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Partai Indonesia Raja, 1936–42: A Study in Cooperative Nationalism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 April 2011

Susan Abeyasekere
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Extract

The term “cooperative nationalism” is a difficult one in the Indonesian context. In the Netherlands Indies the terms “cooperation” and “non-cooperation” had a much more restricted meaning than they did, for instance, in connection with Indian nationalism. The determining factor was merely the decision whether or not to seek seats in the representative councils established by the Dutch. Although in this sense the period 1936–1942 can be called an era of cooperative nationalism in the Indies, because at that time most active nationalist parties agreed to participate in the councils, it is doubtful whether the term is very useful. The cooperating nationalists were themselves reluctant to be classified as such, and the Dutch, with whom the expression implies they were cooperating, generally regarded them as far from cooperative. To the uninitiated the term would seem to indicate that the cooperators took a more moderate, pro-Dutch stand than did the non-cooperators, and because it gives rise to such preconceptions the label may prove a hindrance. Various questions arise. What did the Indonesians and the Dutch understand by cooperation? In what way, apart from participation in the councils, did the cooperators differ from the non-cooperators? Why did the nationalists decide to “go back to cooperation” as they themselves phrased it? What did they hope to gain by the move? Why did cooperation fail to achieve results in terms of political reforms? The answers depend very largely on how the Dutch and the cooperators regarded each other. This paper will consider these problems in relation to the first and largest of the cooperating parties, Partai Indonesia Raja, or Parindra.

Type
Articles
Information
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies , Volume 3 , Issue 2 , September 1972 , pp. 262 - 276
Copyright
Copyright © The National University of Singapore 1972

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References

1 Indeed, some Dutch writers during and shortly after the War, have described the cooperative nationalists in these terms in an attempt to justify Dutch rule in the Indies, e.g. see Hart, G.H.C. (Towards Economic Democracy in the Netherlands Indies, N.Y., 1942)Google Scholar on “inspiring collaboration” between Europeans and Indonesians before the War.

2 Verslag van de Commissie Visman (Batavia, 1941), p. 95.Google Scholar

3 Archives of the former Ministry of Colonies, the Hague. Secret mail report no. 602/36. Head of the service of general research to the Governor-General, Batavia, 10 May 1936. (I am grateful to the Netherlands Ministry of Internal Affairs for permission to consult these archives.)

4 Soeara Parindra, January 1936, p. 4.

5 See reference 3 above.

6 e.g. see A.K., Mihardja (ed.), Polemik Kebudajaan, Djakarta, 1954, p. 47.Google Scholar

7 e.g. Overzicht van de Inlandsche en Maleisch-Chineesche Pers (hereafter referred to as IPO), 1937, p. 538.

8 Pluvier, J.M., Overzicht van de Ontwikkeling der Nationalistische Beweging jn Indonesie in de jaren 1930 tot 1942 ('s-Gravenhage, 1953), pp. 102–3.Google Scholar

9 e.g. see Soeara Parindra, August, 1937, p. 52, and secret mail report no. 614/37, report of the Parindra congress by the Adviser for Native Affairs (Gobee), Batavia, 12 July 1937.

10 Quoted from an article in the Philippines Herald Mid-Week Magazine, 17 June 1936 entitled “With Java Nationalists. In which the author relates a meeting with Javanese patriots in Tokyo”, by Salvador P. Lopez. A copy of this article was sent to the Governor-General by the Head of the Service for East Asian Affairs (A.H.J. Lovink) in a secret mail report no. 715/36 on July 22 1936.

11 Soeara Parindra, February 1936, p. 1.

12 Ibid., May 1937, pp. 7–9.

13 Ibid., December 1939, pp. 350–5 and January 1941, pp. 6–13.

14 Ibid., July 1940, p. 222.

15 In 1939 Parindra had 18 schools, in 1940, 20,235 members of cooperative institutions and 14 branches of the Bank Passar Ibid., July 1940).

16 Mona, Matu, Riwajat Penghidupan dan Perdjuangan M. Husni Thamrin, Medan, 1952, p. 32.Google Scholar

17 See Dahm, Bernhard, Sukarno and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence, (Cornell, 1969), Chapter 3Google Scholar, and Thamrin's contribution to Ratu Langie et. al., De Pacific, n.d.

18 Thamrin was friendly with a great variety of Dutchmen, e.g. Van Mook, H.J. Levelt (the last Government Delegate for General Affairs in the Volksraad), J.E. Stokvis and G.F. Pijper, the last Adviser for Native Affairs. Dr. Levelt and Professor Pijper assured me in interviews that they liked Thamrin very much, even though, Dr. Levelt added, he could not fully be trusted. According to Dr. Levelt, Thamrin spoke perfect Dutch and had a Dutch sense of humour; he had a European character which perhaps accounted for the fact that he got on very well with Dutchmen. After remarks of this type, several Dutchmen have told me that Thamrin was part-European, a statement denied by most Indonesians.

19 Soeara Parindra, May 1937, p. 24.

20 Ibid., October 1937, pp. 127–8.

21 Secret mail report no. 432/39. Political police survey of January 1939.

22 At this time Parindra had 5 Volksraad members, 43 members of Municipal Councils (out of a possible 98 seats), 60 members in Javanese Regency Councils (out of a possible 1,103), 17 in Javanese Provincial Councils (out of a possible 73), 3 in the Community Councils outside Java (of a possible 89) and none in local councils outside Java(of a possible 133). (Indisch Verslag, 1941, vol. II, pp. 546–7)

23 For a detailed coverage of the Soetardjo Petition, see Pluvier, Jan M., “The Soetardjo Petition”, Journal of the Historical Society, University of Malaya, vol. II, (1963/1964), pp. 51–65. Pluvier's argument is inconsistent. On the one hand he claims that the petition, “overtly demonstrating the wish to cooperate with the administration and with democratic Dutch circles in order to make a united stand against the imminent dangers, was a clear expression of the popular movement's change of front” (p. 52). On the other hand he admits the incontrovertible fact that the petition was not supported by the important nationalist parties.Google Scholar

24 Volksraad Handelingen 1939–1940, pp. 546–7.Google Scholar

25 Indonesia (organ of the PI), January 1937.

26 Soeara Parindra, June 1940, p. 193.

27 Indisch Verslag, 1931, ('s-Gravenhage, 1931), p. 43.Google Scholar

28 Tempo, 26 August 1939.

29 Ibid., 19 November 1936.

30 Secret mail report no. 1410/39. Political police survey of June 1939.

31 Secret mail report no. 873/37. Political report of the South and East section of Borneo for the first half of 1937.

32 e.g. see IPO, 1939, pp. 790–1.

33 See Prof. dr. J. Verkuyl's statement in Jacob, H. and Roelands, J., Indisch ABC, (Amsterdam 1970), p. 133.Google Scholar

34 Department of Colonies Verbaal, 19 October 1936. Cabinet note concerning Dr. Raden Soetomo's request for audience to His Excellency the Minister, 31 October 1936.

35 Secret mail report no. 268/37. Survey of the situation of the Roekoen Tani unions (East Java region). Governor van der Plas to the Governor-General, no. 547/Gouv., Soerabaja, 22 March 1937.

36 See 31 above.

37 Jhr. mr Jonge, B.C. de, Herinneringen (Groningen, 1968), p. 191.Google Scholar

38 Department of Colonies Verbaal, 16 April 1937. Copy of a letter from the Ambassador in Tokyo, 24 February 1937, no. 268 PN/19/58.

39 Secret mail report no. 395/38. Governor of Central Java to the Governor-General, no. 887/68, Semarang, 29 April 1938.

40 Department of Colonies Verbaal, 20 January 1939, Letter F2. Supplement: secret mail report no. 4/39. Governor of East Java to the Governor-General, Soerabaja, 10 November 1938.

41 IPO 1938, p. 54. On his visit to Japan in 1936 Soetomo had been similarly impressed with Japanese energy, but, contrary to the charges of some Indonesian Chinese, he had not let himself be used for Pan-Asian propaganda. He was concerned only to find out what Indonesians could learn from the Japanese and was sufficiently objective to note Japanese imperialism in Taiwan, where, he observed, the Japanese were behaving like the Dutch in the Indies. He concluded, “Let us admire Japan and copy its spirit and energy … so that no-one can think that we need to be ruled by anyone”. (Bangoen, 4 June 1936).

42 IPO 1938, pp. 216–17.

43 Soeara Parindra, July-August 1939, p. 195 and June 1941, p. 235.

44 IPO 1940, p. 57.

45 Pemandangan, 19 September 1939.

46 Ibid., 26 February 1940.

47 See documents quoted in Wal, S.L. van der, De Volksraad en de Staatkundige Ontiwikkeling van Nederlands-Indie (Groningen 1965), Vol. II, pp. 410 and 501.Google Scholar

48 Department of Colonies Verbaal, 13 December 1939, Cabinet letter E54/No. 352. Cabinet note by Welter, 28 November 1939. Also see Van Der Wal, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 502–6.

49 Department of Colonies Verbaal, 13 December 1939, secret cabinet letter E54/No. 352. Supplement: secret mail report no. 1074/39. Attorney-General to the Resident of Batavia, Nr. 3621/A.P., Batavia, 23 September 1939.

50 See e.g. Lt. — Admiral Helfrich, C.E.L., Memoires (Amsterdam 1950), Vol. I, pp. 33–4.Google Scholar and Idenburg, P.J.A., “Het Nederlands Antwoord op het Indonesische Nationalisme” in H., Baudet and I.J., Brugmans (eds.) Balans van Beleid (Assen, 1961), pp. 124–6.Google Scholar

51 IPO 1940, pp. 23–4.

52 See document quoted in Van der Wal, op. cit., pp. 601–2.

53 Pemandangan, 7 March 1940.

54 See the complaints of some Minangkabauers who attended the KRI (IPO 1940, pp. 21–7).

55 London Archives XI. 12, the Hague. Secret mail report no. 902/40. Note on the Native Movement, by the Deputy Head of the Service of General Research, Batavia, 22 November 1939.

56 Dr. Levelt maintains that Thamrin told him he did not think a parliament was necessary in an independent Indonesia. (Interview with Dr. Levelt, 21 April 1971).

57 Secret mail reports nos. 116/40, 305/40, 355/40 and 469/40 — political reports from the South and East Section of Borneo.

58 Soeara Parindra, September 1940, p. 310.

59 London archives V4, secret note from the Deputy Head of the Service of General Research. Batavia, 2 September 1940.

60 Ibid.

61 I have found evidence for this statement in the document cited in 59 above and in an interview with Mr. B. van Tijn (10 May 1971). Mr. van Tijn, formerly a friend of Thamrin's, felt that Thamrin thought the Japanese could be useful to the nationalist cause even if they did not come to the Indies; he was using the threat of them against the Dutch.

62 London Archives V4, secret note from the Service of East Asian Affairs, concerning spying and anti-Dutch activities in the Netherlands Indies. Batavia, 2 December 1940.

63 Quoted in Jacob and Roelands, op. cit., p. 135.

64 See document quoted in Van der Wal, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 575.

65 P.J.A. Idenburg in Baudet and Brugmans (eds.), op. cit., p. 148.

66 e.g. secret mail report no. 1220/39, political report on the Celebes for August 1939.

67 Soeara Parindra, February 1941, p. 42.

68 Dr. J.W. Meyer Ranneft has recorded an exchange he had with Thamrin in 1933 in which the latter admitted that the intense interest with which he followed events in India was due to the weakness of the nationalist movement in the Indies vis-à-vis the government. He did not deny Meyer Ranneft's charge that this was a recognition that the nationalist movement in the Indies could not reach its goal without help from abroad. (Undated typescript, “De politieke kaart van Indies (tussen 30 en 40)”, in the Meyer Ranneft Collection 819, General State Archives, The Hague.)