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Punitive Colonialism: The Dutch and the Indonesian National Integration*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 April 2011

Mohd. A. Nawawi
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Extract

It is widely acknowledged that colonial experience has greatly affected the political development of ex-colonial countries. In particular, colonialism has often been regarded as the most important, if not the sole, basis of national integration in many of these countries. At the same time, the literature on political development still lacks a critical evaluation of the impact of colonial rule on these ex-colonies. The following essay is an initial assessment of the contribution of Dutch colonialism to the national political integration of Indonesia. Such an evaluation has not been explicitly made, even though the literature on Indonesia does not lack sweeping judgments by both Indonesian nationalists and the apologists for the Dutch “mission interrupted”.

Type
Articles
Information
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies , Volume 2 , Issue 2 , September 1971 , pp. 159 - 168
Copyright
Copyright © The National University of Singapore 1971

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References

1 The major study of colonialism and its impact on nationalism remains Emerson, Rupert, From Empire to Nation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962).Google Scholar This classic, a model of lucidity and grace, contains the basic wisdom which any further systematic study of colonialism must draw upon.

2 See Deutsch, Karl W., Nationalism and Social Communication: An inquiry Into the Foundation of Nationality (Cambridge, New York, London: Technology Press, John Wiley and Sons, and Chapman and Hall, 1953),Google Scholar esp. chapter 4.

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4 Vlekke, Bernard H. M., Nusantara, A History of Indonesia (The Hague and Bandung: W. van Hoeve, 1959), pp. 170–72.Google Scholar Atjehnese influence in the coastal areas of Minangkabau had been long established. In addition to dominating the pepper trade the Atjehnese exercised considerable religious influence. See Said, M., Atjeh Sepandjang Abad (privately printed, Medan, 1961), esp. pp. 203–07.Google Scholar

5 Vlekke, pp. 167–70.

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8 Hall, pp. 269 and 273–74.

9 Ibid., p. 278.

10 Rauws, Joh., “Dawn of Missionary Interest in Holland,” The Netherlands Indies, ed. Rauws, Joh., et. al. (London: World Dominion Press, 1935), pp. 45–55.Google Scholar

11 The British had intruded earlier in parts of Sumatra as Holland sank into revolution and war with France. See Hall, op. cit., pp. 280–82.

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14 The Padri movement started in 1803 as a fundamentalist religious reform movement inspired by the Wahabbi movement in Saudi Arabia. Following the massacre of the royal family the following year, it turned into an all-out civil-religious war. For a thorough study of the conflict, see Radjab, Muhammad, Perang Padri di Sumatra Barat, 1803–1838 (Djakarta: Perpustakaan Perguruan Kementerian P.P. & K, 1954).Google Scholar A much more lively account is Parlindungan, M.O., Tuanku Rao (Djakarta: Tandjung Pengharapan, 1964).Google Scholar

15 National reconstruction in Holland following the revolution and war also drained resources.

16 After the Padri War, Minangkabau became the only area outside Java, besides Minahasa, where the Dutch introduced compulsory cultivation of coffee. See e.g. Middendorp, W., “The Administration of the Outer Provinces of the. Netherlands Indies,” The Effects of Western Influence in the Malay Archipelago, ed. Schrieke, B. (Djakarta: G. Kolff, 1929), p. 41.Google Scholar

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20 Quoted in Ibid., p. 317.

21 Jakub, Ismail, Tengku Tjhik di Tiro (Djakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1952), pp. 5–7Google Scholar and 27. Until 1918 Atjeh was administered by a military government, while guerilla resistance apparently continued even longer. See Nasution, A.H., Fundamentals of Guerilla Warfare (New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 34.Google Scholar

22 De Klerck, pp. 436–64; 466–73. Kalimantan refers to the southern portion of the island; the three northern territories of North Borneo, Brunei and Sarawak had become British protectorates in 1888. See Irwin, Graham, Nineteenth Century Borneo: A Case Study in Diplomatic Rivalry (S-Gravenhage: M. Nijhoff, 1955), p. 214.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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24 See Hall, pp. 453–60.

25 Kahin, George McT., Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952), p. 37.Google Scholar

26 Middendorp, loc. cit.

27 Benda, H.J., “The Pattern of Administrative Reforms in the Closing Years of Dutch Rule in Indonesia,” Journal of Asian Studies, 25 (August 1966), p. 596.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Benda adds that after that “a halt was called to the earlier policy of abolition and/or merger, and from the mid-nineteen thirties on certain formerly self-governing areas, mainly in Celebes (Sulawesi) and Bali, were even reconstituted.” Ibid., p. 603.

28 Vandenbosch, Amry, The Dutch East Indies (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California, 1941), p. 140.Google Scholar

29 The following description is mostly based on information I recently obtained from interviewing many people, principally former colonial administrators, in South Sumatra and South Sulawesi.

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33 The South Sumatran estimate has been made by M.A. Jaspan, “Aspects of Indonesian Political Sociology in the Late Sukarno Era,” Working Papers in Asian Studies, no. 3 (Center for Asian Studies, the University of Western Australia, 1967), p. 14. In an interview in Makassar, La Side, former inspector of education for South Sulawesi, told me that the first two university graduates from South Sulawesi received their degrees during the Japanese occupation. Most of these graduates did not reside in the regions.

34 Quoted in Kahin, p. 40. Emphasis added.

35 See Kahin, pp. 65–66, and Wertheim, W.F., Indonesian Society in Transition: A Study of Social Change, 2nd rev. ed. (The Hague and Bandung: W. van Hoeve, 1964), p. 69.Google Scholar For a detailed analysis of the Sarekat Islam, see also Noer, Deliar, The Rise and Development of the Modernist Moslem Movement in Indonesia (Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Cornell University, 1963), pp. 160–205.Google Scholar

36 Hindley, Donald, The Communist Party of Indonesia, 1951–63 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1964), p. 18.Google Scholar See also, Benda, Harry J., “The Communist Rebellions of 1926–1927 in Indonesia,” Pacific Historical Review, XXIV (1955), pp. 139–52.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

37 In addition to the Nationalist Party, the membership consisted of Partai Sarikat Islam which constituted what remained of the old SI, Budi Utomo, Pasundan of West Java, Kaum Betawi (The Batavians), De Indische Studie Club and Sumatra Bond which mostly consisted of Sumatrans in Java.

38 See Nawawi, M.A., “Stagnation as a Basis of Regionalism: A Lesson from Indonesia,” Asian Survey, IX (December 1969), pp. 934–45.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

39 See Broek, J. O. M., “East Indonesia: Problems and Prospects,” Far Eastern Survey, 20 (April 4, 1951), pp. 65–7.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

40 Kennedy, Raymond, Field Notes on Indonesia: Ambon and Ceram, 1949–1950, ed. Conklin, Harold C. (New Haven: Human Relations Area Files, 1955), p. 143.Google Scholar

41 According to one estimate, more than one third of the Christian Ambonese were living outside South Maluku in 1940. Tutuarima, W.H. (Rev.), “Ecclesiastical Aspects,” The South Moluccas: Rebellious Province or Occupied State, ed. Bouman, J.C., et. al (Leyden: A.W. Sythoff, 1960), p. 156.Google Scholar

42 Kennedy, Ambon and Ceram, pp. 109–32. Also, “Rebellion Flares in Amboina,” The Christian Century, 67 (October 18, 1950), p. 1221.Google Scholar

43 The adventurous sea-farers have come from the coastal areas and the offshore islands. Lahade, Saleh, Empat Karya-Karya Pembaharuan (Makassar: Jajasan Gelora Demokrasi, 1966), p. 33.Google Scholar

44 Raymond Kennedy repeatedly observed that adat came first religion second. See his Field Notes on Indonesia: South Celebes. 1949–50, ed. Conklin, H. (New Haven: Human Relations Area Files, 1953).Google Scholar See also Geertz, H., “Indonesian Cultures and Communities,” Indonesia, ed. McVey, R.T. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963), pp. 63–4.Google Scholar This was confirmed to me by knowledgable individuals I recently interviewed in Makassar.

45 Ismail Jacub, pp. 40–61.

46 For a justification for isolating the following rebellions as regionalist, see Chapters 2 and 10 of my Regionalism and Regional Conflicts in Indonesia (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1968).Google Scholar Chapters 7, 8, and 9 of this study are a detailed analysis of the three conflicts.

47 The government offered amnesty and agreed to absorb the majority of those who desired regular army service. Others who preferred demobilization were promised adequate rehabilitation. As a conscious attempt to placate the traditional leaders, the central government appointed as the first post-revolution governor for South Sulawesi a Javanese nobleman with considerable administrative experience in one of the traditional areas in Central Java.