This volume's eight chapters by experts on the Mekong River offer comprehensive, unbiased, and meticulous analyses of the sociopolitical, cultural and ecological issues surrounding China's growing interest and influence in the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS). The book focuses on the challenges for the GMS countries in coping with a rising and ambitious China, with a view to managing a complex, interwoven relationship in a healthier and more predictable manner for the sake of regional peace and development. However, China's regional megaprojects increasingly reveal striking differences between the GMS's grassroots and civil society and an enthusiatic ASEAN elite (pp. 2–3).
The book argues that the post-Cold War problems between China and the GMS have primarily been related to China's perceptions, approach and strategic goals and objectives with regards to the region. To name a few contentious areas, the territorialisation by Chinese enterprises via so-called ‘land grabs’ or land concessions to create different types of zoning or ‘spaces of exception’, the growing influence of new state-supported Chinese immigrants (xin yi ming), and China's sense of a ‘civilising mission’ (upholding ancient Chinese values as visionary alternatives to those of the West) have demonstrated Beijing's regional strategy. The case studies from Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam in this book testify to China's failure in conducting a harmonious and fruitful relationship with its GMS neighbours.
It is worth noting that territorial disputes, historical mistrust and ideological/political constraints were largely dismissed by regional elites in the mid-2000s, in the wake of Beijing's ‘charm offensive’ in Asia and optimism about an economic take-off. Beijing's handling of its new challenges have ironically resulted in a more troubled relationship, marked by memories of hostile past interactions as well as ongoing coercion and discontent. Inconsistencies between words and deeds as well as the unpredictability of China's pursuit of its self-proclaimed ‘good neighbourliness policy’ with the smaller states in the Mekong region and the rest of Southeast Asia have undoubtedly caused further confusion and complexity for regional stability. In other words, China's strategic credibility, long-term vision, and strategic trust have been called into question.
The contributions of this book aside, several points and arguments need to be appropriately addressed to grasp a better understanding of the far-reaching implications of China's rise in the Mekong region.
First, while historical distrust, suspicion and a Cold War mentality did not loom large over China–GMS countries in the early 1990s, such problems were not ‘dead and gone’, Yos Santasombat points out (p. 18), given the lingering legacies and simmering tensions in the region. There has been a revived mistrust of China's strategic ambitions and its re-ascendancy to great power status in the contemporary era, which serve as a reminder of the concept of Tianxia (‘All under Heaven’) — the ancient vision of an hierarchical world order and tributary system.
Second, China's soft power projection, including its norms and values, has increasingly become less appealing to its Mekong neighbours. China's ties with regional countries have basically been driven by its material power, either for economic benefit or as a form of coercion rather idealism. In Laos, the local backlash to Chinese investors’ civilising model in the Golden Triangle SEZ, which aimed to replace the rural Lao way of life with a ‘civilised’ and good lifestyle, is a case in point, revealing the risks of future conflicts and crises in recipient countries (pp. 13–14). China's preoccupation with its own interests, and its half-hearted commitment to bilateral and regional investment projects, only serve as a stumbling block instead of the stepping stone that Beijing desperately seeks.
Third, the GMS countries should adopt constructive and innovative approaches in strengthening their respective power vis-á-vis China, avoiding an over-reliance on its economic wealth and political power. The so-called free-ride on the ‘Chinese economic express’ (p. 47) will not work for the GMS countries if they are not ready for internal restructuring, transformation and integration, as empirically evidenced in the case of Vietnam with regard to China's capital inflows in dealing with poverty reduction and rising unemployment (pp. 75–6). The impacts of economic flows from China on Vietnam's development are quite limited, especially in light of heightened tensions over the former's assertiveness in disputed seas and possible tit-for-tat scenarios.
This book presents timely and important research on China and the mainland Southeast Asian countries as they advance to a new stage of a deepening strategic partnership, offering insightful perspectives of scholars from different countries and disciplines in Asia.