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Sino-Malay Conflicts in Malaya, 1945–1946: Communist Vendetta and Islamic Resistance

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 August 2009

Cheah Boon Kheng
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Extract

The Japanese occupation (1941–45) in Malaya enabled the predominantly Chinese Malayan Communist Party (MCP) to increase its political influence during and after the war. As it was the only effective political organization actively engaged in anti-Japanese insurgency, it attracted widespread support among the Chinese who suffered greatly from the hostility of the Japanese. The MCP succeeded, therefore, in establishing a strong politico-military resistance movement led by the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MFAJA), in the midst of the Chinese community. There was, however, considerably less support for the MCP from the Malay and Indian communities because their cooperation with the Japanese was clearly better and greater than that of the Chinese. None the less, because of its sizeable guerrilla forces operating during the Japanese occupation, the MCP thus became a major political force in post-war Malaya.

Type
Articles
Information
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies , Volume 12 , Issue 1 , March 1981 , pp. 108 - 117
Copyright
Copyright © The National University of Singapore 1981

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References

1 For information on these units, see Lebrar, Joyce C., Japanese-Trained Armies in Southeast Asia (Kuala Lumpur, 1977), pp. 116–19Google Scholar.

2 Ellsbree, Willard H., Japan's Role in Southeast Asian Nationalist Movements, 1940 to 1945 (Cambridge, Mass., 1953), p. 149Google Scholar.

3 The best account on Kiyai Salleh and the Sufi orders is al-Attas, Syed Naguib, Some Aspects of Sufism, as Understood and Practised among the Malays (Singapore, 1963), pp. 33–34Google Scholar. An excellent case study of Kiyai Salleh and his Simpang Kiri area can be found in Bamadhaj, Halinah, “ The Impact of the Japanese Occupation of Malaya on Malay Society and Politics, 1941–1945 (M.A. thesis, University of Auckland, 1975)Google Scholar.

4 Datuk Onn, scion of the royal household of Johor, was appointed DO in Aug. 1945 by the Japanese, with the consent of Sultan Ibrahim of Johor. His appointment was to replace Ismail bin Dato Abdullah who was killed in June of that year by the MPAJA.

5 See Malaya Command intelligence telegram, 29 Nov. 1945, “Subject: MCP activity: Klang. Village headman ordered by Chinese to enrol all Malays into Chinese fighting force.” See also Intelligence Summary (ISUM) No. 28, Hqs. Malaya Command to SACSEA, 3 Dec. 1945: “Ipoh meeting. MCP representatives made speeches urging Malays to unite with Chinese.” Enclosures in BMA PSD/29.

6 The Chinese in Malaya were granted various freedoms by the BMA in 1945 which had been denied them before the war. Chinese associations, trade unions, and secret societies could be freely organized and Chinese newspapers published without controls. The British also proposed to grant them citizenship under the Malayan Union plan. Chinese would possess the same rights and privileges as other sections of the population. See “Chinese policy: Long-term Directive”, 31 Oct. 1945, WO 172/1789.

7 The best account on the Malayan Union policy is Allen, James V., The Malayan Union (New Haven, Conn., 1967)Google Scholar.

8 See Force 136 field intelligence report, 11 Sept. 1945, in BMA PSD/39. Force 136 was a component of Admiral Louis Mountbatten's South-East Asia Command. Mountbatten was the British Supreme Allied Commander for Southeast Asia (SACSEA).

9 Force 136 reports, 15 and 16 Sept. 1945.

10 Force 136, report, 26 Sept. 1945.

11 Victor Purcell, “Malaya's Political Climate III, (19 Oct. — 9 Nov. 1945)”, in WO 203/5302; see also idem, The Chinese in Malaya (London, 1949), p. 268.

12 HamzahMohamad, , “The Fourteen Days of Terror, Before, During and After”, (B A. thesis. University of Malaya, 1969/1970), pp. 17–20Google Scholar. See also ISUM, Hqs. Malaya Command, 2 Feb. 1946, in WO 172/9773.

13 Purcell, “Malaya's Political Climate III”.

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid.

16 See Report, “Situation in Malaya”, 14 Nov. 1945, in WO 172/1791.

17 SACSEA to War Office on Malaya, 17 Nov. 1945, in WO 172/1792.

18 Nanyang Siang Pau (Singapore), 17 11 1945Google Scholar.

19 Telegram from Johor Bahru to SACSEA, 20 Nov. 1945, in WO 172/1792.

20 BMA (Malaya) Monthly Report No. 3 for Nov. 1945, 3, in Confidential BMA PSD/39/45.

21 BMA Monthly Report for Nov. 1945, Confidential SCA9/45, 3.

22 Weekly Intelligence Review (WIR), No. 61 Hqrs. SACSEA, 10 Dec. 1945, in WO 172/1794.

23 WIR, 25 Indian Division, 12 Dec. 1945, in MU Secret 335/46.

24 Min Sheng Pau, 20 12 1945Google Scholar.

25 ISUM Hqrs. Malaya Command No. 10, up to 5 Jan. 1946, in WO 172/9773.

26 Ibid.

27 Hone, H.R., Report on the British Military Administration in Malaya, September 1945–March 1946, p. 41Google Scholar.

28 Shaw, William, Tun Razak: His Life and Times (Kuala Lumpur, 1976), p. 58Google Scholar. The account is believed to be based on an interview with the late Malaysian Prime Minister.

29 Ibid.

30 Nanyang Siang Pau, 12 03 1946Google Scholar.

31 Seruan Raayat (Kuala Lumpur), 12 12 1945Google Scholar.

32 Kheng, Cheah Boon, The Masked Comrades: A Study of the Communist United Front in Malaya, 1945–1948 (Singapore, 1979)Google Scholar.