¹ The affair is treated within the context of French expansion into Indochina in John Cady, F.,; The Roots of French Imperialism in Eastern Asia (Ithaca, 1954)Google Scholar, Buttinger, Joseph, The Smaller: Dragon (New York, 1958)Google Scholar, and Chesneaux, Jean, Contribution à l'histoire de la nation vietnamienne (Paris, 1955)Google Scholar. Although highly partisan, the most detailed account is Romanet du Caillaud, F., Histoire de l'intervention françise au Tonkin de 1872 a 1874 (Paris, 1880)Google Scholar. Selections from the documents and a discussion of some of the still unresolved questions about the affair are in: Taboulet, Georges, La Geste française en Indochine (Paris, 1956)Google Scholar, II: 678-741. McAleavy, Henry, Black Flags in Vietnam, the story of a Chinese Intervention (London, 1968)Google Scholar attempts to place the affair in its Asian as well as its French context. In the last analysis, however, McAleavy's treatment regards the French failure as largely the result of contingencies and overlooks material of some importance in the local setting. For example, on p. 134 Liu Yung-fu's presence where he could be called in against the French by Hoang Ke Vien is treated as the result of ”luck.” There was no luck about'it; Liu and Hoang had been co-operating in a campaign against bandit group in northwest Tonkin, a campaign which McAleavy does not mention in his discussion of conditions in Tonkin. Not only that, but Liu had to make a long detour around rebel-held territory in order to arrive at Hanoi with some of his best units.

² Khoi, Le Thanh, Le Viet-Nam (Paris, 1955), 368-69Google Scholar.

³ For Liu's early career in China, see Laffey, Ella, “The Making of a Rebel: Liu Yung-fu and the Formation of the Black Flag Army,” in Chesneaux, Jean, ed., Popular Movements and Secret Societies in China, 1840-1950 (Stanford, 1972), 85–96Google Scholar. The only study I have seen on the Yellow Flags is an unpublished seminar paper done by Miss Sophie Sa several years ago at Harvard. Both these studies rely heavily on Liu Yung-fu's autobiography, Liu Yung-fu li-shih ts'ao (A draft history of the career of Liu Yung-fu), complied by Huang Hai-an , edited and annotated by Lo Hsiang-lin (Taipei 1957 reprint edition; hereafter cited as LST). I have commented on the reliability of the LST in “Making of a Rebel.”

⁴ I have relied heavily on the published works of Jean Dupuis in the following section, especially Les Origines de la Question du Tong-kin (Paris, 1896)Google Scholar, L'intervention du Contre-Amiral Dupré au Tongking (Paris, 1885)Google Scholar, Le Tong-Kin et l'intervention française (Francis Gamier et Philastre) (Paris, 1898)Google Scholar and Le Tonkin de 1872 à 1886 (Paris, 1910)Google Scholar. Dupuis is highly partisan and for many years after 1873 was trying to obtain compensation for his losses in the Gamier affair from the French state. However, I have used his accounts for several reasons: (a) on some matters he is the only source available; (b) he was a shrewd observer; (c) he seems to lie only on certain specific matters and when he considers it absolutely necessary.

⁵ Dupuis, Les Origines, 12-29.

⁶ The most recent example is Lamb, Helen B., Vietnam's Will to Live (New York, 1972), 162Google Scholar, where Dupuis is dismissed as a “freebooter,” who “posed as a Chinese official.” Dupuis was not above threatening the Vietnamese with the wrath of his Chinese sponsors but I have found no evidence he claimed actual official status; he evidently regarded his position as a Chinese agent as sufficient.

⁷ Dupuis, Les Origines, 93-95, 98, 99. According to Dupuis' second-in-command, Ernst Millot, Dupuis intended to utilize the Yellow Flags in his mining schemes. Le Tonkin, son commerce et sa mise en exploitation (Paris, 1888), 69Google Scholar. The time of this trip fits with the LST account of the early stages of the conflict between the Black and the Yellow Flags.

⁸ Dupuis is often vague — probably intentionally — about the precise nature of his Chinese credentials. On p. 103, Les Origines, his description indicates they were limited to getting an initial shipment of arms into the interior as quickly as possible. On pp. 101-102 of the same work his claims are more grandiose, as he claims his mission was “pour ouvrir le Fleuve Rouge au commerce ... En résumé, on acceptait toutes mes propositions et on me laissait absolument carte blanche pour l'ouverture du Fleuve Rouge et pour assurer sa protection contre les attaques, de quelque côté qu'elles vinssent.” (My emphasis.) Later when the Vietnamese protested to China about Dupuis' presence and the Kwangsi governor was asked to investigate he pointed out several technical flaws in Dupuis' documents. First, if the Yunnan t'i-tu wanted to provide Dupuis with the right to “borrow passage” (chia-tao ) through the territory of another state, he should have obtained the proper documents from the civil officials of the province. (Dupuis indicates he did have such documents. He is either lying outright, or the civil officials had provided him with only quasi-official documents such as personal letters of introduction, or the Yunnan authorities were covering up their support of Dupuis. He had some credentials, but they were probably insufficient. See note 9 below.) Second, even if the documents had been in order they were only good for a year from their date of issue and had now expired. For the Kwangsi governor's report in full see Ch'ou-pan I-wu shih-mo (The plete account of our management of barbarian affairs; Taipei 1963 reprint of Peiping 1930 edition), T'ung-chih period, ch. 89, 43a-49b.

⁹ The Canton governor-general was the only proper channel for dealing with the Vietnamese on matters of this kind, and it was precisely on this point that the Vietnamese later raised objections. In a footnote on p. 123, Les Origines, Dupuis admits what he denies elsewhere, that his Chinese credentials were insufficient because they did not come from the Canton viceroy: “C'est le vice-roi de Canton qui était chargé d'entretenir les relations entre la Chine et l'An-nam. Je n'avais pas été accredité par ce dernier, mais on remplit cette formalité plus tard ...” (My emphasis). In 1910 Dupuis noted that Canton was not even asked for accreditation until the spring of 1873. Tonkin de 1872 à 1886, 52. He did not get them until September, and he only got them after the French consul at Canton had brought pressure on the Viceroy. Millot, 79-80. The translations of these documents in Millot, 106, and Dupuis, Les Origines, 201-202, refer only to Dupuis' military commissions.

¹⁰ The amount and kind of official French support promised Dupuis remains unclear. The principals in the genesis of the affair appear to have understood that some things are better not committed to paper. However, Dupuis was by no means the innocent victim of official double-dealing; given the content of his various arrangements in Yunnan, I think it likely that Dupuis tried to set himself up to profit from the opening of Tonkin under either French or Chinese auspices.

¹¹ The commander was Ch'en Teh-kuei (), an officer with previous campaign experience in Tonkin. See the account by a man who saw service in Tonkin in the 1870's, Hsu Yen-hsü , Yüeh-nan shih-hsi yen-ko , reprinted in Hsün-cheng, Shao et al., eds., Chung-Fa chan-cheng (The Sino-French War; 7 volumes, Shanghai, 1955)Google Scholar, 1:53. Ch'en's rank at this time was “colonel” (fu-chiang ). Ta-Ch'ing li-ch'ao shih-lu (Veritable records of successive reigns of the Ch'ing dynasty, T'ung-chib period; Taipei reprint edition, 1964. Hereafter cited as CSL-TC), ch. 320, 15b.

¹² Peking was informed by Liu Ch'ang-yu (), the governor of Kwangsi, who forwarded the Vietnamese protests. The excerpts from Liu's memorial and the Court's response in an edict dated 22 April 1873 indicate that Peking was hearing about Dupuis for the first time.: CSL-TC ch. 350, 24b-26b. The full report is the one cited for the I-wu shih-mo in footnote 8.

¹³ Garnier was one of the most outstanding of a generation of young naval officers who served the cause of French expansion in Indochina as warriors, explorers, administrators and publicists. His most spectacular achievement had been leading the Doudart de Lagrée mission after the death of its first leader. There is an extensive literature available on Garnier in French, most of it hagiographical.

¹⁴ The exact nature of Dupré's instructions to Garnier is still unclear. In October, 1873, Garnier wrote his brother “Je pars samedi ... Voilà une petite expedition comme je les aime Comme instructions, carte blanche. L'amiral s'en rapporte à moi.” Taboulet, II: 703 (emphasis in Taboulet). On the other hand there is an undated copy ofa letter in the French military archives from the Chef du Secretariat de la Cochinchine to the Editor of Le Temps which says categorically Dupré's instructions were peaceful. Service Historique de l'Armée de Terrre, Fonds Tonkin, carton 80 (1872-1890), dossier 5. I am indebted to Milton Osborne for this reference. I regard the question as open and, for my purposes, not crucial.

¹⁵ LST, 121-23, but see Lam, Truong Buu, Patterns of Vietnamese Response to Foreign Intervention: 1858-1900 (New Haven, 1967), 105–107Google Scholar for two interesting documents: (1) an edict indicating defeatism at the Vietnamese court; (2) a protest to the edict by the scholars and populations of Nghe-an and Ha-tinh provinces.

¹⁶ LST, 31: “(In 1857) the rebels were everywhere calling for the destruction of the Ch'ing and the restoration of the Han. There was no place which did not have them.” The best treatment of the various rebel movements in Kwangsi is Hsieh Hsing-yao , T'ai-p 'ing T'ien-kuo ch'ien-hou Kuang-hsi te fan-Ch'ing yün-tungi (Anti-Ch'ing movements in Kwangsi before and after the Taiping Rebellion; Peking, 1950).

¹⁷ Kwangsi gazetteers are full of accounts of these operations, for example, Ch'ien-chiang hsien-chih (Taipei reprint of 1891 edition), ch. 4, 44-55; Chen-an fu-chih (Taipei reprint of 1892 edition), ch. 20, 5-26.

¹⁸ The gazetteers frequently refer to groups of two or three thousand men, as in Ch 'ien-chiang hsien-chih, ch. 4,44b, 45,46. On the other hand Liu Yung-fu's account of these years from within the rebel movement talks in terms of much smaller groups. When larger figures are mentioned they usually represent several combined bands for a single operation; even so, the figure most frequently mentioned is “over a thousand.” LST, 31, 32, 47, 48. There is not necessarily an inconsistency, therefore, with the gazetteer accounts. Winston Hsieh has found similar combinations in Triad revolts in the early twentieth century in Kwangtung. “Triads, Salt Smugglers, and Local Uprisings: Observations on the Social and Economic Background of the Waichow Revolution of 1911,” in Chesneaux, ed., Popular Movements, p. 152.

¹⁹ Wakeman, Frederic Jr., Strangers at the Gate, Social Disorder in South China, 1839-1861 (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1966), 136-56Google Scholar. “Red Sashes” or “Red Bellies” may be a more accurate name. The Ch'ien-chiang hsien-chih, ch. 4,47b refers to a raid by a known Red Turban leader, Liu Pa, and 3,000 followers, “all using red cloth wrapped around their stomachs and known as red-bellied bandits (hung-tu ).” A western observer confirms this: “The rebels were dressed like labouring men. Some had red sashes, but I did not see red turbans.” Scarth, John, Twelve Years in China: The People, The Rebels, and the Mandarins (Edinburgh, 1860), 225Google Scholar.

²⁰ Like many rebels, Wu was known by several names; I have used the most common. For a discussion of Wu's aspirations see “Making of a Rebel,” 91 and 253-54, n. 19.

²¹ CSL-TC, ch. 219, 14; ch. 222, 36b-37a.

²² CSL-TC, ch. 230, 8b-9b.

²³ Ibid.; P'ing-Kuei chi-lueh (A brief history of the suppression of rebellion in Kwangsi), supplemental volume to Kuang-hsi t'tung-chih chi-yao (A collection of essential material about Kwangsi, Kweilin, 1889), ch. 4, 19b.

²⁴ CSL-TC, ch. 245, 24a-25a.

²⁵ CSL-TC, ch. 235, 32b-35a.

²⁶ CSL-TC, ch. 245, 5-6a.

²⁷ Kuo Ting-i, et al., eds., Chung-Fa Yüeh-nan chiao-she tang (Tsungli Yamen archives relating to relations between China, France and Vietnam; 7 vols., Taipei, 1962; hereafter cited as YNT) I, 92.

²⁸ CSL-TC, ch. 255, 17a; ch. 260, 17.

²⁹ Hsieh Hsing-yao, 228.

³⁰ Hsü Yen-hsu, 53.

³¹ LST, 65-72.

³² 72-74.

³³ LST, 78-100; CSL-TC, ch. 273, 11; Hsü Yen-hsü, 52.

³⁴ “Mémoires de Deo Van Tri,” Revue Indo-chinoise (1905) II: 257Google Scholar. Deo Van Tri was the T'ai leader who signed the protectorate agreement with France in 1889. This account was dictated when he was an old man and either his memory or the transcriber were faulty, because the chronology is frequently unreliable, so I have used it with some caution. This material was brought to my attention by John F. Laffey.

³⁵ Deo Van Tri, 259-62. Also see Archaimbault, Charles, “Les Annales de l'Ancien Royaume de S'ieng Khwang,” Bulletin de l'Ecole Francaise d'Extreme-Orient, LII:2 (1967), 557–673CrossRefGoogle Scholar. In a note on p. 588 Archaimbault identifies a group which became particularly troublesome in 1874 as Black Flags. I think it likelier they were Yellow Flags: S'ieng Khwang was closer to areas which the Yellow Flags controlled in the early 1870's than it was to Black Flag centers, and on p. 636 Archaimbault says that after this group was expelled in 1876 it was attacked by Black Flags.

³⁶ Hsü Yen-hsü, 53. Dupuis, Les Origines, 101, refers to the Yellow Flags protecting montagnards against other Chinese bandits, although the Miao seemed to have protected the Yellow Flags as often as the other way around.

³⁷ Deo Van Tri, 259.

³⁸ LST, 67-78; Hsü Yen-hsü, 52.

³⁹ Hsü Yen-hsü, 52; LST, 101.

⁴⁰ CSL-TC, ch. 296, 16b.

⁴¹ Hsü Yen-hsü, 52; CSL-TC, ch. 302, 19b; Ch'ing shih (An official history of the Ch'ing dynasty, 8 vols, Taipei, 1961), 5761/3.

⁴² Hsü Yen-hsü, 52. Hsü was stationed at Lang-son at the time of Su's attack.

⁴³ Ibid; CSL-TC, ch. 296, 17a; ch. 306, 12a, 20b.

⁴⁴ LST, 101-105.

⁴⁵ LST, 110.

⁴⁶ LST, 111, 117.

⁴⁷ LST, 120-121.

⁴⁸ Dupuis, Tonkin de 1872 à 1886, 287. Dupuis also quotes Hoang Ke Vien's reply, which he does not appear to find ominous: “The chief rebel Huan g Ch'ung-ying has been in Tonkin for a long time. I have campaigne d against him but was no t able to defeat him, and the troops of Kwangsi, who came to our aid, were not any more fortunate. But you had hardly arrived within his territory than you reasoned wit h him; he ha s listened to your words and bowed before you.”

⁴⁹ Dupuis, Le Tong-kin et l”intervention française, 236.

⁵⁰ LST, 126; YNT 1, dcmt. 19, 25-26 ; dcmt. 20, 27; dcmt. 18, 23-24.

⁵¹ YNT I, dcmt. 1, 1. McAleavy's treatment of this is insufficient. In a sense the following Chinese campaign against Huang was a continuation of the campaigns of 1869, as McAleavy says on p. 167, but far more important were Dupuis’ reputed alliance with Huang and the invasion of Yunnan. As I have indicated above, before 1873 the Chinese were willing to maintain a defensive posture so far as lesser rebels in Tonkin were concerned. This attitude began to change in the early 1870's, and after 1873 the Chinese responded fairly promptly to outbreaks in Tonkin, but not in 1869 when their foremost concern was stamping out rebellion in China.

⁵² Laffey, Ella, “The Content of the Sino-Vietnamese Tributary Relationship in th e late 19th Century,” in Wickberg, Edgar, compiler, Historical Interaction of China and Vietnam: Institutional and Cultural Themes (Lawrence, Kansas, 1969), 26–33Google Scholar.

⁵³ This is my impression from the Chinese documents, but it needs confirmation (or refutation) from Vietnamese sources such as the Veritable Records (Dai-Nam Thuc-Luc) for Tu-Duc's reign. For those who read Vietnamese — as I do not — there is an interesting series of articles about this period in the major historical journal of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Nghien Cuu Lich Su, centering around the role of Liu Yung-fu (Luu Vinh Phuc) in particular. I have had these translated for my own use, but have not cited them here, in part because there is substantial disagreement about the final assessment of Liu, and I cannot myself consult the sources on which they are based. There is a slightly more recent summing-up of the debate in Ben, Phan Gia, La Recherche historique en République Démocratique du Vietnam, 1953-1963 (Hanoi, 1965), 51Google Scholar, which also provides citations for the articles in Nghien Cuu Lich Su. In the broadest terms, although the Black Flags are given credit for assisting the Vietnamese in their struggle against France, the Vietnamese also note that the Black Flags, no less than other Chinese bandit groups, also committed crimes against and brought grief to the population in the areas where they were active. This is also my conclusion from the Chinese documents, including Liu's autobiography. One final note on my non-use of Vietnamese materials. I do not believe they would materially alter the picture which I have painted here of conditions in upper Tonkin, because precisely one of the problems which the Vietnamese faced in this period was their tenuous hold over large parts of the area. The major military forces in the area, whether official or bandit, were in fact Chinese. Large parts of the population were also not Vietnamese and have left relatively few records in that language, although some oral traditions have been recovered by the historians of the Democratic Republic or by the French somewhat earlier, such as the recollections of Deo Van Tri cited above. In short, for this particular problem, the Chinese records alone cast a great deal of light on what was going on and how it affected the histories of Vietnam, France, and China, from a perspective which has not been much utilized previously.