¹ von Clausewitz, Carl, On War, ed. Rapoport, Anatol, Penguin Books, 1968, p. 140Google Scholar.

² President Thieu called on 14 May 1970 for a ‘joint anti-communist fight by Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Thailand’. U.S. Secretary of State Rogers claimed on 15 July 1970 that the ‘total combined forces of the four Asian nations that are now cooperating together — Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and South Vietnam — are about three times that of the North [Vietnam]’. Department of State, Bulletin, 3 August 1970. An optimistic impression of the struggle emerges from most contributions to the Vietnam issue of Quadrant, Sydney, May-June 1970. Osborne, Milton, Region of Revolt: Focus on Southeast Asia, Pergamon Press, Australia, 1970, pp. 130–134Google Scholar, is more sceptical.

³ ‘It is necessary for a prince to have the friendship of the people; otherwise he has no remedy in times of adversity’ Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, tr. George Bull, Penguin Books, 1961, p. 69.

⁴ Cf. President Nixon's rationale of 3 June 1970 for the Cambodian operations: ‘We have won precious time for the South Vietnamese to train and prepare themselves to carry the burden of their national defence.’ The same argument was advanced by the Johnson Administration, to ‘gain time’ for all Southeast Asia, as a justification of U.S. massive intervention in Vietnam in 1965.

⁵ President Nixon's cease-fire proposals of 7 October 1970 notwithstanding.

⁶ See my article, ‘Politics Amalgamated: The Thai Example’, Australian Outlook, December 1970.

⁷ Vietnam was a province of China for a thousand years; but ever since the successful struggle for independence in the tenth century A.D. it has been invaded or occupied several times.

⁸ Prime Minister Sato, during Rogers' visit to Tokyo, reportedly disclaimed any intention of assuming the burden of military defence of Southeast Asia after the withdrawal of U.S. forces, he Monde, weekly review, 15 July 1970. In a television interview in Japan, Rogers had pointed out: ‘We want to encourage Asian nations to work together in regional cooperation to deal with some of their questions. And certainly Japan will play a leading role in that part of the program.’ He also said: ‘We believe it is inevitable that you are going to play a more important role [in the Pacific area] — economically, politically and in every other way — and we welcome that’. Department of State, Bulletin, 3 August 1970. Indonesia's Foreign Minister, Adam Malik, had previously told the December 1969 ASEAN meeting that ‘Japan is approaching the point where it has to make a fundamental choice between either continuing its predominantly economic role or that of another nature. It is reasonable to assume that Japan will make a wise choice’ — and he hoped it would pursue economic cooperation.

⁹ Soedjatmoko, Indonesian Ambassador to Washington, makes Malik's point that Japan will soon face a basic choice, either to enlarge its economic role or to ‘assume a direct political and military role’ in Southeast Asia. The first means continued dependence on the United States; but if the second is chosen, the existence of Chinese nuclear capacity ‘will make it impossible for her [Japan] not to go nuclear as well’. Address on ‘Southeast Asia and Security’, Hawaii, May 1969, reprinted in Survival (Institute for Strategic Studies, London), October 1969. A similar argument was employed by Dr. Henry Kissinger to emphasise the importance of America's remaining a Pacific power and retaining an interest in Asia, so that Japan pursues policies compatible with those of the United States. The aim was to avoid a Japanese move to ‘go it alone’. Report of news briefing in San Clemente by Sam Lipski, The Australian, 7 September 1970. A very similar view was expressed in January 1971 by the Japanese Foreign Minister, Kiichi Aichi: “As long as the United States' determination to stand by its security commitments abroad is clear … there should be no necessity for our country to acquire an excessive military capacity”. The Australian, 21 January 1971.

¹⁰ Asian reactions are discussed in my article, ‘ The Guam Doctrine’, International Affairs, January 1970.

¹¹ Ibid. Yet the present phase of U.S. disengagement may be only temporary. Indeed a superpower is likely to maintain a world-wide role, though not necessarily with military commitments.

¹² A British battalion in Singapore or Malaysia. U.K. Defence Minister, Lord Carrington, in Canberra, 1 August 1970. A Gurkha battalion in Brunei. Canberra Times, 3 August 1970.

¹³ Carrington, Canberra Times, 1 August 1970.

¹⁴ Ibid. Five-power talks on Britain's ‘modest’ role will probably be held in London in April 1971.

¹⁵ Extended report of speech by Defence Minister, Malcolm Fraser. Canberra Times, 13 February 1970.

¹⁶ SirWatt, Alan, ‘The ANZUS Treaty: Past, Present and Future’, Australian Outlook, April 1970Google Scholar.

¹⁷ ‘The challenge [of ‘so-called wars of national liberation’] must surely be met. If we fail to meet it here and now, we will inevitably have to confront it later under even more disadvantageous conditions. This is the clear lesson of history which we can ignore only at our peril …’ Defence Secretary McNamara, 18 February 1965.

¹⁸ Fraser, Canberra Times, 13 February 1970.

¹⁹ Australia has a ‘battalion plus’, two squadrons of Mirages and ‘at least one ship’ in the Malaysia-Singapore area. Malaysian forces have been expanded recently to 19 infantry battalions. Bruce Juddery, Canberra Times, 6 August 1970.

²⁰ Canberra Times, 10 February 1970. Mr. Gorton had earlier declared at the five-power conference in Canberra in June 1969 that Australian forces in Malaysia and Singapore would ‘assist’ in defence against external aggression and subversion, ‘which can be clearly seen to stem from without the region and can be clearly seen to be supported by external regimes … The maintenance of internal order in any country or the involvement in the internal quarrels in any country are not, and will not be, our business.’

²¹ Robert O'Neill, ‘New Attitudes for a New Decade: Some Conclusions for Australian Policy towards Asia in the 1970s’, Australian Outlook, August 1970.

²² Report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1969–70, Wellington, 1970Google Scholar, Introduction, p. 6.

²³ ‘ Joint Declaration of Summit Conference of Indochinese Peoples’, Peking Review, 8 May 1970.

²⁴ Speech at Vung Tau, The Australian, 14 May 1970. Vice-President Ky also proposed an ‘anti-communist front line’ on 22 May 1970, to include the same countries.

²⁵ Report to the National Assembly, 8 June 1970. However the Assembly Vice-President, Chao Sopsaisana, took a contrary line urging that ‘all countries within the Indochinese peninsula, including South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Thailand, should form an economic, political and social bloc for survival’. He added that there was ‘even more reason for a military bloc’. Bangkok World, 30 July 1970.

²⁶ Thanat Khoman, 22 May 1970.

²⁷ Speech in Cambodia, 17 July 1970.

²⁸ Cambodia, Laos and South Vietnam were designated in the ‘protocol’ to the South-East Asia Collective Defence Treaty as subject to its articles, provided this was at their invitation or with their consent.

²⁹ Bangkok Post, 14 June 1970.

³⁰ Representative Panit Sampavakoop. Bangkok Post, 13 June 1970.

³¹ Neil Jillett reporting from Manila. Canberra Times, 6 July 1970.

³² Rogers told the SEATO Council: ‘We concur in the position taken by the Cambodian Government which does not favour Cambodia's military association with SEATO.’ This speech and Council communique are reported in SEATO Record, Bangkok, August 1970.

³³ ‘Understanding of the United States of America’: Manila, 8 September 1954.

³⁴ Sir Alan Watt, op. cit.

³⁵ ASPAC members are: Australia, Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand, South Vietnam. Laos sent an observer to the fifth Ministerial meeting at Wellington in June 1970. The meeting reported ‘concern and apprehension’ over the tense situation in the region, discussed the implications of the ‘changing policies of the major powers’ and urged the need for regional cooperation on the widest possible basis. ASPAC's economic, cultural and technical projects are listed in Current Notes on International Affairs, Department of External Affairs, Canberra, June 1970.

³⁶ Perhaps not for long: negotiations were reported in September 1970 for the withdrawal of the Thai ‘Black Leopard’ (previously ‘Black Panther’) Division from Vietnam for defence of Thai borders.

³⁷ United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East.

³⁸ ‘A Policy of Regional Cooperation’, Collected Statements, 1967–68, Bangkok, p. 75.

³⁹ Speech to the Asia Society, New York. Text in Bangkok World, 8 March 1970. (Emphasis added.)

⁴⁰ ‘Other great powers will see to it that their rival does not go too far’. Foreign Minister Rajaratnam, The Mirror, Singapore, 1 June 1970.

⁴¹ To build a ‘firm framework of effective administration, sound currency, orderly social conditions and work discipline, so making labour productive, enterprise profitable, anob revenue more or less equal to the budgetary needs of a developing economy’. Speech at Columbia University, The Mirror, 23 December 1968.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Rajaratnam, op. cit.

⁴⁴ Rajaratnam's address to ASEAN Council, Cameron Highlands, December 1969.

⁴⁵ ‘We appeal to the three super-powers, the United States, Russia and China, to help guarantee a neutralised zone in Southeast Asia’. Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak, 22 September 1970. A week later, he added: ‘We should find our own identity … [and pursue] an independent foreign policy.’

⁴⁶ These new approaches were somewhat blunted by alarm at the extent of internal unrest early in 1970 and by renewed external uncertainty following the Cambodian crisis. At the SEATO Council meeting in July, Marcos urged recognition of the growing spirit of nationalism and independence in the region: but he also attacked ‘fanatical elements’ dedicated to the ‘subversion and ruin of existing society’. Manila Chronicle, 1 July 1970.

⁴⁷ Besides Australia, Indonesia also ‘strongly rejected possible inclusion [in ASEAN] of India and Japan, two big powers of their own right, and thus potential rivals’. Ronnie Muntu, Antara correspondent in Canberra, ‘Indonesian-Australian Relations: Possible Obstacles and Pitfalls’, Australian National University seminar paper, August 1968.

⁴⁸ It is important to see ASEAN ‘not as a prelude to a military alliance’ but as a means to speed up economic development, which should be the ‘top priority commitment’. Soedjatmoko, op. cit. J. A. C. Mackie writes that Malik has ‘resisted pressures to convert ASEAN into a regional security association … The primary aim of his policy is to minimise the influence of the great powers (including Japan) in Southeast Asia …’ ‘Indonesia and Australia’ in H. G. Gelber, ed. Problems of Australian Defence and Foreign Policy, forthcoming.

⁴⁹ Muntu, op. cit.

⁵⁰ Machiavelli, op. cit., pp. 118–119.