¹ Earlier culture and personality theories were subject to “level of analysis problems”. Extrapolations from culturally defined personality traits to organizational behaviour were made without considering the impact of structural restraints.

² Stinchcombe, A., “Social Structure and Organizations”, Handbook of Organizations, ed. March, J. (Chicago, 1965) pp. 142–93.Google Scholar

³ Crozier, M., The Bureaucratic Phenomenon (Chicago, 1964), p. 54.Google Scholar

⁴ We are not criticizing this approach. We are only reacting to the advocates of such approach who denigrate any attempt to bring “culture” into analyses of bureaucracy. Meyer, M. [Bureaucratic Structure and Authority (New York, 1972)],Google Scholar by making quantitative comparisons between “hierarchical differentiation” and “evaluation processes”, or Boland, W. [“Size, External Relations and Distribution of Power: A Study of Colleges and Universities”, in Comparative Organizations, ed. Heydebrand, W. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1973), pp. 428–40], by correlating “size” and “levels at which decisions are made”, investigate similar questions to those that we shall exploreGoogle Scholar.

⁵ Meyer, , op. cit., p. 58.Google Scholar

⁶ Of the major organizational theorists, Stinchcombe, A. [Creating Efficient Industrial Administration (New York, 1974)]Google Scholar represents a major exception in connecting “values” to organizational behaviour. Others have tried to relate “perceptions of control” to organizational features in a comparative context, i.e., Tannenbaum, A. [Hierarchy in Organizations (San Francisco, 1974)].Google Scholar Such studies, however, fail to answer “why” or “how” such different environments develop or are supported. For example, we need explanations for the markedly different regulatory environments in European public administration described by Chapman, B. [The Profession of Government (London, 1959)]Google Scholar.

⁷ Other studies have made similar analyses. Bendix, R. [Work and Authority in Industry (New York, 1956)]Google Scholar traces the relationship between changes in managerial ideology and worker compliance. Dore, R. [British Factory-Japanese Factory (Berkeley, Cal., 1973)]Google Scholar describes the evolutionary nature of hierarchical control systems and the means through which they are implemented.

⁸ Blau, P., The Dynamics of Bureaucracy (Chicago, 1963)Google Scholar and Crozier, op. cit.

⁹ Blau, P., Exchange and Power (New York, 1964), pp. 88–115.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Selznick, P., Law, Society and Industrial Justice (New York, 1969), p. 5.Google Scholar

¹¹ The Weberian use of these terms can be found in Weber, M., The Theory of Social and Economic Organizations (New York,1947), p. 35ff.Google Scholar Our discussion draws heavily upon the interpretation of Weber found in Hartman, H., Authority and Organization in German Management (Princeton, N.J., 1959), pp. 286–88Google Scholar.

¹² We shall use the term “culture” as an undefined term connotating the collectionof values and supportive institutions that distinguish one group from another. For a justification of this approach, see Rubin, H. and Rubin, I., “The Function of Liminal Events in the Succession to a Position of Power: The Transfer of the District Officer in Thailand”, American Ethnologist, 2, no. 2 (1975): 329–47CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹³ Compare Wilson, D., Politics in Thailand (Ithaca, N.Y., 1962)Google Scholar(discussion of the self-justifying nature of authority) or Hanks, L., “The Corporation and The Entourage”, Catalyst 2 (1966): 55–63Google Scholar(justification of Thai managerial authority) with Bendix's Work and Authority (description of the use of Protestant ideology in supporting managerial authority).

¹⁴ Karma refers to a running account of an individual's merit and demerit through all existences. The karma one has acquired in previous existences account for the individual's state in this life. In popular preceptions, individuals perceive punishments or rewardsas “karmic” returns for evil or good done in the current existence. For a discussionof such concepts of karma1 and further references to the literature on popular Buddhism, see Rubinand Rubin, op. cit.

¹⁵ Scott, J., “Patron-Client Politics and Political Changein Southeast Asia”, American Political Science Review 66 (1972): 91–114.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Implicit criticisms of his approach are given in the notes to Rubin, H., “Will and Awe: Illustrations of Thai Villager Dependency Upon Officials”, Journal of Asian Studies 32 (1973): 425–44.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Contrasting images of patrons in Indonesia, Burma, and Thailand are presented.

¹⁶ Hartman, , op. cit., pp. 255–94.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Selznick, in Law, Society and Industrial Justice, describes how appeals are vital to the justification of authority in American organizations. Crozier argues the opposite for France. In fact, we hypothesize that any system in which individuals in authority are justified in terms of their being representative of the state is threatened through a piecemeal appeal process. Such an argument has been made for Indonesia, see Anderson, B., “The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture”, Culture and Politics in Indonesia, ed. Holt, C. (Ithaca, N.Y., 1972), pp. 1–69,Google Scholar or Fagg, D. “Authority and Social Stratification: A Study of Javanese Bureaucracy” (Ph. D. diss. (Harvard University, 1958).Google Scholar In contrast, Metzger, T., [The Internal Organization of Ch'ing Bureaucracy (Cambridge, 1973)]CrossRefGoogle Scholar describes a system which obtained the best of both worlds. Appeals were not allowed; however, regular channels for appeals existed.

¹⁸ This is Selznick's, point in Law, Society and Industrial Justice, p. 211Google Scholar.

¹⁹ The logic of hypothesis formation is essentially one of “analytic induction”. See Glaser, B. and Strauss, A., The Discovery of Grounded Theory, (Chicago, 1967), pp. 104–5.Google Scholar Such arguments by their very nature are inductive.

²⁰ These differences occur in spite of the large numbers of detailed codified regulations in the three bureaucracies. It is the discretion in the use of such regulations and the substantive support for the use and not their existence that is under discussion.

²¹ Implicit within our discussion is an extension of Weber's concept of patrimonial authority. In contrasting the French and Thai cases, we are implicitly arguing that the justification for patrimonial authority can differ markedly. For a discussion of Thai patrimonialism, see Jacobs, N., Modernization Without Development: Thailand as an Asian Case Study (New York, 1971), pp. 27–95Google Scholar.

²² Blau, , op. cit., p. 20.Google Scholar

²³ Ibid., p. 215. 2

²⁴ Ibid., p. 200.

²⁵ Loc. cit.

²⁶ Gouldner, A., Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy (Glencoe, 1954)Google Scholar traces how an American bureaucracy adjusts when superiors ignore this symbolic relationship. When the “give and take” of the superior-subordinate dyad stopped, the subordinates went on strike. Anew accommodation had to be found.

²⁷ Again, this utilizes Selznick's, argument in Law, Society and Industrial Justice, pp. 3–34, 121-82Google Scholar.

²⁸ Crozier, , op. cit., p. 156.Google Scholar

²⁹ Ibid., p. 57.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 87.

³¹ Ibid., p. 22.

³² Chapman, B., The Prefects and Provincial France (London, 1955),Google Scholar and Gregoire, R., The French Civil Service (Brussels, 1954), pp. 34–60Google Scholar.

³³ Our comparisons are with Siffin, W., The Thai Bureaucracy: Institutional Change and Development (Honolulu, 1966),Google Scholar and with Riggs, F., Thailand: The Modernization of a Bureaucratic Policy (Honolulu, 1966).Google Scholar These studies focus mainly upon the structure of the national level bureaucracy. For comparative material on the local bureaucracy, see Neher, Clark, The Dynamics of Politics and Administration in Rural Thailand, Papers in International Studies, Southeast Asia Series, no. 30 (Ohio, 1974).Google ScholarDhiravegin, Likhit, Political Attitudes of the Bureaucratic Elite and Modernization in Thailand (Bangkok, 1974)Google Scholar presents social background and attitudinal data on higher civil servants that support our argument.

³⁴ Siffin, , op. cit., p. 234.Google Scholar

³⁵ Ibid., p. 239.

³⁶ For a complete translation of the code of conduct of the civil service, see Rubin, H., “Will and Awe: The Local Thai Official and Rural Development” (Ph. D. diss., M.I.T., 1972), pp. 16–18.Google Scholar The many handbooks and preparation books for examinations also explicitly state the importance of thesevarious deference and obedience norms. The handbooks exhort superiors to behave in a benevolent and concerned fashion.

³⁷ A documented description of the effectiveness of the anonymous letter system including both the subordinates' letters and the superior's reactions will be found in Krannich, R., “Dimensions of Urban Political and Administrative Behavior: The Role of the Municipal Clerk in Thailand” (Ph.D. diss., Northern Illinois University, 1975), pp. 255–57Google Scholar.

³⁸ A complete description (somewhat disguised) of the two districts can be found in Rubin, H.J., The Dynamics of Development in Rural Thailand, Monograph number 8, Center for Southeast Asia Studies, 1974, pp. 18–27.Google Scholar Briefly, the two Districts were chosen because they were areas with minimal contact with central government officials. We tried to maximize differences in core problems faced in the area. One of the districts was considered an ordinary, rather boring area, with local crime as the major problems. The second, more isolated, district was near areas of insurgency. Supposedly, there was increased governmental interest in the area. In fact, this developmental interest frequently meant only more work for the local officials. Results were gathered through a combination of participant observation, intensive (sometimes over several days) in-depth interviewing, and confirmatory survey done with three villages. These results have been reported in Rubin, , “Will and Awe: Illustrations of Thai Villager Dependency Upon Officials” (pp. 425–36).Google Scholar The attitude scale instruments in Krannich's thesis done on an entirely different (and far more extensive) sample of Thai officials largely confirms our impressions of Thai views of proper hierarchical relations.

³⁹ More details of local administration (with the appropriate Thai terminology) can be found in my Ph. D. dissertation, pp. 13-39. See also Mehden, Fred von der and Wilson, David (eds.), Local Authority and Administration in Thailand, Academic Advisory Council for Thailand, Report No. 1 (Los Angeles Cal., 1970), pp. 23–80,92-141.Google Scholar Local school teachers are legally district officials; we did not include them in our research.

⁴⁰ More complicated relations involving technical agencies or centralized development programmes partially bypass this local command. For ecological reasons, malaria and forestry agencies are not always organized on a district level. Similarly, the Advanced Rural Development types of projects often have very short lines of command reporting to elite levels. We briefly studied a malaria group but no important differences were found. We did not try to study the insurgency oriented rapid development agencies.

⁴¹ For more details, see Rubin, and Rubin, , op. cit., pp. 333–37;Google Scholar also Rubin, , The Dynamics of Development in Rural Thailand, pp. 46–63Google Scholar.

⁴² Compare with Jacobs', N.Modernization Without Development: Thailand as an Asian Case Study. p. 33Google Scholar(discussion of the role of the model in Thai behaviour). In acting the model rule, the D.O. uses referrent power as a means to achieve control; see French, J. and Raven, D., “The Bases of Social Power”, Studies in Social Power, ed. Cartwright, D. (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1959), pp. 150–65Google Scholar.

⁴³ Interesting techniques of surviving in an environment of resource limitations were displayed. The D.O. could suggest (and by his presence assure) cooperation between the sections. Hecould use his status and power to borrow equipment from other governmental agencies or private companies.

⁴⁴ For more details of villager relations with officials, see Rubin, , “Will and Awe: Aspects of Villager Dependency Upon Officials”, pp. 437–44.Google Scholar For communications within the local Thai bureaucracy, see Rubin, H., “Modes of Bureaucratic Communications: Examples from Thai Local Administration”, Sociological Quarterly 15, no. 2 (1974): 212–30CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴⁵ Especially the works by Siffin, Riggs, Wilson, and Dhiravegin.

⁴⁶ Note that we are not denying the existence and importance of patron-client relations. We are simply indicating that the forms of patron-client relationships can exist without the substance.

⁴⁷ The “nitty-gritty” administrative literature focused mostly on the petty-bureaucratic administrator, e.g., Sommers, W., Report on Amphoe Administration, Agency for International Development, Thailand, 1966.Google Scholar Riggs and Siffin and Wilson describe both the benevolent, concerned superior and the “boss”chaonai. The anthropological literature is more prone to describe the chaonai visitor to the village.

⁴⁸ Rubin, , “Modes of Bureaucratic Communications”, pp. 222–25.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ We are presenting a paraphrase of material reported in Rubin, , “Will and Awe: The Local Thai Official and Rural Development”, pp. 114–290.Google Scholar Needless to say, much supporting evidence has been omitted.

⁵⁰ We are adding to the “merit and power” theme introduced by Hanks, L., “Merit and Power in the Thai Social Order”, American Anthropologist 64, no. 6 (1962): 1242–61Google Scholar and expanded in the political literature by David Wilson. This theme — of the self—justified nature of authority — is the predominant behavioural theme in the literature on Thailand. We have summarized the material on it in “Will and Awe: Illustrations of Thai Villager Dependency UponOfficials”, pp. 425-27. In Rubin, and Rubin, op. cit. (pp. 337–41),Google Scholar we explored how power is “delegitimated” in Thailand. In this current paper, we try to present the linkage between cosmological and “workaday” concepts.

⁵¹ The material on krengcaj and kamlangcaj parallels that presented in “Will and Awe: Illustrations of Thai Villager Dependency Upon Officials”, pp. 429-33. The village material and the official material were analysed separately. Both indicated a commonality on normative concepts of superior behaviour. Referees have observed that the more common Thai word would be krengklua (afraid). My respondents — perhaps because I was an outsider — used the milder word — krengcaj (“not to bother”). The importance of either concept is that it is the subordinate who feels inadequate and displays the feeling of either krengklua orkrengcaj.

⁵² Similar normative findings on the good Buddhist superior have been reported by Mosel, J., “Communication Patterns and Political Socialization — Transitional Thailand”, Communications and Political Development, ed. Pye, L. (Princeton, N.J., 1963), pp. 184–249.Google Scholar

⁵³ On several occasions, we mention the officials' desire to work in villagesor their contentment in doing village work. On a superficial level, such statements are contradictory to the Bangkok orientationof Thai officials. However, no real contradiction exists. These officials wereeither literally (or insome cases, we suppose, metaphorically) describing their desire for comfort, status, and autonomy. All three could be obtained in the village; they could not be obtained while in the office in the presence of the powerful D.O. Many of the officials realized that they would not succeed if they were transferred to Bangkok. Rather, they hoped that their superiors would permit them to work autonomously on assignments within the District. A few of the better educated and more ambitious officials, however, did spend leave time in Bangkok trying to arrange a transfer to the capital.