King Indra is involved in building stupas for the hair relics. Enshrining and keeping relics signify royal power and protection for the Buddha's teachings.

43 On the spire, see Gravers, ‘Cosmology, prophets, and rebellion’. The Talakhoung (Talaku) movement shares the legend of Phu Le Aung Hai (or Yaw Hae). According to Kwanchewan, the name means ‘one who possesses virtue’ (‘Constructing and maintaining the Ta-la-ku Community’, p. 91). Talakhoung had entered an offensive phase in the 1960s when the 7th Phu Chaik (Grandfather Buddha, chaik [g'jai'] is a Mon word for Buddha), head of the Talakhoung, followed a prophecy of imminent change and the arrival of Ariya and began attacking the Burmese army. He later contacted the Communist guerrillas and was executed by the KNU.

44 Herzfeld, Michael, Cultural intimacy: Social poetics in the nation state, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2005)Google Scholar.

45 The author stayed and worked in ten villages with approximately 1000 Pwo Karen from 1970–72 and has regularly visited these and conducted numerous interviews until 2010. During this period, community-based subsistence agriculture was replaced by individual cash cropping. See Mikael Gravers, ‘The Pwo Karen ethnic minority in the Thai nation: Destructive “hill tribe” or utopian conservationists?’ (Copenhagen: Centre for East & Southeast Asian Studies, Copenhagen University, discussion paper no. 23, 1994), pp. 21–46. Thai students came to teach democracy in the 1970s, followed by CPT members, who tried to mobilise the villagers for their revolutionary struggle.

46 Young women were harassed by the soldiers. Later, in a tragic incident in 1992, Lu Baung Karen in Mae Chanta, Tak province, killed five Border Patrol Police (BPP) soldiers. These Karen under a young boung kho, Di Liao Eng (perhaps named after the legendary king Phu Le Aung Hai since Hai is pronounced with a nasal ending in Pwo: ‘eing’), felt intimidated by the soldiers, who allegedly demolished the Karen stupa and broke the Karen ban on eating meat and drinking alcohol. The Karen feared eviction from the forest and defended their sacred space. Seven Karen were killed and twenty-two jailed (Bangkok Post, ‘Outlook’, 20 Nov. 1992). Some reports did not consider these Karen to be Buddhists, but followers of a hermit (ruesi) and animists. On this period and its political struggles, see Phongpaichit, Pasuk and Baker, Chris, Thailand: Economy and politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), ch. 9Google Scholar; and Connors, Democracy and national identity, ch. 4.

47 The pole may be an imitation of the lak müang pole — a city post, signifying the power centre of a city. It has four arms as the four directions perhaps signifying the four lokapala. See Davis, Richard, Muang metaphysics (Bangkok, Pandora, 1984), p. 76Google Scholar. On similar ritual poles among the Kayah, see Lehman, ‘Kayah society as a function of the Shan–Burman–Karen context’, p. 30 and following, and Chit Hlaing (F.K. Lehman), ‘Some remarks upon ethnicity theory’.

48 On the community culture concept in recent Thai political debates, see Reynolds, Craig J., ‘Globalisers vs. communitarians: Public intellectuals debate Thailand's future’, Singapore Journal of Geography, 22, 3 (2001): 251–69Google Scholar.

49 Bangkok Post, 25 Mar. 2004. Shooting, stealing, drugs, poaching and polygamy are strictly forbidden and the young must obey their elders.

50 Hinton, ‘Karen millennialism’, p. 84. The title khruba (khuba in northern Thai) means ‘venerable teacher’. The Karen refer to Wong as Phu Ga Cha (‘Grandfather Lord’). His full name is Khruba Wongsa Phattana (the last word means ‘development’). On the khruba movement, see Cohen, Paul T., ‘Buddhism unshackled: The Yuan “holy man” tradition and the nation-state in the Tai world’, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 32, 2 (2001): 227–47CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Buadaeng, Kwanchewan, ‘Khuba movements and the Karen in northern Thailand: Negotiating sacred space and identity’, in Cultural diversity and conservation in the making of mainland Southeast Asia and southwestern China: Regional dynamics past and present, ed. Hayashi, Yukio and Sayavongkhamdyds, Thongsa (Bangkok: Amarin, 2003), pp. 262–93Google Scholar. On Khruba Siwichai and Khruba Khao Pi, see Keyes, Charles F., ‘Death of two Buddhist saints in Thailand’, Journal of the American Academy of Religion, 48, 3–4 (1984): 149–79Google Scholar. The khruba movement is inspired by the forest monk tradition; see Tambiah, Stanley J., The Buddhist saints of the forest and the cult of amulets: A study of charisma, hagiography, sectarianism, and millennial Buddhism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Taylor, J.L., Forest monks and the nation-state: An anthropological and historical study in north-eastern Thailand (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1993)Google Scholar. A khruba is often considered to have special merit (ton bun) and the potential to be a bodhisatta. The embalmed bodies of Wong and Khao Pi are kept for veneration by their followers; their spiritual capital is preserved.

51 Today, only 25 per cent, or even less, follow the rules strictly. A few shops sell beer and meat.

52 Wat Phrabat Huay Tom has long had relations with prominent Burmese monks in the Karen State in Burma such as Hsayadaw Thamanya and U Thuzana. U Thuzana prophesied peace among the Karen when 50 white stupas had been constructed, and he discovered a lost Karen alphabet called Lei Tjaung hwei' (‘letters of chicken scratch’) or Lei Gwae Gau after the famous mìn laùng. On these monks, see Rozenberg, Guillaume, Renunciation and power: The quest for sainthood in contemporary Burma (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asian Studies, monograph 59, 2010)Google Scholar; Gravers, Mikael, ‘The monk in command’, Irrawaddy, 18, 5 (2010)Google Scholar, http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=18407; and Mikael Gravers, ‘Religious imaginary as an alternative social and moral order: Karen Buddhism across the Thai–Burma border’, paper for the workshop, ‘Transnational religion, missionization, and refugee migrants’, Göttingen, 6–7 Oct. 2011.

53 See Keyes, Charles F., ‘Buddhism and national integration in Thailand’, Journal of Asian Studies, 30, 3 (1971): 551–67CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

54 Djau La' told his followers he knew the site of the grave of Gwae Gau, the mìn laùng, and his wife Naw Bo, and that Gwae Gau's robes were hidden in Lamphun.

55 The radiant sun symbolises the king's power; the silver gleaming moon is a symbol of pure Buddhism. The messengers probably never met the King in person.

56 He was jailed for fraud, but had a considerable following among the Karen.

57 According to Walker, Anthony R., Merit and millennium: Routine and crises in the ritual lives of the Lahu people (New Delhi: Hindustan Publishing, 2003)Google Scholar, Buddhist Lahu have a similar history of prophecies and quests for moral leadership: they combine Buddhism and a belief in a creator god; their ritual sites and stupas also use carved poles; and they have been involved in rebellions against authorities in Burma and China. This seems to be a similar strategy to creating a sacred, non-state space.

58 This capacity among the poor to imagine a better future is discussed by Appadurai, Arjun, ‘The capacity to aspire: Culture and the terms of recognition’, in Culture and public action, ed. Rao, Vijayendra and Walton, Michael (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004)Google Scholar.

59 Gravers, Mikael, ‘Moving from the edge: Karen strategies of modernizing transition’, in Challenging the limits: Indigenous people of the Mekong region, ed. Leepreecha, Prasit, McCaskill, Don and Buadaeng, Kwanchewan (Chiang Mai: Mekong Press, 2008), pp. 145–80Google Scholar. On the mine, see Bangkok Post, 18 Oct. 2007.

60 Bangkok Post, 1 Sept. 2006: ‘The nation is sacred. People who think about using it for personal or group benefits will be met with misfortune. Phra Syam Thewathirat always protects good people and condemns bad people to a life of suffering.’ Phra Syam, the guardian spirit of the Thai nation, is connected to the City Pillar (lak muang) in Bangkok and symbolises the Chakri dynasty, thus fusing the nation, divine power and royalty in a concept of high moral leadership (‘good people’, khon tham dee). Thaksin replied: ‘A charismatic figure is wielding extra-constitutional force interfering with agencies set up under the constitution’ (Bangkok Post, 30 June 2006). On morality and Thai political leadership, see Connors, Michael Kelly, Democracy and national identity in Thailand (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2007)Google Scholar, and Jackson, ‘Virtual divinity’. I have discussed moral leadership in Mikael Gravers, ‘In quest of moral leadership: Buddhist ethics, politics and lay movements in Thailand’, paper presented at the conference, ‘Varieties of secularism’, Sandbjerg Castle, Denmark, May 2008, p. 28.

61 On Thaksin's karma, see The Nation, 2 Nov. 2008. The Karen view was related to me by Vinai Boonlue SJ, personal communication, 2007. The Karen emphasise Thaksin's campaign against drug dealers as an important effort. On Thaksin, the King and the Karen, see Gravers, Mikael, ‘Thaksin the orphan, and the king: Contested moral leadership as seen by poor Buddhist Karen’, Asia Insights, 3 (2007): 19–22Google Scholar; and Gravers, ‘Moving from the edge’.

62 See Jackson, ‘Virtual divinity’; and Taylor, James L., Buddhism and postmodern imagining in Thailand (Farnham: Ashgate, 2008)Google Scholar. A comparison of the Karen and Thai imaginaries is not possible here.

63 Hinton, ‘The Karen millennialism’, p. 84.