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A Question of Expediency: Britain, the United States and Thailand, 1941–42

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 August 2009

Richard Aldrich
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Extract

This passage was written on 27 March 1945 by Major Andrew Gilchrist, a Foreign Office official serving with the Special Operations Executive in Thailand. It neatly demonstrates the manner in which the wartime debate within and between the various Allied bureaucracies responsible for Thailand's post war status appeared to be dominated by the circumstances of Thailand's rapid capitulation to Japan in December 1941. Subsequently, diametrically opposed interpretations of these unhappy events were employed both by Britain to legitimize her wartime plans to re-establish a degree of control over Thailand, and also by the United States to justify her attempts to thwart perceived British aggrandizement in Southeast Asia. Yet despite the clear importance of the events of 1941 for Thailand's relations with the Allies, her place in the outbreak of the Pacific War is not yet fully understood.

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Articles
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Journal of Southeast Asian Studies , Volume 19 , Issue 2 , September 1988 , pp. 209 - 244
Copyright
Copyright © The National University of Singapore 1988

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References

The author wishes to thank the Franklin D. Roosevelt Four Freedoms Foundation and Corpus Christi College, Cambridge for assistance that facilitated the writing of this article. Gratitude is also expressed to Dr Peter Lowe, Dr David Reynolds and members of the Seminar on the Recent History of South East Asia at SO AS, University of London, for their comments on earlier versions of this paper. Responsibility for errors remains with the author.

1 Gilchrist (SOE) to Brain, Very Secret and Personal, 27 March 1945, F2145/738/40, FO 371/46560 (London: Public Record Office). Subsequent references to the Air Ministry Series (AIR), the Cabinet Series (CAB), the Colonial Office Series (CO), the Foreign Office Series (FO) and the War Office Series (WO) are also to documents from the PRO. Transcripts of Crown-copyright records in the Public Record Office, London appear by permission of the Controller of Her Majesty's Stationery Office. All references referring to Record Groups (RG) indicate material from the National Archives, Washington.

2 For a detailed picture of British wartime policy towards Thailand from the Foreign Office perspective, see Tarling, N., ‘Atonement before Absolution: British Policy Towards Thailand During World War II’, Journal of Siam Society 66, Part I (01 1978): 22–65Google Scholar, and ‘Rice and Reconciliation: The Anglo-Thai Peace Negotiations of 1945’, Journal of Siam Society 66, Part II (07 1978): 50–112Google Scholar.

3 For general accounts of this period, see Lowe, P., Great Britain and the Origins of the Pacific War (Oxford, 1977)Google Scholar and Reynolds, D., The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance, 1937–41 (London, 1981)Google Scholar.

4 The intricacies of Thai foreign policy during this period have attracted much debate. An uncontroversial account is offered by Santaputra, Charivat, Thai Foreign Policy, 1932–46 (Bangkok, 1986)Google Scholar; for a highly sympathetic interpretation, largely from secondary sources, see Brailey, N., Thailand and the Fall of Singapore: The Failure of an Asian Revolution (Boulder, 1986)Google Scholar. J. Stowe is less compromising in her forthcoming work Thailand Becomes Siam: A Story of Intrigue. I am most grateful for the opportunity to consult this work in manuscript form.

5 OSS Report ‘Thailand: Current Developments’, 11 December 1944, File 483, Box 49, Entry 106, RG 226. See also Annual Report on Siam: 1931, 5 January 1932, F1078/1078/40, FO 371/16260; Annual Economic Report (A) for 1937, 28 November 1938, F5937/1373/40, FO 371/22212.

6 Reynolds, , Anglo-American Alliance, pp. 222–23Google Scholar.

7 Crosby to Air Officer Commanding FE, 18 July 1940, F23/149/40, FO 371/24573.

8 Sherwood, R., Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History (New York, 1948), p. 430Google Scholar.

9 Crosby to FO, No. 421, 7 November 1940, F5036/3268/40, FO 371/24757. For a detailed account of Thai-Japanese relations during this period making extensive use of Japanese sources see Flood, E., ‘Japan's Relations with Thailand’ (Ph. D., University of Washington, 1967)Google Scholar.

10 The C. in C. FE, Air Vice Marshal Brooke-Popham remarked of Crosby that he was ‘too much inclined to rely on his former knowledge of the Thais’ and commented that ‘One so often finds people who have been a long time in one place and who have a genuine affection for the people, getting into the position of believing “these people are my friends and they will never deceive me”’. However, Brooke-Popham recognized Crosby's considerable influence in Thailand and felt that moving him ‘would be a great mistake’. Brooke-Popham to Ismay, DO/Ismay/4, 3 February 1941, v/1/5, Brooke-Popham papers, quoted in Allen, L., Singapore, 1941–1942 (London, 1977), p. 76Google Scholar. For a comparison with Crosby's independent perspective see Lowe, P., ‘The Dilemmas of an Ambassador: Sir Robert Craigie in Tokyo, 1937–41’, Proceedings of the British Association for Japanese Studies, Vol. 2, Pt. 1, 1977Google Scholar.

11 Peck to State Department No. 465, 4 October 1941, 792.94/156 RG 59. See also the autobiographical account given by Crosby's personal assistant and intelligence liaison officer in SirGilchrist, Andrew, ‘Diplomacy and Disaster: Thailand and the British Empire, 1941’, Asian Affairs XIII (Old Series, 69, Pt. III) (10 1982): 249CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

12 Dreifort, J., ‘Japan's Advance into Indochina, 1940: The French Response’, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies XIII, No. 2 (09 1982): 279–95CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Grant to Hull No. 42, 25 January 1941, Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS) (Department of State, Washington, 1967), 1941, V, p. 43Google Scholar.

13 Intercepted letter from Japanese Legation to Director of Economic Studies, Tokyo, 1 February 1941, cited in Saigon to Chief of Intelligence Staff (COIS), Singapore, Very Secret, 24 April 1941, not foliated, WO 208/1901. See also FO to Crosby via COIS, Singapore (To Be Burnt After Perusal), Nos. 58 and 59, 15 December 1940, ibid. The Foreign Office decided not to show this material to the State Department on the grounds that ‘they are already sufficiently stiff-necked with the Thais’, Gage minute, 1 January 1941, F5566/116/40, FO 371/24752. A number of previous Thai-Japanese discussions and agreements on this matter are discussed in Flood, E., ‘Japan's Relations with Thailand’ (Ph. D., University of Washington, 1967)Google Scholar.

14 Crosby to Eden No. 2, 2 June 1941, F597/210/40, FO 371/28120.

15 Minutes by Sterndale Bennett, Seymour and Ashley Clarke, 2 December 1940; R.A. Butler minute, 3 December 1940, F5371/3268/40, FO 371/24757. See also N. Butler statement to Welles, and memorandum by Hamilton, 18 November 1940, FRUS, 1940, IV, pp. 214–16.

16 Crosby to Eden No. 38, 1 February 1941, F1208/210/40, FO 371/28120; Grew to Hull Nos. 40–41, 9 January 1941, FRUS, 1941, V, pp. 9–10. Several requests were made for American mediation, see Butler memorandum to DS, 22 January 1941, ibid., pp. 28–30.

17 Crosby to FO No. 183, 17 July 1941, F7683/114/40, FO 371/28117. Grant's analysis was that ‘the Thai leaders in order to acquire their mess of pottage from the prostrate French in Indochina have gone along and deliberately put their heads in the Japanese noose’, Grant to Hull No. 38, 27 January 1941, FRUS, 1941, V, p. 44.

18 Grant to Roosevelt, 3 December 1941, 740.0011 PW/1006, RG 59. See also Grant to Hull No. 169, 20 March 1941, 741.92/20, ibid., and Grant to Hull No. 371, 28 July 1941, FRUS, 1941, V, pp. 236–37.

19 Doll to Dolbeare (Most Confidential), 19 November 1940, 892.00/217, RG 59.

20 Governor of the Straits Settlements to Colonial Office No. 391, 28 December 1940, F8/8/61, FO 371/27758; see also Gage minute, 16 January 1941, F185/8/61, ibid.

21 Crosby to FO No. 156, 2 March 1941, F1482/8/40, FO 371/28110.

22 Crosby to Eden No. 38, 1 February 1941, F1208/210/40, FO 371/28120. In general Anglo-French relations in the Far East were poor. Typically, Meiklereid, the British Consul at Saigon remarked that the Vichy Governor General of Indochina, Admiral Jean Decoux, was ‘as small physically as in mental outlook and irascible to a degree which deprives him of all charm’, Saigon to FO No. 12, 11 July 1941, F11336/9/61, FO 371/27769.

23 Shijiro, Nagaoka, ‘The Drive into Southern Indochina and Thailand’, in Morley, J.M. (ed.), The Fateful Choice: Japan's Advance into Southeast Asia, 1939–41 (New York, 1980), p. 234Google Scholar.

24 Crosby to FO No. 19, 8 January 1941, F83/9/61, FO 371/27759. For an especially swingeing attack on the French intelligence network in Bangkok see Crosby to FO No. 365, 30 August 1938, F10430/113/40, FO 371/22207.

25 Crosby to FO No. 89, 10 February 1941, F710/210/40, FO 371/28120. The agent in question may have been U On Pe, a secret police agent of the Government of Burma referred to in Crosby to Governor of Burma, 21 June 1939, 28/39/39, not foliated, WO 106/5591. During May 1941 Crosby reported that the Hsip Hsawng Pawna area of Burma was ‘in a state of great excitement’ as they believed they were about to be taken over by the Thais, Crosby to FO No. 127, 19 May 1941, F5007/2264/40, FO 371/28154. British Embassy to DS, 10 February 1941, FRUS, 1941, V, pp. 70–71.

26 Crosby to Eden No. 42, 10 February 1941, F2021/210/40, FO 371/28120.

27 Ashley Clarke minute, 1 March 1941, F1174/246/40, FO 371/28131.

28 Ashley Clarke minute, 13 February 1941, FO 371/28120; Crosby to FO No. 86, 9 February 1941, F707/246/40, FO 371/28131.

29 Crosby to FO Nos. 199 and 200, 18 March 1941, F2121/210/40, FO 371/28121; Leahy to Hull No. 131, 30 January 1941, FRUS, 1941, V, p. 49; Leahy to Hull No. 158, 5 February 1941, ibid., pp. 57–58; British Embassy to DS, 10 February 1941, ibid., pp. 70–71.

30 FE(40)10 ‘Thailand’, memorandum by Treasury, 12 October 1940, CAB 96/1; FE(40)32 ‘Economic Pressure on Thailand’, note by secretariat, 31 October 1941, ibid. 82 per cent of Thai rice exports were shipped to either Singapore or Hong Kong, Britain also held £91/2 million of Thai currency reserves. For the role of the Cabinet Far Eastern Committee see Lowe, , Pacific War, pp. 292–94Google Scholar.

31 Crosby to FO No. 121, 21 February 1941, F1153/246/40, FO 371/28131; Jayanama, Direck, Siam and World War II (Bangkok, 1978), pp, 44–45Google Scholar.

32 Crosby to Eden No. 213, 25 March 1941, F2426/1281/40, FO 371/28140. Andrew Gilchrist, who was running Crosby's propaganda bureau, recalled in September 1941 that six months previously a senior Thai Prince had remarked to him, ‘Why try to bribe the newspapers when you can bribe the Prime Minister himself — with oil’, Gilchrist memorandum enclosed in Crosby to Sterndale Bennett, 15 September 1941, not foliated, FO 837/995.

33 FO to Halifax Nos. 1692 and 1693, 28 March 1941, F2390/246/40, FO 371/28131. Foreign Office fears were not wholly justified. Grew, the American Ambassador in Tokyo had written to Hull only four days before that as a result of the border crisis ‘Japan is now in a position … through its increased influence in both Indochina and Thailand, to acquire complete dominance in these areas whose importance to the defence of Singapore and British Malaya cannot be overestimated’, No. 5463, 24 March 1941, FRUS, 1941, V, pp. 117–19.

34 Memorandum of a conversation between Hull and Halifax, 8 April 1941, and aide memoires A and B, 8 April 1941, FRUS, 1941, V, pp. 120–24.

35 Sterndale Bennett minute, 8 April 1941, F1451/438/40, FO 371/28135.

36 Ashley Clarke minute, 20 April 1941, F2390/246/40, FO 371/28131.

37 Thailand was especially irritated by the American refusal to supply aircraft that had already been paid for, Direck, , Siam, p. 47Google Scholar.

38 Grant to Hull, 21 May 1941, 711.92/18, RG 59; ‘US Economic Pressure Hits Thailand’, article by Ostananda, Nai Vilas in The Bangkok Chronicle, 15 05 1941Google Scholar.

39 Grant to Hull No. 286, 26 May 1941, 711.92/16, RG 59.

40 Halifax to FO No. 1685, 16 April 1941, F3075/885/40, FO 371/28138; FE (41) 13th mtg., 17 April 1941, CAB 96/3, also CAB 21/1026.

41 FE (41) 59, ‘Policy Towards Thailand (Siam)’, 22 April 1941, CAB 96/3. Eden had arranged for this to be ‘reinforced’ by a conversation in London between R.A. Butler and the American Minister, Winant to Hull No. 1578, 21 April 1941, FRUS, 1941, V, pp. 133–34.

42 Halifax minute, 22 April 1941, FO 115/3447; Halifax to FO No. 1769, 23 April 1941, FO 837/997; Memorandum of a conversation between Halifax, Casey and Hull, 22 April 1941, FRUS, 1941, V, pp. 136–37.

43 Butler minute, 30 April 1941 and Eden minute 1 May 1941, F3509/246/40, FO 371/28132; FE (41) 15th mtg., 1 May 1941, CAB 96/3. Britain remained unsure of the extent of American support well into May, see Halifax to Hull, 6 May 1941, FRUS, 1941, V, pp. 142–43.

44 Crosby to FO No. 273, 1 May 1941, F3588/1281/40, FO 371/28140; Crosby to FO No. 287, 7 May 1941, F3854/1281/40, ibid.

45 Petroleum Department to Ashley Clarke, 9 May 1941, F3652/1281/40, ibid.; FO to Crosby No. 200, 10 May 1941, F3854/1281/40, ibid.; FO to Crosby No. 209, 17 May 1941, F4001/1281/40, FO 371/28141; Halifax to FO No. 2213, 17 May 1941, F4161/1281/40, ibid.

46 Grant to Hull No. 262, 8 May 1941, FRUS, 1941, V, pp. 146–47; memorandum of a conversation between Hornbeck and Butler, 9 May 1941, ibid., pp. 148–49.

47 Memorandum of a conversation between Hornbeck, Hiss and Walden (Standard-Vacuum Oil Co.), 14 May 1941, ibid., pp. 152–53; Hull to Grant No. 62, 31 May 1941, ibid., p. 163; memorandum of conversation between Hull, Bulter and Hall, 3 June 1941, ibid., pp. 165–66.

48 Crosby to FO No. 328, 21 May 1941, F4323/1281/40, FO 371/28140. See also Memorandum by Major Mansell MI2e, ‘Possible Coup d'Etat in Thailand’, 13 May 1941, f. 92, WO 106/4474.

49 Crosby to FO No. 356, 3 June 1941, F4735/1281/40, FO 371/28142; Crosby to FO No. 358, 4 June 1941, F4735/1281/40, ibid.; Crosby to FO No. 360, 4 June 1941, F4844/1281/40, ibid.; Crosby to FO No. 393, 17 June 1941, 5342/1281/40, ibid.

50 Crosby to FO No. 394, 17 June 1941, F5342/1281/40, ibid.; Direck, , Siam, p. 49Google Scholar.

51 Anthony Eden minute, no date, F5342/1281/40, FO 371/28142; Sterndale Bennett minute, 19 June 1941, ibid.

52 Eden minute, no date, on Crosby to FO No. 498, 25 July 1941, F6759/438/40, FO 371/28135.

53 Sterndale Bennett to Bridgeman, Petroleum Department, 16 July 1941, F6707/1281/40, FO 371/28144; Niemeyer to Waley, Treasury, 25 July 1941, F6903/1281/40, ibid.

54 Troutbeck (MEW) to Sterndale Bennett, 2 August 1941, T33/65/2, F7351/1281/40, FO 371/28145.

55 Memorandum of a meeting between Hall, Thorold, Acheson and Feis, 23 June 1941, FRUS, 1941, V, pp. 185–86; Grant to Hull No. 202, 4 June 1941, 711.92/19, RG 59; Grant to Hull No. 320, 27 June 1941, 711.92/20, ibid. According to the Foreign Office, Britain had intercepted letters from Grant to the American oil companies insisting that British proposals were part of a scheme ‘to do US companies down’, Gage minute, 19 August 1941, F7805/1281/40, FO 371/28145.

56 Halifax to FO No. 2000, 17 June 1941, F5321/1281/40, CAB 122/1030. Eden had already made it clear to Washington that poor relations between Crosby and Grant were the only obstacle to the free exchange of British and American intelligence in the Far East, see Eden to Halifax No. 3246, 12 June 1941, ibid.; Direck, , Siam, p. 54Google Scholar.

57 Halifax to FO No. 2000, 17 June 1941, F5321/1281/40, CAB 122/1030; Welles to Grant No. 76, 12 July 1941, FRUS, 1941, V, pp. 205–206; Memorandum of a conversation between Peck and Seni Pramoj, 26 July 1941, ibid., pp. 226–27.

58 Crosby to FO No. 433, 30 June 1941, F5774/1281/40, ibid.; Crosby to FO No. 487, 20 July 1941, F6509/1281/40, ibid.; Katsumi, Yamamura, ‘The Role of the Japanese Finance Ministry’, in Borg, D. and Okamoto, S. (eds.), Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese American Relations, 1931–41 (New York, 1973), p. 301Google Scholar.

59 Crosby to FO No. 527, 5 August 1941, F7316/210/40, FO 371/28123; Doll to Waley (Treasury) No. 590, 20 August 1941, T35/9/33, FO 837/997; Grant to Hull No. 367, 26 July 1941, 792.94/133, RG 59.

60 Crosby to FO No. 449, 4 July 1941, F6108/210/40, FO 371/28123; Crosby to FO No. 521, 2 August 1941, F7207/210/40, ibid. See also Grant to Hull No. 367, 26 July 1941, FRUS, 1941, V, pp. 233–34.

61 Crosby to FO No. 391, 17 June 1941, F5317/210/40, FO 371/28122.

62 Doll to Waley (Treasury) No. 590, 20 August 1941, T35/9/33, FO 837/997; Doll to Niemeyer (Bank of England), 2 August 1941, F7175/32/40, FO 371/28113; Direck, , Siam, p. 45Google Scholar. See also Grant to Hull No. 369, 27 July 1941, 792.94/134, RG 59.

63 Doll to Waley (Treasury), No. 592, 21 August 1941, F8132/210/40, FO 371/28124: Doll to Waley (Treasury), No. 612, 27 August 1941, F9545/210/40, FO 837/977. The Thai Ambassador in Tokyo gave the American Ambassador a similar version of the Thai-Japanese negotiations, see Grew to Hull No. 1479, 18 September 1941, 792.94/147, RG 59.

64 Doll to Waley No. 590, 20 August 1941, T35/9/33, FO 837/997.

65 WP (41) 154, Memorandum by Foreign Secretary, 6 July 1941, CAB 66/19. Sumner Welles had shown Halifax a variety of Ultra material indicating this on 10 July, Dilks, D. (ed.), The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan (London, 1971), p. 392Google Scholar.

66 Halifax to FO No. 3393, 19 July 1941, F6473/9/61, FO 371/27763; Ike, N. (ed.), Japan's Decision for War: Records of the 1941 Policy Conferences (Stanford, 1967), p. 50Google Scholar. A French Foreign Office official frankly expressed French policy towards Japan's incursion into Indochina at the end of July: ‘If the Japanese win or keep out of the war we may be able to save something by co-operating with them now, if the Allies are victorious we feel confident that the United States will see that we get our colony back again’, Leahy to Hull No. 966, 1 August 1941, FRUS, 1941, V, pp. 244–45.

67 WC 66 (41) 4, 7 July 1941, CAB 65/19.

68 WP (41) 172, Memorandum by Foreign Secretary, ‘Japanese Plans in Indochina’, 20 July 1941, CAB 66/19; 72 (41) 8 Concl., 21 July 1941, CAB 66/19; Churchill to Eden, 16 July 1941, M745/1, F6609/9/61, FO 371/27764. Eden's doubts were shared by the MEW and the Service Departments, see Lowe, , Pacific War, p. 238Google Scholar.

69 Crosby to FO No. 512, 30 July 1941, F7027/210/40, FO 371/28123. These Japanese demands were reported as —

1. Thailand to sign no treaty with any third party which might possibly harm the “East Asiatic Prosperity Sphere”.

2. The recognition of Manchokuo [sic].

3. Cessation of relations with Russia.

4. Military Co-operation and an exchange of specialists and the formation of a joint military organization.

5. The recognition of Indochina as part of the “safety area of the Prosperity Sphere” and as such to be protected by Thai and Japanese troops. The seaboard of Annam and Cambodia to be under Japanese protection.

70 FO to Halifax No. 4363, 1 August 1941, F6812/438/40, FO 371/28135; Halifax to Welles, 2 August 1941, FO 115/3447. See also Major Steveni (MI6) to MI2c/e, 2 July 1941, CX Report 27301/2/286, not foliated, WO 208/873. Craigie reported similar terms from Japanese naval sources in Tokyo, see Craigie to FO No. 1524, 24 August 1941, F8372/210/40, FO 371/28124.

71 Crosby to FO No. 520, 2 August 1941, F7206/1281/40, FO 371/28123; Crosby to FO No. 622, 1 September 1941, F8782/210/40, FO 371/28125.

72 Minute by Eden, 2 August 1941, F7072/1299/23, FO 371/29793, quoted in Lowe, , Pacific War, p. 241Google Scholar.

73 FO to Crosby No. 343, 1 August 1941, F7027/210/40, FO 371/28123; FO to Halifax No. 4380, 2 August 1941, ibid.

74 Memorandum by Peck, 30 July 1941, FRUS, 1941, V, p. 240; record of a conversation between Hull and Welles at Sulphur Springs, 31 July 1941, 740.0011 PW/426, RG 59; Halifax to FO No. 3583, 30 July 1941, F7090/210/40, FO 371/28123.

75 Halifax to FO No. 3614, 31 July 1941, F7171/210/40, ibid.; Halifax to FO No. 3683, 4 August 1941, F7301/210/40, ibid.; memorandum of a conversation between Hull and Halifax, 9 August 1941, FRUS, 1941, V, pp. 268–69.

76 Crosby to FO No. 525, 5 August 1941, F7315/210/40, FO 371/28123; Halifax to FO No. 3726, 7 August 1941, F7491/210/40, ibid.; WP (41) 202, 20 August 1941, CAB 66/18. See also Hull, C., Memoirs, Volume II (London, 1948), p. 1014Google Scholar.

77 Ashley Clarke minute, 12 August 1941, F7581/210/40, FO 371/28124.

78 DO (41) 56th mtg. (3), 8 August 1941, CAB 69/2; Bell, R.J., Unequal Allies: Australian-American Relations and the Pacific War (Melbourne, 1977), p. 23Google Scholar; Attlee to Churchill, Abbey 23, 8 August 1941, WP (41) 203, CAB 66/18.

79 Cadogan raised the matter of Thailand with Welles again on 11 August but found him ‘rather sticky’, Dilks, , Cadogan Diary, p. 399Google Scholar. The Thais continued to press for assurances in Washington during early August, memorandum of a conversation between Peck and Seni Pramoj, 14 August 1941, FRUS, 1941, V, pp. 271–72.

80 Memorandum by Bruce, 9 August 1941, F7695/210/40, FO 371/28124; Eden to Bruce, 11 August 1941, ibid. Bruce also sent a draft of his memorandum to the Australian Prime Minister, R.G. Menzies, Bruce to Menzies, No. 635, 8 August 1941, Documents on Australian Foreign Policy, 1937–49 (hereafter DAFP) (Department of Foreign Affairs, Canberra, 1982), V, document 38, pp. 65–67.

81 Crosby to FO No. 544, 10 August 1941, F7622/210/40, FO 371/28124.

82 Crosby to FO No. 212, 23 August 1941, F6437/210/40, FO 371/28123.

83 C. in C. FE to FO, 4 August 1941, F7221/7221/40, FO 371/28158. See also Brooke-Popham to Ismay, DO/Ismay/11, 20 August 1941, v/1/16, Brooke-Popham papers, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King's College, London.

84 Crosby to FO No. 593, 21 August 1941, F8253/90/40, FO 371/28157; Crosby to FO No. 605, 26 August 1941, F8464/90/40, ibid.; Gage minute, 27 August 1941, and Seymour minute, 29 August 1941, ibid.; Direck, , Siam, p. 54Google Scholar. The incredulity expressed by the Far Eastern department at these erratic appointments demonstrates how little the purpose or efficacy of Phibun's policy of hedging was understood in London.

85 Col. Scott (MO10) minute, 1 April 1941, not foliated, WO 106/4474.

86 FE (41) 16th mtg., ‘Infiltration — Thailand’, 13 May 1941, CAB 96/2. This meeting was chaired by R.A. Butler in his room at the FO. Lt. Col. Scott MO10 to Colonel Sugden MO1 [SOE], 19 June 1941, f. 37a, WO 193/915.

87 Cruickshank, C., SOE in the Far East: The Official History (Oxford, 1983), pp. 70–74Google Scholar. This account of SOE in the Far East has under-emphasized the political dimension of SOE activities. For a discussion of this matter see, Aldrich, R., ‘Imperial Rivalry: British and American Intelligence in Asia, 1942–46’, Intelligence and National Security 3, No. 1 (01 1988): 5–55CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

88 Killery to SO.2 [SOE London] No. 506/7, 30 July 1941, F7487/246/40, FO 371/28134. SOE initially consisted of two sections — SO.1, responsible for unattributable (black) propaganda, and SO.2, responsible for sabotage and subversive operations.

89 Jebb to Cadogan, SC/26/43/69, 7 August 1941, ibid.

90 Gage minute, 12 August 1941, ibid.; Sterndale Bennett to Jebb, 17 August 1941, ibid. SOE seems to have been generally enamoured of coups d'état at this time. Adolf Berle entered in his diary a few months later that ‘a British military attaché showed up with a plan to organize a revolution in Argentina — about the most disastrous thing anyone could have thought of at the moment’, diary entry for 6 January 1942, Adolf Berle Diary, Franklin D. Rossevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York.

91 Crosby to FO No. 774, 31 October 1941, F11629/210/40, FO 371/28126.

92 Eden minute, 5 November 1941, F11629/210/40, FO 371/28126.

93 Grimsdale to Ismay, 8 March 1942, Ismay/IV/Gri/la, Ismay Papers, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King's College, London. Acting on intelligence from Brigadier Sir Stuart Menzies, Director of the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), SOE were also debriefing General Catroux, the Free French ex-Governor General of Indochina, in preparation for a demolition operation at Camranh Bay. See minute by R.H. Barry, a senior SOE staff officer of MO1(SP) [SOE] and also sketch map by Catroux, ff. 51a–51d, WO 193/603.

94 JP (41) 1, ‘Far East’, 1 January 1941, CAB 79/8; ‘Operation Etonian Without Prior Occupation of Thailand by Japan’, memorandum, 9 May 1941, not foliated, AIR 23/1865. For a detailed examination of the military planning for Operation Matador see Chung, Ong Chit, ‘“Operation Matador” and the Outbreak of War in the Far East: The British Plan to forestall the Japanese’ (Ph.D., London University, 1985)Google Scholar.

95 JIC (41) 309, ‘Japan's Next Move’, 2 August 1941, CAB 79/13; COS (41) 276th mtg. (6), 5 August 1941, ibid.; Mallaby (DDMO) to Sterndale Bennett, 18 September 1941, f. 5a, WO 106/2506; DO (41) 55th and 56th mtgs., CAB 69/2; diary entry for 8 August 1941, Oliver Harvey Diary, MSS, 56398, British Museum.

96 Colonial Office Secret Monograph, Relations Between Thailand and the Southern States of the Malay Peninsula, by Dr W. Lineham, MCS, Singapore, 1941, CO 537/7335. Only thirty-five copies of this secret reference work were printed. Col. F.C. Scott to Gent (Colonial Office), 1 September 1941, f. 3a, WO 106/2505.

97 Brooke-Popham to WO, 28 August 1941, ff. 1a, WO 106/2506. Between 10 June and 23 October 1941, thirty-six British officers had made clandestine visits to Thailand in parties of three and four, Brooke-Popham to Crosby, 27 October 1941, not foliated, WO 193/869; COS (41) 396th mtg. (5), 24 November 1941, CAB 79/15. One of these clandestine visitors was Air Vice Marshal Brooke-Popham, see Gilchrist, ‘Diplomacy and Disaster’, p. 249.

98 Crosby to Sterndale Bennett, 11 September 1941, F10295/246/40, FO 371/28134; Note by G. II, MI2c, 11 September 1941, ibid.; Far Eastern Security Service Report No. 5401, ‘Japanese Penetration of Thailand’, November 1941, not foliated, WO 208/1915.

99 FO to Crosby No. 468, 8 October 1941, F10505/114/40, FO 371/28118. For details of Wendler's activities in Bolivia see FO 371/25792, passim. Crosby to FO No. 806, 12 November 1941, F12300/114/40, FO 371/28118.

100 Peck to Hull No. 465, 4 October 1941, 792.94/156, RG 59; Division of Far Eastern Affairs memorandum, 10 October 1941, ibid.

101 Crosby to FO No. 684, 24 September 1941, F9929/210/40, FO 371/28125.

102 Crosby to FO No. 725, 15 October 1941, F10827/210/40, FO 371/28125.

103 British Embassy to DS (2 parts), 25 October 1941, FRUS, 1941, V, pp. 325–29. Hornbeck advocated extending a military guarantee to Thailand, but was opposed by Hamilton, Head of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, Berle, B. and Jacobs, T., Navigating the Rapids: From the Papers of Adolf A. Berle (New York, 1973), p. 379Google Scholar.

104 C.R. Price (Secretary to COS), to Seymour, 18 October 1941; minutes by Ashley Clarke, 19 September 1941; Sterndale Bennett and Seymour, 20 September 1941; Cadogan, 21 September 1941, F10967/210/40, FO 371/28126. Sterndale Bennett minute, 13 November 1941, F11876/210/40, ibid. Churchill decided to send the ships against the advice of the Admiralty, DC(O) (41) 65/1 and 66/1, 17 and 20 October, CAB 69/3 and CAB 69/8.

105 Ike, , Japan's Decision for War, pp. 211, 235 and 242–43Google Scholar.

106 Crosby to FO No. 803, 12 November 1941, F12159/210/40, FO 371/28126; Crosby to FO No. 798, 10 November 1941, F12040/210/40, FO 371/28126.

107 Crosby to FO No. 831, 20 November 1941, F12608/9789/40, FO 371/28126; Landon, K., ‘Thai Non-Resistance: A Footnote in History’, Far Eastern Survey (11 1944), pp. 222–23Google Scholar.

108 Lt. Col. Mackinzie (Director MI2) to DDMI(I), 23 November 1941, f. 85, WO 193/917.

109 Crosby to FO No. 870, 1 December 1941, F13164/9789/40, FO 371/28163.

110 Peck to Hull No. 520, 15 November 1941, FRUS, 1941, V, pp. 342–43; Peck to Hull No. 547, 3 December 1941, 740.0011 PW/611, RG 59.

111 Peck to Hull No. 550, 4 December 1941, 740.0011 PW/673, RG 59; Peck to Hull No. 551, 5 December 1941, 740.001 PW/687, ibid.

112 Crosby to FO No. 870, 1 December 1941, F13164/9789/40, FO 371/28126. See also Dilks, , Cadogan Diary, Monday, 1 12 1941, p. 415Google Scholar.

113 Curtin to Cranborne (DO) No. 762, 30 November 1941, DAFP, V, document 142, pp. 247–48. Sterndale Bennett minute, 1 December 1941, F13289/9789/40, FO 371/28163.

114 Diary entry for 29 November 1941, Oliver Harvey Diary, MSS 56398, British Museum.

115 Bruce to Curtin No. 113, 1 December 1941, DAFP, V, document 149, p. 265; see also Bruce to Curtin No. 112, 1 December 1941, ibid., document 264, pp. 254–55.

116 Stimson Diary, 28 November 1941, cited in Lash, J.P., Roosevelt and Churchill, 1939–1941: The Partnership that Saved the West (London, 1977), p. 474Google Scholar. This change of attitude in Washington was clearly detected by Halifax who was confident of the support of Hull, Stimson and Knox, see Halifax to FO No. 5493, 30 November 1941, F13001/86/23, FO 371/27913. See also Halifax to FO No. 5474, 29 November 1941, F12992/86/23, ibid.

117 Halifax to FO No. 5496, F13303/9789/40, FO 371/28163.

118 Halifax to FO No. 5519, 1 December 1941, F13114/86/23, F0371/27913. Cadogan noted in his diary ‘Things look critical, but American attitude seems firm and sound.’ Dilks, , Cadogan Diary, Wednesday, 3 12 1941Google Scholar. See also British Embassy to DS, 30 November 1941, FRUS, 1941, V, p. 360; and Casey to Department of External Affairs No. 1064, 1 December 1941, DAFP, V, document 152, pp. 259–60.

119 WP (41) 296, ‘Far Eastern Policy’, memorandum by Eden, CAB 66/20; DC(O) (41) 71st mtg. (1), 3 December 1941, CAB 69/2. Direck expressed similar sentiments to Peck regarding the United States offer of ‘ultimate independence’ on 4 December 1941, Direck, , Siam, p. 58Google Scholar.

120 Churchill minute to Eden, M.1078/1, 2 December 1941, F13114/86/23, FO 371/27913.

121 Halifax to FO No. 5577, 3 December 1941, F13219/86/23, FO 371/27914.

122 WP (41) 296 ‘Far Eastern Policy’, memorandum by Eden, 2 December 1941, CAB 66/20; WM 124 (41) 4, 4 December 1941, CAB 65/24.

123 Halifax to FO No. 5603, 5 December 1941, F13280/86/23, ibid.; Halifax to FO No. 5612, 5 December 1941, F13282/86/23, ibid.

124 Crosby to FO No. 890, 5 December 1941, F13279/9789/40, FO 371/28163; FO to Crosby No. 590, 6 December 1941, F13329/9789/40, ibid.

125 FO to Halifax No. 6742, 8.45pm, 6 December 1941, F13329/9789/40, ibid.

126 Charivat, , Thai Foreign Policy, p. 260Google Scholar, see also p. 277.

127 Halifax to FO No. 5654, 9.29pm, 6 December 1941, F13329/9789/40, FO 371/28163. Richard Casey, the Australian Minister in Washington, attributed Roosevelt's hesitation over a guarantee to Thailand to pressure from the State Department regarding the constitutional difficulty of an American President giving such an undertaking, Casey to Curtin and Evatt No. 1095, 6 December 1941, DAFP, V, document 168, p. 283.

128 Dilks, , Cadogan Diaries, entry for Saturday, 6 12 1941, p. 416Google Scholar.

129 Churchill's full message read, ‘There is a possibility of imminent Japanese invasion of your country. If you are attacked, defend yourself. The preservation of the full independence and sovereignty of Thailand is a British interest and we shall regard an attack on you as an attack upon ourselves.’ Crosby's Final Report, p. 23, 7 October 1942, F7056/1083/40, FO 371/31860. See also Churchill to Crosby, 7 December 1941, Prime Minister's telegram file — 1941, Ismay VI/I, Papers of General Sir Hastings Ismay, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King's College, London.

130 For the official interpretation see Woodward, L., British Foreign Policy in the Second World War (London, 1971), Vol. II, p. 175Google Scholar. This work erroneously states that Churchill sent a guarantee to Phibun on the night of 6–7 December and that the Japanese ultimatum to Thailand on the night of 7–8 December was ‘the sequel to this message’. In fact the reverse was true, for in the same message, Crosby was instructed to hold this guarantee until he was informed that Washington had approved it. London only sent Crosby authority to deliver Churchill's guarantee, now reworded, at 1.40pm on 7 December 1941. This did not arrive in Bangkok until early the following day. FO to Crosby No. 590, 8.25pm, 6 December 1941, F13329/210/40, FO 371/21863; FO to Crosby No. 595, 1.40pm, 7 December 1941, ibid.

131 Crosby's Final Report, 7 October 1942, F7056/1083/40, FO 371/31860; Crosby to FO No. 903, 8 December 1941, F13942/210/40, FO 371/28128. See also Hood, ‘Thai-Japanese Relations’, pp. 714–16. A much neglected question seems to be the role of the Thai Air Force on 8 December 1941, which Phibun had instructed to resist invasion at any cost. This remained conspicuously on the ground on 7 and 8 of December. There was no equal to the Thai Air Force between Tokyo and Iraq. For its modernity see Leahy to Hull No. 97, 23 January 1941, FRUS, 1941, V, p. 38.

132 Thawi Bunyaket gives a detailed account of this Cabinet meeting in Direck, , Siam, pp. 109–114Google Scholar, see also pp. 61–65.

133 Crosby's Final Report, p. 23, 7 October 1942, F7056/1083/40, FO 371/31860.

134 Ashley Clarke minute, 26 February 1941, F1126/5/40, FO 371/28110; Crosby's Final Report, p. 23, 7 October 1942, F7056/1083/40, FO 371/31860.

135 Churchill, W., The Grand Alliance (London, 1956), p. 512Google Scholar; Diary entry 7 December 1941, Alanbrooke Diary, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King's College, London.

136 Admiralty (Director of Naval Intelligence) to COIS Singapore, 3 December 1941, f. 156a, WO 208/1898; Halifax to FO No. 5519, 1 December 1941, F13114/83/23, FO 371/27913; SirKennedy, John, The Business of War: The War Narrative of Major-General Sir John Kennedy (London: Hutchinson, 1957), p. 183Google Scholar. London had eventually informed Crosby of the possibility of a British preemptive operation in southern Thailand, whereupon Crosby and Direck together sent a characteristic joint appeal to the FO on 7 December 1941, urging ‘For God's sake do not allow British forces to occupy one inch of Thai territory’, Cranborne (DO) to Curtin M.426, 5 December 1941, DAFP, V, document 163, pp. 276–77; Crosby to FO No. 893; 7 December 1941, F13332/9789/40, FO 371/28163.

137 WO to Brooke-Popham, 5 December 1941, v/4/41, Brooke-Popham papers, Liddell Hart Military Archives, King's College, London; Kirby, S.W., The War Against Japan (London, 1957), p. 186Google Scholar; Willmott, H.P., Empires in the Balance: Japanese and Allied Pacific Strategies to April 1942 (London, 1982), p. 169Google Scholar.

138 The text of this treaty of alliance, including its secret annex specifying its relevance to the present conflict, was available to the FO two days before it was signed, presumably from signals intelligence, see Broad minute, 19 December 1941, F14195/210/40, FO 371/28127.

139 FO to Washington No. 7006, 17 December 1941, not foliated, WO 106/4774.

140 DS to British Embassy, 19 January 1942, FRUS, 1942, I, pp. 913–14.

141 FO to Washington No. 7183, 22 December 1941, f. 120, WO 106/4474; Ashley Clarke minutes 19 and 22 January 1942 and Sterndale Bennett minute 24 January 1942, F1033/396/40, FO 371/31856; Sterndale Bennett memorandum, 27 December 1941, F14298/13522/40, FO 371/28164.

142 Law minutes, 23 and 29 December 1941, F14297/13522/40, FO 371/28164; Peterson minute 21 January 1942 and Cadogan minute 24 January 1942, F1033/396/40, FO 371/31856. In fact British nongovernmental opinion seems to have been sympathetic. A.F. Thavenot speaking in January 1942 declared, ‘Thailand has been more sinned against than sinning … it is entirely in the hands of this military clique and has no choice in the matter’, Thavenot, A.F., ‘Thailand and the Japanese Invasion’, Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society XXIX (1942): 17Google Scholar.

143 Hull aide memoire, 18 December 1941, FO 115/3447; Halifax to FO No. 348, 19 January 1942, F643/396/40, FO 371/31856.

144 Turner (Burma Office) to Hollis, 3 February 1942, B. 10138/42, CO 968/1/7.

145 Sterndale Bennett minute, 31 January 1942, F1426/396/40, FO 371/31856; State Department memorandum, 19 January 1942, F1576/396/40, ibid.; Peterson minute, 1 February 1942, F1426/396/40, ibid.

146 Crosby's Final Report, 7 October 1942, F7056/1083/40, FO 371/31860; Eden to Churchill, 28 January 1942, F1085/1083/40, ibid,; Peterson minute, 31 October 1942, F7056/1083/40, ibid.

147 De la Valette to Dening, 10 April 1942, F2878/2878/40, FO 371/31866; Halifax to FO No. 2719, 11 May 1942, F3617/2878/40, ibid.

148 Martin to Harvey, 21 May 1942, F4097/2878/40, ibid.; Harvey to Martin, 8 June 1942, ibid.

149 Martin to Harvey, 12 June 1942, ibid.; Eden minute, undated, ibid. Harvey's original letter on which Churchill wrote his minute subsequently referred to by Eden and Martin is missing from the Foreign Office file. There is some evidence to suggest that at one point Oliver Harvey included it in his diary, now deposited in the British Museum. If this was so it has subsequently been removed.

150 Crosby to FO No. 38, 24 February 1941, F1208/210/40, FO 371/28120; Grant to Hull No. 369, 27 July 1941, FRUS, 1941, V, pp. 235–36.

151 Clauson (CO) to Consolidated Tin Mines Ltd, 26 June 1941, CO 852/435/1.

152 Ike, , Japan's Decision for War, p. 281Google Scholar; Crosby to FO No. 893, 6 December 1941, F13332/9789/40, FO 371/28163.

153 Gilchrist (SOE) to Brain, Very Secret and Personal, 27 March 1945, F2145/738/40, FO 371/46560.

154 Adams minute, 27 February 1946, U2105/1578/40, FO 371/57608.

155 Sterndale Bennett minute, 29 December 1941, F14297/13522/40, FO 371/28164.