² See also Guinness, Patrick, “Local Society and Culture”, in Indonesia's New Order: The Dynamics of Socio-economic Transformation, ed. Hill, Hal (NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1994), p. 300Google Scholar. For various interpretations of Pancasila by Islamic groups, military leaders and secular nationalists, see Ramage, Douglas, Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam and the Ideology of Tolerance (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), pp. 60–70, 108–110, 172–74CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³ Pranarka, A.M.W., Sejarah Pemikiran Tentang Pancasila (Jakarta: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1985), p. 33Google Scholar.

⁴ The sequence of five principles in this speech was Nationalism, Humanism, Democracy, Social Justice and Belief in God. Sukarno, , “Lahirnya Pantja Sila”, in Tjamkan Pantja Sila!: Pantja Sila Dasar Falsafah Negara (Jakarta: Departemen Penerangan, 1964), pp. 3–34Google Scholar.

⁵ Pranarka, A.M.W., Sejarah Pemikiran Tentang Pancasila, p. 30Google Scholar.

⁶ Ibid., p. 38.

⁷ It is said that this Charter was kept secret from the public at the time of agreement. See Soepardo, et al. , Manusia dan Masjarakat Baru Indonesia (Civics) (Jakarta: Departemen P.P. dan K., 1960), p. 63Google Scholar.

⁸ Boland, B.J., The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), pp. 23–25CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁹ In Indonesian, this phrase is composed of seven words: dengan kewajiban menjalankan syari'at Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya. Following Boland, I will call it “the seven words” throughout this paper. See Boland, B.J., The Struggle of Islam, p. 27Google Scholar.

¹⁰ Pranarka, A.M.W., Sejarah Pemikiran Tentang Pancasila, pp. 57–59Google Scholar.

¹¹ Ibid., pp. 58, 59.

¹² It is said that Christian committee members demanded the omission of “the seven words” from the Constitution, even if no records remain to prove this. A Hindu delegate made an attempt to delete Islamic wording in the Constitution, suggesting a substitution of the term Allah (a word derived from Arabic designating God) for Tuhan Yang Maha Kuasa (Indonesian words signifying “God, the Almighty”). His proposal was accepted by the Committee but was not inserted into the final form of the Constitution. Pranarka, A.M.W., Sejarah Pemikiran Tentang Pancasila, pp. 59–60Google Scholar.

¹³ A notable exception was a presidential decree issued in 1965 which lists religions followed by Indonesians, namely, Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism and Confucianism. This decree, however, does not give these religions an exclusive and privileged status, as a part of it states: “[specifying religions confessed by Indonesians] does not mean that other religions such as Judaism, Zoroastrianism, Shintoism and Taoism are prohibited in Indonesia. These religions are given full guarantee [to be practised in Indonesia] as is stipulated in Article 20, Section 2 [in the Constitution] in so far as they do not violate the stipulations in this presidential decree or other acts and regulations.” The inclusiveness of this decree contrasts with later development under the New Order, whereby these religions, with the exception of Confucianism (from 1966 on, Confucianism lost the same status as the other five religions), are tacitly considered as the religions in which Indonesians are permitted to acknowledge their faith. This development reflects the changing religious atmosphere in the New Order. For the presidential decree issued in 1965, see Budiyono, , Membina Kerukunan Hidup Antar Umat Beriman, vol. I (Yogyakarta: Yayasan Kanisius, 1983), p. 106Google Scholar.

¹⁴ Soepardo, et al. , Manusia dan Masjarakat Baru Indonesia, p. 49Google Scholar.

¹⁵ Sukarno, , “Pantja Sila Dasar Falsafah Negara”, in Tjamkan Pantja Sila!: Pantja Sila Dasar Falsafah Negara (Jakarta: Departemen Penerangan, 1964), pp. 35–93Google Scholar.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 81.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 83.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 86.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 92.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 92.

²¹ van der Kroef, Justus, The Communist Party of Indonesia: Its History, Program and Tactics (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 1965), p. 7Google Scholar.

²² Sukarno, “Lahirnya Pantja Sila”, p. 18.

²³ In the 1950s, the PKI repeatedly expressed its allegiance to all principles in Pancasila including that of Belief in One God. The Seventh Special National Congress of the PKI in 1962 revised its Constitution so that Pancasila might be included as a part of its ideology. In spite of this official admission, most Muslims did not abandon their conviction that the PKI was an organization of infidels. They accused the PKI of opportunism and hypocrisy since the very theories of Marxism and Leninism made it impossible for Communists to accept the first principle of Pancasila. See Pipitseputra, , Beberapa Aspek Dari Sejarah Indonesia: Aliran Nasionalis, Islam, Katolik sampai Akhir Zaman Perbedaan Paham (Flores: Nusa Indah, 1973) p. 362Google Scholar; and van der Kroef, Justus, The Communist Party of Indonesia, pp. 99, 162Google Scholar.

²⁴ The Kebatinan Congress defines kebatinan as the basic source of the principle of Belief in One God, the aim of which is to achieve a noble character and perfection of life. Subagyo, Rahmat, Kepercayaan Kebatinan Kerohanian Kejiwaan dan Agama (Yogyakarta: Penerbit Yayasan Kanisius, 1973), p. 76Google Scholar.

²⁵ Badan Kongres Kebatinan Indonesia Pusat, Tjahaja Widjajakusuma (Jakarta, 1963), p. 112Google Scholar.

²⁶ Subagyo, Rahmat, Kepercayaan, p. 118Google Scholar.

²⁷ Pipitseputra, , Beberapa Aspek Dari Sejarah Indonesia, pp. 358–59Google Scholar.

²⁸ Subagyo, Rahmat, Kepercayaan, p. 118Google Scholar.

²⁹ Djojodigoeno, , “Definisi Agama dan Merusak Agama”, in Aliran-Aliran Kepercayaan dan Kebatinan di Indonesia, H.M. As'ad El Hafidy (Jakarta: Ghalia Indonesia, 1982), pp. 126–29Google Scholar.

³⁰ Christianity was believed by Muslims to possess all the elements that they used to define a religion: divine revelation (wahyu), prophets, Holy Books, commands and prohibitions to regulate life in this world and the Hereafter and universal acceptance as a religion by other nations.

³¹ Sidjabat, W.B., “Religious Tolerance and the Christian Faith: A Study Concerning the Concept of Divine Omnipotence in the Indonesian Constitution in the Light of Islam and Christianity” (Th.D. diss., Princeton Theological Seminary, 1960), p. 288Google Scholar.

³² Singodimejo, Kasman, Renungan dari Tahanan (Jakarta: Tintoamas, 1969), pp. 73–74Google Scholar.

³³ Lembaga Penelitian dan Pembangunan Sosial, Ichtisar Statistik Tentang Geredja Katolik di Indonesia: 1949–1967 (1968), table 33 and Willis, Avery, Indonesian Revival: Why Two Million Came to Christ (California: William Carey Library, 1977), p. 192Google Scholar.

³⁴ Cooley, Frank, Indonesia: Church & Society (New York: Friendship Press, 1968), p. 92Google Scholar.

³⁵ Hasyim, Umar, Toleransi dan Kemerdekaan Beragama Dalam Islam Sebagai Dasar Menuju Dialog dan Kerukunan Antar Agama: Sejarah Toleransi dan Intoleransi Agama dan Kepercayaan sejak Jaman Yunani (Surabaya: PT. Bina Ilmu, 1991), pp. 270–71Google Scholar.

³⁶ Singodimejo, Kasman, Renungan dari Tahanan, p. 74Google Scholar.

³⁷ A reformist Islamic leader put forward what had been in the heart of Muslims but could not have been expressed in the Old Order as follows: “when bewailing or speaking about the intolerance of other religious communities, we [ Muslims] were accused of being breakers of national unity. They [Christians] Christianized Muslims by distributing hundreds of rupiahs and with systematic ways to hurt the hearts of Muslims. However, if we opened our mouths, we were accused of being anti-Pancasila or fanatics.” Hasyim, Umar, Toleransi dan Kemerdekaan Beragama. p. 298Google Scholar.

³⁸ Other major demands of Muslims were to legalize the Jakarta Charter and to rehabilitate the banned Islamic Party, Masjumi, neither of which was accepted by the Soeharto government. See Samson, Allan, “Islam in Indonesian Politics”, Asian Survey 8, 12 (1968): 1005–1013CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³⁹ Frank Cooley estimates that the Protestant Church alone saw an increase of two million converts while the Catholic Church reported annual increases of 100,000 followers in 1965–67. See Cooley, Frank, Indonesia, pp. 6–7Google Scholar; Lembaga Penelitian dan Pembangunan Sosial, Ichtisar Statistik, Table 33; and Avery Willis, Indonesian Revival.

⁴⁰ Boland, B.J., The Struggle of Islam, pp. 230–31Google Scholar.

⁴¹ Soeharto, , “Pidato Sambutan Pejabat Presiden Republik Indonesia, Soeharto, Pada Pembukaan Musyawarah Antar Agama Pada Tanggal 30 Nopember 1967 di Jakarta”, in Toleransi dan Kemerdekaan Beragama, ed. Hasyim, Umar, pp. 393–97Google Scholar.

⁴² Rasyidi, H.M., “Modernisme dan Toleransi: Pidato Sambutan Pada Musyawarah Antar Agama tgl. 30 Nopember 1967 di Jakarta”, in Toleransi dan Kemerdekaan Beragama, Umar Hasyim, pp. 401–410Google Scholar.

⁴³ The bargaining position of Christians vis-à-vis the government did not immediately deteriorate after the installation of the New Order Government. One of their strengths came from their active role in denouncing the attempted communist coup. As soon as news of the coup spread, the Indonesian Council of Protestant Churches issued a statement, registering their reaction to atrocities inflicted by Communists, thanking God for the failure of the coup and expressing their support for the leadership of the country. The Roman Catholic Party also supported the disassociation of the PKI and the installation of General Soeharto as a president. The Catholic Student organization played an important part in the youth movement called “Generation of 1966”, which expedited the shift of power from Sukarno to Soeharto. Boland, B.J., The Struggle of Islam, pp. 141–42Google Scholar; Pipitseputra, , Beberapa Aspek Dari Sejarah Indonesia, pp. 452–55Google Scholar; and Willis, Avery, Indonesian Revival, p. 19Google Scholar.

⁴⁴ Willis, Avery, Indonesian Revival, p. 105Google Scholar.

⁴⁵ Harun, Lukman et al. , “Interpelasi Anggota DPRGR Drs. Lukman Harun dkk”, in Toleransi dan Kemerdekaan Beragama, pp. 299–308Google Scholar.

⁴⁶ This interpretation was given by a head officer of the Department of Religion at the kecamatan (sub-district) level, showing one way Decree No. 70 can be interpreted. This does not mean, however, that the decree prohibits Indonesians from talking about their religion to followers of different religions in any circumstances whatsoever. Dialogues about religions are said to be permitted and encouraged, but on the condition that the aim is to deepen knowledge about other religions and not to spread religion to others. In a situation where criteria to determine whether the purpose of religious dialogue is to understand or to spread a certain religion are not available, application of the Decree is dependent on the subjective evaluation of an individual or a group. In this sense, Decree No. 70 would become another source of controversy in the future between Muslims and Christians.

⁴⁷ The Protestant and Catholic Churches expressed their objection to the two decrees. They argued that restrictions on the freedom to spread religion contradicted religious freedom guaranteed by the 1945 Constitution and that these decrees violated the essence (hakikah) of every religion, namely, that religious messages should be spread not only to a limited circle of human beings but to all mankind. This reaction from Christians brought no result, and open criticisms of the two decrees soon abated when the government expressed its strong intention to maintain them by issuing another decree in 1979. The new decree, reiterating Decree No. 70 in 1978, was signed not only by the Minister of Religion but by the Minster of Internal Affairs. See, Sekretariat Umum Dewan Gereja-Gereja di Indonesia & Sekretariat Majelis Agung Waligereja Indonesia, Tinjauan mengenai Keputusan Menteri Agama No. 70 dan No. 77 Tahun 1978 dalam Rangka Penyelenggaraan Kebebasan Beragama dan Pemeliharaan Kerukunan Nasional (Jakarta, 1978), mimeoGoogle Scholar.

⁴⁸ Departemen Agama Yogyakarta, Munakahat Membina Keluarga Sakinah dan Keputusan Forum Dialog Pemuka-Pemuka Agama Prop. Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta (Yogyakarta: Kantor Departemen Agama, 1990), pp. 19–48Google Scholar.

⁴⁹ Apart from the regulations related to the propagation of religion, Muslims were also successful in enacting decrees to regulate the construction of a church. A decree issued in 1969 made permission from the government and from the residents of a certain area a prerequisite to the construction of religious buildings, while the decree in 1975 prohibited an ordinary house from being used as a group prayer house on a regular basis. These decrees could effectively control the expansion of missionary activities since Christians were forced to obtain the agreement of the local Muslim population in order to build a church. The 1975 regulation made it almost impossible, at least in legal terms, for Christians to initiate missionary activities in a new area where no work had been carried out previously, since private houses could not be used for religious purposes and no church could be constructed. See Keagamaan, Proyek Perencanaan Peraturan Perundangan, Peraturan Perundangan Yang Menyangkut Tata Kehidupan Beragama dan Pendirian Rumah Ibadah (Jakarta: Departemen Agama, 1980/1981)Google Scholar.

⁵⁰ Nairn, Sahibi, Kerukunan Antar Umat Beragama (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1983), pp. 38–39Google Scholar.

⁵¹ See also Stange, Paul, “Religious Change in Contemporary Southeast Asia”, in The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia Volume Two: The Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, ed. Tarling, Nicholas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 554Google Scholar.

⁵² Statistik, Biro Pusat, Penduduk Indonesia Menurut Propinsi, Kabupaten dan Kotamadya (Jakarta: Biro Pusat Statistik, 1990)Google Scholar.

⁵³ Kolojonggo, a pseudonym for the hamlet in which this study was carried out, is located about 9 kilometres from Yogyakarta city. In 1993, the total population was 544, of whom 258 were male and 286 were female.

⁵⁴ For more about the accelerating Islamic development and subsequent changes in Kolojonggo, see Kim, Hyung-Jun, “Reformist Muslims in a Yogyakarta Village: The Islamic Transformation of Contemporary Socio-Religious Life” (Ph.D. diss., Australian National University, Canberra, 1996), pp. 70–111, 234–64Google Scholar.

⁵⁵ This idea is connected to Islamic leaders' view of conversion, namely that conversion is possible only after a person compares and analyzes two religions thoroughly and is convinced of the truthfulness of one over the other. As most Muslim converts to Christianity have not been given chances to carry out these activities, they argue, their conversion can be explained only by referring to extra-religious factors.

⁵⁶ All names appearing in the text are pseudonyms.