^{page 119 note 1} See the typed verbatim report of the trial of Dani, Omar: Mahmilub. Perkara Omar Dani (Jakarta, 1966), Vol. 2, p. 140Google Scholar, issued by the Special Military Tribunal (Mahmilub). (Hereafter cited as Omar Dani). The name of the former air force commander is in various books also written as Omar Dhani. He was sentenced to death by the Mahmilub.

^{page 119 note 2} As expressed in the initial statement of Lieutenant-Colonel Untung over Radio Republik Indonesia at approximately 7.15 a.m. on 1 October 1965.

^{page 120 note 3} Omar Dani, Vol. 2, p. 131. Also the typed verbatim report of the trial of former Brigadier-General Supardjo: Mahmilub, Perkara Supardjo (Jakarta, 1967), p. 88.Google Scholar (Hereafter cited as Supardjo). Supardjo, like Untung, was sentenced to death and executed.

^{page 120 note 4} Published in 1973 by Mouton & Co in The Hague.

^{page 120 note 5} Published in 1974 by Interdoc Publishing House, Van Stolkweg 10, The Hague.

^{page 121 note 6} The time of Sukarno's departure from Senayan has been corroborated by the presidential aide, Colonel Bambang Widjanarko, and by Chief Police Commissioner Sumirat. See Supardjo, Vol. 2, p. 410 and p. 430.

^{page 121 note 7} For Mangil's testimony, see Supardjo, Vol. 2, pp. 354–359.

^{page 122 note 8} As testified by Saelan in Supardjo, Vol. 2, pp. 337–343. Bapak is a term of respect, literally meaning ‘Father’, and generally reserved for male members of an older generation. For women the equivalent word is Ibu (Mother).

^{page 122 note 9} Sunarjo's account can be read in Supardjo, Vol. 2, p. 395.

^{page 122 note 10} Hughes, John in his Indonesian Upheaval (New York, 1967)Google Scholar, stated that there were two other choices open, namely to go to a warship of the navy or to travel overland by armoured car to some refuge (pp. 53–54). These possibilities were, however, not mentioned in the trials of Omar Dani and Supardjo.

^{page 122 note 11} About the hours of departure for and arrival at Halim, see Sumirat's statement in Supardjo, Vol. 2, p. 414.

^{page 122 note 12} Omar Dani, Vol. 2, p. 129. Also as testified by General Sunarjo in Supardjo, Vol. 2, p. 397.

^{page 123 note 13} For the text of this broadcast, see Indonesia, Ithaca, New York, (April 1966), pp. 134–135.Google Scholar

^{page 123 note 14} Sukarno seemed on this occasion to have used the Dutch language: ‘Zoiets kan in een revolutie gebeuren’. See Supardjo's statement in Supardjo, Vol. 2, p. 88. According to Omar Dani, Supardjo on that occasion was still ignorant of many facts so that he was frequently evasive in his answers to questions asked by the President (Omar Dani, Vol. 2, p. 131).

^{page 123 note 15} Omar Dani, Vol. 2, p. 132. General Sunarjo had overheard the dialogue between the President and Supardjo. According to this witness, Supardjo, when asked for proofs concerning the disloyalty of the generals, promised that he would get these proofs (Supardjo, Vol. 2, p. 398).

^{page 123 note 16} Supardjo, Vol. 2, p. 83. Sukarno seemed to have spoken in Sundanese, the local language of West Java: ‘… engke maneh dipeuntjif’, which means ‘you will be slaughtered’ or ‘your throat will be cut’. Horever, the word aing (I) is not used here so that it would be incorrect to translate the sentence as ‘I will cut your throat’. This means that it would not necessarily be Sukarno who would do the act. Anyway, according to Supardjo, the late President expressed the sentence in a jocular vein with no real threat behind it.

^{page 124 note 17} Omar Dani in Omar Dani, Vol. 2, p. 134. According to Saelan (note 8 above) it was already nearly 11.30 a.m. when Sukarno departed from Ko-Ops to Susanto's house.

^{page 124 note 18} Acknowledged by , Sjam, another leader of the 30 September Movement. See Mahmilub. Perkara Sjam (Jakarta, 1968), Vol. 1, p. SIV/34.Google Scholar (Hereafter cited as Sjam.) At the end of the trial Sjam was sentenced to death. About Untung's assent to follow the President's order and cease all military activities, see Supardjo, Vol. 2, p. 35.

^{page 125 note 19} About this preliminary stage in the discussions concerning the appointment of an army caretaker in Susanto's house, see the testimonies of Omar Dani (Omar Dani, Vol. 2, p. 136) and of Supardjo (Supardjo, Vol. 2, p. 132).

^{page 125 note 20} Indonesia, see note 13 above, p. 136.

^{page 125 note 21} Supardjo, Vol. 2, p. 131 and p. 148.

^{page 125 note 22} Omar Dani, Vol. 2, p. 139. It seems improbable that at that time Sukarno did not know who Untung was as alleged by Omar Dani, especially after Sukarno had earlier been handed over the list of the Revolution Council members, presumably by Supardjo who had brought it on one of his trips from Cenko to Susanto's house that day and who had certainly informed him that the Untung heading the list was none other than the commander of one of the battalions of the Palace Guard.

^{page 126 note 23} Supardjo, Vol. 2, p. 399.

^{page 126 note 24} For Sutjipto's account of the deliberations, see Omar Dani, Vol. 1, p. 481, and Supardjo, Vol. 2, p. 471. The testimony of Deputy Prime Minister Leimena concerning the same subject is in Omar Dani, Vol. 1, p. 472.

^{page 126 note 25} Supardjo, Vol. 2, p. 133. This was corroborated by Omar Dani, see Omar Dani, Vol. 2, pp. 140–141.

^{page 126 note 26} Sjam, Vol. l,p. SIV/34.

^{page 127 note 27} About the decision to go to Bogor, see the testimony of Leimena (Omar Dani, Vol. 1, p. 472, and Supardjo, Vol. 2, p. 449) and of Sutjipto (Omar Dani, Vol. 1, p. 480). According to William L. Oltmans, a Dutch journalist who had good relations with Sukarno and his wife, Dewi, the meeting between the two in Susanto's house lasted 20 minutes. In it Dewi had begged her husband not to take refuge in Madiun, East Java, as suggested by one of Sukarno's ministers at , Halim (Den Vaderland Getrouwe, Utrecht, 1973, p. 271).Google Scholar Dewi herself wrote in an ‘Open Letter to President Suharto’ (Vrij Nederland, Amsterdam, 18 April 1970Google Scholar) that she had secretly arrived at Halim to be near her husband. She did not, however, mention the private conversation with Sukarno. She described the situation in Susanto's house as one of ‘great confusion’ (p. 3, col. 3).

^{page 127 note 28} Omar Dani, Vol. 1, p. 480. The people were open-mouthed (mlongo) and did not understand because the communists did not mobilise their masses in support of the 30 September Movement, e.g. in the form of mass uprisings and a general strike. The absence of such revolutionary actions suggests that the movement of Untung was not initiated and organised by the PKI but had indeed originated with officers who were dissatisfied with the army leadership. The intra-army conflict thesis is defended by Anderson, Benedict R. O’G. and McVey, Ruth T., A Preliminary Analysis of the October 1, 1965 Coup in Indonesia (Ithaca, New York, 1971).Google Scholar

^{page 128 note 29} Indonesia, see note 13 above, p. 153.

^{page 128 note 30} Mahmilub. Perkara Subandrio, (Jakarta, 1966), Vol. 1, p. 368.Google ScholarPak is the shortened version of Bapak (see note 8 above). The former Foreign Minister also received the death sentence on the basis of circumstantial evidence of being involved with Untung's movement. The sentence had apparently been commuted to life imprisonment.

^{page 128 note 31} Omar Dani, Vol. 1, pp. 470–471.

^{page 129 note 32} Roeder, O. G., The Smiling General: President Suharto of Indonesia, (Jakarta, 1970), p. 67.Google Scholar

^{page 129 note 33} Dewi has published nine letters. Eight of them can be found in the Dutch daily NRC Handelsblad, Rotterdam, 22 September 1973Google Scholar, and the ninth letter (dated 1 October 1965) in Ernst Utrecht, ‘Negende Brief van Sukarno aan zijn Vrouw’, in De Nieuwe Linie, Amsterdam, 28 November 1973.Google Scholar Some of these letters have also been printed in Oltmans, op. cit., Appendix XIII, p. 632. Concerning the value of these letters as a historical source, see Spoor, A. S., ‘Wat Bewijzen de Brieven van Sukarno?’, in NRC Handelsblad, 8 October 1973.Google Scholar

^{page 130 note 34} See the English translation of the report in The Devious Dalang (The Hague, 1974), pp. 19–20.Google Scholar (Hereafter cited as DD.) If not otherwise mentioned, the English translation in the second part of the book is meant.

^{page 131 note 35} DD 167–168.

^{page 131 note 36} DD, pp. 14–15. Yani was indeed summoned to report to the President at his weekend palace at Bogor in the morning of 1 October (Hughes, op. cit., pp. 8–9). This also seemed to suggest that Sukarno had no inkling of what was planned by Untung with regard to the army commander for the early hours of 1 October.

^{page 131 note 37} DD, p. 21. The word bung may be translated into ‘brother’. It was frequently used in the armed struggle against the Dutch after 17 August 1945. In this period Sukarno was sometimes referred to as Bung Karno and various people continued using it until his death.

^{page 132 note 38} DD, p. 29.

^{page 132 note 39} As stated by Utrecht, Ernst, ‘Sukarno's Aandeel in Staatsgreep met Vals Document “Bewezen”’, in De Nieuwe Linie, Amsterdam, 21 November 1973.Google Scholar

^{page 132 note 40} Dake, Anotnie C. A., In the Spirit of the Red Banteng, The Hague, 1973, p. 388, footnote 56.Google Scholar

^{page 133 note 41} DD, the original Indonesian text, p. 21 and p. 174.

^{page 133 note 42} Dake, op. cit., p. 411, note 35.

^{page 133 note 43} Oltmans, op. cit., p. 312.

^{page 133 note 44} DD, p. 15.

^{page 133 note 45} Dake, op. cit., pp. 407–408.

^{page 134 note 46} The Istana Olahraga (Istora) or Sports Palace at Senayan was built in 1962 for the Asian Games held that year in Indonesia. Up to 1965 the writer of this article had at least twenty times heard President Sukarno speak at this venue. The mass audience was always different. Sometimes it consisted of university students, or of journalists, or lawyers. On other days Sukarno spoke to members of a political party, to industrial workers or other groupings in Indonesian society. The implementation of the programme on such occasions, however, was generally done according to a fixed pattern with the President forming the last speaker and making a speech of more than one hour's duration while standing all alone on the raised platform.

^{page 134 note 47} DD, p. 29.

^{page 134 note 48} Dake lamely stated: ‘What Untung wrote is not known but can be guessed’ (Dake, op. cit., p. 408).

^{page 134 note 49} Dake, op. cit., pp. 410–411, note 32.

^{page 134 note 50} Dake, op. cit., p. 398, note 10.

^{page 135 note 51} Dake's dissertation and the Widjanarko Report have elicited much controversy in the Netherlands. The unnamed writer of ‘Levert Dake het Bewijs van de Schuld van Soekarno?’, in NRC Handelsblad, Rotterdam, 29 June 1974Google Scholar, showed some glaring inconsistencies in the report. At the beginning of the second interrogation of Widjanarko on 21 October 1970, the same interrogators of the interrogation of 3 October, eighteen days earlier, stated that they did not yet know Widjanarko (DD, p. 35). Further on Widjanarko made a statement to the effect that he was already interrogated in 1967 as a witness in the trials of General Supardjo and Pranoto. He added: ‘No statements have been made by me about ex-President Sukarno and the palace apart from the investigation taking place today, 21 October 1970’ (DD, p. 38). This seems to warrant the view that the 3 October 1970 interrogation has never taken place and that the socalled verbatim report of it is possibly a forgery. Not fortuitously the 3 October interrogation covers the alleged meetings between Sukarno and Untung (4 August 1965), between Sukarno and some of his ministers and generals (23 and 29 September 1965) and also the episode with the letter allegedly sent by Untung to Sukarno at the Sports Palace on 30 September 1965. Dake himself reacted by pointing out that Widjanarko also stated to his interrogators while answering a question: ‘Yes, I adhere to the statements given in the Report of Investigation of 3 October 1970 last’. This was indeed printed in the Widjanarko Report (DD, p. 36) but its effect was immediately neutralised by the above-mentioned statement of Widjanarko two pages further in which he denied having made statements prior to the investigation of 21 October 1970. In his rejoinder Dake attempted to bolster his weak cause by asserting that Brigadier-General Supardjo was also present in the meetings with Sukarno and his coterie in the palace on 23 and 29 September 1965 (See Dake, Antonie C. A., ‘Sukarno, de Untung Putsch en het Widjanarko-Rapport’, in NRC Handelsblad, Rotterdam, 1 and 2 August 1974).Google Scholar Supardjo was, however, not mentioned in the relevant places of the Widjanarko Report.

^{page 135 note 52} After ten years the real story behind the events of 1 October 1965 is still wrapped in a shroud of mystery. This situation is perhaps epitomised by the title of van der Kroefs, J. M. article about these events: ‘Origins of the 1965 Coup in Indonesia: Probabilities and Alternatives’, in Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, Vol. III, No. 2 (September 1972).Google Scholar