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11 General sources on Al-Jaelani include Drewes and Poerbatjaraka, De Mirakelen; Chabbi, Jacqueline, ‘Abd al-Kâdir al-Djîlânî personnage historique: Quelques éléments de biographie’, Studia Islamica 38 (1973): 75–106CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and for Indonesian settings, Martin van Bruinessen, ‘Shaykh ‘Abd al Qâdir al-Jîlânî and the Qâdiriyya in Indonesia’, in The Qâdiriyyah order, ed. Zarcone, Thierry, Isin, Ekrem and Buehler, Arthur, special issue, Journal of the History of Sufism 1–2 (2000): 361–95.Google Scholar

12 The talqin (Arabic: talqīn, instruction) takes place when the teacher conveys the ‘good words’, namely ‘There is no God other than Allah’, to the aspirant. See Maslul, Muhammad Abdul Goas Saefulloh, Saefulloh Maslul menjawab 165 masalah: Pemahaman Qodiriyyah Naqsyabandiyyah Pondok Pesantren Suryalaya (Bandung: Wahana Karya Grafika, 2006).Google Scholar

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15 Manakiban is not a new phenomenon in some of Tasikmalaya's ‘private’ mosques such as the Masjid Haji Bakri in Cihideung.

16 Tasikmalaya was the site of religio-political powerplays during the New Order period. The Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party, PPP) drew strong support in Tasikmalaya during that time, but the Golkar-dominated government gave preferential treatment (project funding, etc.) to religious schools that supported Golkar, and discriminated against those that supported the PPP, forcing religious figures to make painful but highly consequential decisions about which party to support. See Amarah Tasikmalaya: Konflik di basis Islam, ed. Thoriq Hadad (Jakarta: Institut Studi Arus Informasi, 1998), pp. 96–119.

17 Howell, Julia Day, ‘Modernity and Islamic spirituality in Indonesia's new Sufi networks’, in Sufism and the ‘modern’ in Islam, ed. van Bruinessen, Martin and Howell, Julia Day (London: I.B. Tauris, 2007)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, p. 227.

18 Atkinson, Jane Monnig, ‘Religions in dialogue: The construction of an Indonesian minority religion’, American Ethnologist 10, 4 (1983): 684–96.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

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24 Examples are the establishment of the Bandung Islamic University (Unisba), the ‘Centre for Islamic Dakwah’ (Pusdai, completed in 1998), and the At-Ta'awun Mosque in Puncak, Bogor (completed in 1997).

25 John Bowen, Muslims through discourse, pp. 315–19.

26 Snouck-Hurgronje, C., Mekka in the latter part of the 19th century. Daily life, customs and learning; The Moslims of the archipelago, trans. Monahan, J.H. (Leiden: Brill, 1970)Google Scholar, p. 264; Williams, Michael C., Communism, religion and revolt in Banten (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1990).Google Scholar

27 Steenbrink, Karel, ‘A Catholic Sadrach: The contested conversion of Madrais adherents in West-Java between 1960–2000’, in Een vakkracht in het Koninkrijk: Kerk- en zendingshistorische opstellen aangeboden aan dr. Th. van den End ter gelegenheid van zijn vijfenzestigste verjaardag, ed. Chr. de Jong, G.F. (Heerenveen: Groen, 2005).Google Scholar

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30 See Federspiel, Howard M., Islam and ideology in the emerging Indonesian state: The Persatuan Islam (PERSIS), 1923 to 1957 (Leiden: Brill, 2001).Google Scholar

31 Hadad, Amarah Tasikmalaya.

32 Millie, Splashed by the saint, pp. 139–58.

33 Howell et al., ‘New faces of Indonesian Sufism’; Kahmad, Tarekat dalam Islam; Asep Usman Ismail, ‘Tradisi manakiban di lingkungan tarekat Qadiriyyah-Naqsyabandiyyah (Pengamatan awal pada beberapa tempat)’, paper presented at the conference on ‘Sufism and the “Modern” in Islam’, Bogor, 4–6 Sept. 2003.

34 The source of these figures was the secretary of the Suryalaya Foundation.

35 As Dadang Kahmad has pointed out, however, many converts to TQN hope for worldly benefits from doing so, and upon disappointment, cease their affiliation with the group. The Sufi order's ‘dropout rate’ is high: Kahmad estimates that 60 per cent of converts eventually cease TQN practice. See Kahmad, Tarekat dalam Islam, p. 84.

36 Thompson, John B., The media and modernity: A social theory of the media (Cambridge: Polity, 1995).Google Scholar

37 Kitley, ‘Playboy Indonesia’, p. 306.

38 Ajengan is the Sundanese equivalent of the word kyai (leader of an Islamic school).

39 We interviewed Ajengan Gaos in Ciamis on 19 Dec. 2011.

40 Maslul, Saefulloh Maslul menjawab, p. 9.

41 Zamhari, Arif and Howell, Julia Day, ‘Taking Sufism to the streets: Majelis zikir and majelis salawat as new venues for popular Islamic piety in Indonesia’, Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs 46, 2 (2012): 53–4.Google Scholar

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43 Up until 2001, it was under the Regency government. After the formation of the City of Tasikmalaya in 2001, it fell under the jurisdiction of the City government.

44 We received conflicting accounts of the year of the first manakiban. Informants offered the years 2006 and 2008.

45 In West Java the acronym DKM is variously interpreted as Dewan Keluarga Masjid (Board of the Mosque Family) or Dewan Kemakmuran Masjid (Board for the Prosperity of the Mosque). In other locations in Java, the DKM is frequently called takmir.

46 The KUA deals with routine matters requiring religious administration and verification.

47 Mudzakkir, Politik Muslim.

48 Some Muslim figures were critical of this delegation. They saw it as a strategic move reflecting a politically motivated agreement between MUI, which represents a clique of well-positioned religious leaders, and the kota government. For critiques of the political brokerage performed by religious elites in Tasikmalaya, see Pluralisme, sekularisme dan liberalisme di Indonesia: Persepsi kaum santri di Jawa Barat, ed. Hasyim, Syafiq (Pondok Indah: ICIP, 2007)Google Scholar; Mudzakkir, Politik Muslim; A.Z. Noor, ‘Keingingan dan niat buruk’, in Nuhammadiyah bicara nasionalisme, ed. Binhad Nurrohmat and Moh. Shofan (Jogjakarta: Ar-Ruzz Media, 2011): 49–62.

49 Buehler, Michael, ‘Decentralisation and local democracy in Indonesia: The marginalization of the public sphere’, in Problems of democratization in Indonesia: Elections, institutions and society, ed. Aspinall, Edward and Mietzner, Marcus (Singapore: ISEAS, 2010)Google Scholar, p. 273.

50 Hamid, Sandra, ‘Indonesian politics in 2012: Coalitions, accountability and the future of democracy’, Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies 48, 3 (2012): 325–45Google Scholar. In the 2012 mayoral election, the successful ticket was supported by the Koalisi Masyarakat Madani (Civil Society Coalition) made up of the Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Prosperous Justice Party, PKS), PPP, Reform Star Party (PBR), Partai Bulan Bintang (Crescent and Star Party, PBB), Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (National Awakening Party, PKB), and Partai Demokrasi (Democratic Party, PD).

51 Mudzakkir, Politik Muslim.

52 We rely on various media reportage from the time here: ‘Ahmadiyah dilarang beraktivitas’, Pikiran Rakyat, 10 Aug. 2007; ‘Massa rusak tempat ibadah’, Pikiran Rakyat, 17 Sept. 2007; ‘Wahidiyah dilarang melakukan aktivitas’, Pikiran Rakyat, 1 Oct. 2007. For background on the Ahmadiyah situation in West Java see Crouch, Melissa, Indonesia, militant Islam and Ahmadiyah: Origins and implications (Melbourne: University of Melbourne/Centre for Islamic Law and Society, 2009).Google Scholar

53 The resolutions throw the spotlight on a further reality emerging from the developments discussed here, namely MUI's increasing public role. Since the end of the Suharto period, the Council has been granted a role in the appointment of DKM members. Furthermore, the regency and municipal governments have passed pseudo-regulations implementing MUI's ideological positions about minority Islamic movements. In their public aspects, the lives of Tasikmalaya's Muslims are becoming more and more exposed to the Council and its agendas.

54 Accounts of Suryalaya's positive relationship with Golkar and successive Indonesian governments refer to ties existing as far back as the Indonesian war of independence and the Darul Islam conflict of the post-independence period. See Sunardjo, Unang, Menelusuri perjalanan sejarah pondok pesantren Suryalaya, pusat pengembangan tarekat Qodiriyyah wa Naqsyabandiyyah abad kedua puluh (Tasikmalaya: Yayasan Serba Bakti Pondok Pesantren Suryalaya, 1995)Google Scholar; Zulkifli, Sufism in Java: The role of the Pesantren in the maintenance of Sufism in Java (Leiden and Jakarta: INIS, 2002)Google Scholar; Hadad, Amarah Tasikmalaya.

55 Zulkifli, Sufism in Java, p. 79.

56 See Mietzner, Marcus, ‘Funding Pilkada: Illegal campaign financing in Indonesia's local elections’, in The state and illegality in Indonesia, ed. Aspinall, Edward and van Klinken, Gerry (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2011), pp. 123–38.Google Scholar

57 The first Regent elected by the voters of Tasikmalaya was in fact an ikhwan (‘brother’ in the sense of follower) of Suryalaya, Tatang Farhanul Hakim, a PPP representative. It would be a mistake to read too much into this affiliation. Tatang was known for establishing good relations with a wide range of political and social partners (see Mudzakkir, Politik Muslim). Furthermore, Suryalaya did not actively support his campaign. He served two terms between 2001 and 2011.

58 Acep Zamzam Noor, ‘Istighotsah’ (2007), Blog: Acep Zamzam Noor, http://budaya-acepzamzamnoor.blogspot.com.au/ (last accessed 23 June 2013).

59 See Muhtadi, Asep Saepul, Komunikasi politik Nahdlatul Ulama: Pergulatan pemikiran politik radikal dan akomodatif (Jakarta: LP3ES, 2004), pp. 205–21.Google Scholar

60 See Mursalin Dahlan, ‘Revolusi “Pisang Goreng”’, Pikiran Rakyat, 2 Apr. 2011.

61 In Solahudin's account of Salafi jihadism in Indonesia, Dahlan is named as a plotter in a conspiracy to assassinate President Suharto. See Solahudin, NII sampai JI: Salafy jihadisme di Indonesia (Depok: Komunitas Bambu, 2011), pp. 159–98.Google Scholar

62 For an account of the intimidation of religious figures in Tasikmalaya by the security–military apparatus, see Hadad, Amarah Tasikmalaya, pp. 115–19.

63 See Howell, ‘Muslims, the New Age and marginal religions in Indonesia’.

64 Kahmad, Tarekat dalam Islam, pp. 182–8. After completing their group performance of ritual worship (salat), TQN members perform loud repetitions of the phrase ‘la illaha illa Allah’ (There is no God other than Allah). The verbalisation is often accompanied by distinctive body movements performed in a sitting position. The phrase and its repetition are familiar to all Muslims in Indonesia, but it was the loud volume that, in Kahmad's account, attracts neighbours' suspicions.

65 Ibid., p. 124.

66 For descriptions and analyses of the dramatic increase in the frequency of pilgrimages to graves and the phenomenon of ‘religious tourism’, see Slama, ‘Wisata religi’; George Quinn, ‘Throwing money at the holy door: Commercial aspects of popular pilgrimage in Java’, in Expressing Islam, pp. 63–79.

67 See Millie, Julian, ‘Women's spectatorship and Islamic oratory in West Java’, Australian Journal of Anthropology 22, 2 (2011): 151–69.Google Scholar

68 See Kitley, Playboy Indonesia.

69 Hefner, Robert W., Civil Islam: Muslims and democratization in Indonesia (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).Google Scholar

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