¹ William Pitt, Lord Amherst (1773–1857). Nephew of General Sir Jeffrey Amherst, first Lord Amherst, to whose title he succeeded in 1797. Minister to the Court of Palermo, Sicily, 1808–1810. Embassy to the Court of Peking 1815–17. Governor-General of India 1823–28. Appointed Governor-General of Canada in 1835, but did not serve.

² Amherst preferred the peaceful details of day-to-day administration, of which he said “Whatever our Indian Policy may have been in former times, it is now, thank God, plain and strait forward, and directed to some of the noblest objects which can occupy the human mind.” British Museum, Add. MSS 48,225, Morley Papers, Amherst to Lord Morley, 27 Oct. 1823.

³ Trade figures between British India and Burma show considerable fluctuation in the years prior to the war, from a high 8,94,033 rupees exports in 1813/14 to a low 2,55,680 in 1817/18, and from a high 11,47,246 rupees imports in 1814/15 to a low 4,48,150 in 1818/19. The exports to Burma were largely re-exports of European manufactured goods. The imports from Burma varied as the demand for teak, the principal item of commerce. The balance of trade between 1811 and 1824 was in favour of the Burmese, with exports to Burma totalling 67,84,492 rupees and imports from Burma totalling 88,53,986 rupees. The total trade constituted less than 1% of the external trade of British India. Statistics compiled from India Office Records (I.O.R.), Bengal Commercial Reports and Madras Commercial Reports.

⁴ On the origins of the war, see my article, “Lord Amherst and the Declaration of War on Burma, 1824,” Journal of Asian History, IX, 2 (July, 1975), 101–127.Google Scholar

⁵ If the evidence of missionaries and merchants who suffered imprisonment during the war is discounted to some extent because of bias and insufficient opportunity to observe the inner workings of the Burmese court, the motivation of the Burmese for precipitating the crisis still remains obscure.

⁶ Philips, C. H., The East India Company, 1784–1834 (Manchester, 1961), pp. 254–260.Google Scholar

⁷ Richie, A. T. and Evans, R., Lord Amherst (Oxford, 1894)Google Scholar, and Banerjee, A. C., The Eastern Frontier of British India (Calcutta, 1946), for example.Google Scholar

⁸ See Pemble, J., The Invasion of Nepal: John Company at War (Oxford, 1971)Google Scholar.

⁹ Roselli, J., Lord William Bentinck (Sussex University Press, 1974), pp. 21–22.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Captain Jeffrey Amherst was A.D.C. to his father in India. He had accompanied his father on the China Embassy, and relations between the two were very close. When the son died, Amherst became dangerously ill as well. India Office Library (I.O.L.), Amherst Papers, F140/168, Lady Amherst to William Pitt Amherst, 25 Aug. 1826.

¹¹ The Burmese War and the capture of the Jat fortress of Bharatpur, which had successfully defied Wellesley's army.

¹² “I remember well its being said most justly before I left England that if a Conqueror were wanted in India, I was not the man who would have been selected to go there.” I.O.L. Amherst Papers, F140/114(a), Amherst to George Canning, 8 Aug. 1825.

¹³ John Adam (1779–1825). Entered India in 1796. Served mainly in administration. His work, while less spectacular than that of his friends, Charles Metcalfe and Richard Jenkins, was solidly appreciated. Appointed to Supreme Council in 1817. Acting Governor General in 1823.

¹⁴ William Butterworth Bayley (1782–1860). Distinguished member of Indian civil service. Entered India in 1799 and worked in revenue and judicial service. Appointed to Supreme Council in 1825. Acting Governor General in 1828. Director of East India Company in 1833 and Chairman in 1840.

¹⁵ Sir Edward Paget (1775–1849), a Peninsular veteran. Governor of Ceylon, 1821–23, and Commander-in-Chief in India 1823–25. He had very little confidence in the Indian army, especially the native portion. Long after Paget had left India, he wrote to Amherst that he had not previously written because “I have such a Horror of any Thing which makes me feel that I am in any way approaching that infernal country.” He felt that a full purse was “the only good thing to be had in India.” I.O.L. Amherst Papers, F140/137(a), 26 July 1826.

¹⁶ In both campaigns the cause for universal complaint was the inadequate, poor quality food supplied by the commissariat. Much of the steam behind the Barrackpore Mutiny stemmed from bad supplies and inadequate transport, arising from the creation of a demand that the commissariat was woefully incapable of adjusting to. Barat, A., Bengal Native Infantry: Its Organization and Discipline 1796–1852 (Calcutta, 1962), pp. 202–219.Google Scholar

¹⁷ He allowed himself to be convinced, though reluctantly, that action was justified against the usurper in Bharatpur by the arguments of Sir Charles Metcalfe on the responsibilities of the paramount power. British Museum, Add. MSS 48, 225, Morley Papers, Amherst to Lord Morley, 23 Nov. 1825.

¹⁸ I.O.L. Munro Papers, F151/145, Sir Thomas Munro to Alexander Munro, 15 Jan. 1826.

¹⁹ To a certain extent Amherst was to blame for a communications gap with the court. He was notoriously a tardy writer, and reluctant to explain his actions fully until pressured. This was the most serious of the charges actually made against him in the court's attempt to secure his dismissal.

²⁰ Good accounts of the war occur in books written by participating officers, Snodgrass, Doveton, Trant and Havelock, as well as in Wilson's, H. H. Documents Illustrative of the Burmese War (Calcutta, 1827)Google Scholar. A recent work, Bruce, G., The Burma Wars 1824–1884 (London, 1973Google Scholar), is lively on military matters, though unreliable on the political situation.

²¹ Banerjee, A. C., The Eastern Frontier of British India 1784–1826 (Calcutta, 1946), pp. 313 and 316.Google Scholar

²² I.O.R. Bengal Secret Consultations, P/320, Consultation of 20 Feb. 1824, Lord Amherst's Minute of 14 Feb. 1824; and Resolution of the Governor-General's Council, 20 Feb. 1824.

²³ Barooah, N. K., David Scott in North East India, 1802–1831 (New Delhi, 1970), pp. 73–74.Google Scholar

²⁴ By 1842, the British had assumed direct responsibility for administration in the area. Banerjee, The Eastern Frontier, p. 487.

²⁵ Settled finally by the annexation of the entire province in 1826. “Political considerations” were too strong to allow the Burmese any part of this territory, or the Mughs their independence. Bengal Secret Consultations, P/339, Consultation of 12 May 1826, Lord Amherst's Minute of 23 Apr. 1826.

²⁶ Often referred to in the documents as Cassay and/or Munnipore.

²⁷ Finally solved when the Munniporean prince, Gambhir Singh, with the aid of British arms and a British officer, led his own force to the expulsion of the Burmese. Banerjee, The Eastern Frontier, pp. 346–349.

²⁸ Bengal Secret Consultations, P/231, Consultation of 26 Mar. 1824, G. Swinton to Sir A. Campbell, 26 Mar. 1826; and G. Swinton to J. Canning, 26 Mar. 1826. Canning had made three trips to the Burmese Empire and was regarded as the expert. He was also a family friend of the Amhersts.

²⁹ Guns and ammunition, and even sails and rudder had to be landed when a ship was in port. This item incorporated suggestions from a letter from Captain T. Crisp, a merchant trading to Rangoon, who had obviously suffered from these “vexatious” regulations. Bengal Secret Consultations, P/138, Consultations of 21 Nov. 1823, Captain Crisp to A. Stirling, 17Nov. 1823.

³⁰ Amherst did, of course, accept the existence of the empire, and the necessity for its maintenance. In 1835 he accepted a commission from the new Tory government to go, as Governor-General, to Canada “to enquire into and redress the grievances complained of,” it being only natural that he “should entertain the desire of preserving to England a colony which had been acquired by one ofmy own name. …” The returning Whig ministers also offered him the position, but since they wished to make it a regular appointment, involving an extended separation from his family, he declined. I.O.L. Amherst Papers, F140/192, Memo of Lord Amherst, n.d.

³¹ It was a justifiable fear. Only non-co-operation by the Liverpool Government prevented Amherst's removal by the Court of Directors late in 1825. I.O.L. Amherst Papers, F140/107, W. Wynn to Amherst, 22 Dec. 1825, enclosing copies of correspondence with the Court of Directors. Amherst made clear his desire for an advance in the peerage in a letter to George Canning prior to the Chinese Embassy. I.O.L. Amherst Papers, F140/35, 25 Sept. 1815.

³² I.O.L. Amherst Papers, F140/114(a), Amherst to T. C. Robertson, 30 May 1825, in which Robertson, the Governor-General's Agent for the South East Frontier, is informed of the decision that Arakan should be separated from Burma, but is asked for information on which to base a decision on its future fate.

³³ I.O.R. Bengal Secret Consultations, P/321, Consultation of 26 Mar. 1824, G. Swinton to Sir A. Campbell, 26 Mar. 1824.

³⁴ Most of the trade noted in n. 3 above was with Pegu.

³⁵ At various times later Manipur and Arakan were proposed as the major field of operations, but the difficulties of operating in these territories always brought the planners back to Rangoon. The plan for an attack on Rangoon was produced by Captain John Canning, whose three missions to the Burmese made him the expert on the subject. I.O.R. Bengal Secret Consultations, P/321, Consultation of 26 Mar. 1824, G. Swinton to Sir A. Campbell, 26 Mar. 1824.

³⁶ I.O.L. Amherst Papers, F/140/115(g), Note by Amherst, unsubmitted to Council, 8 Sept. 1824.

³⁷ I.O.L. Amherst Papers, F/140/122, Amherst to Major J. Canning, 11 Aug. 1824. An even more uncomfortable possibility was the expansion of China to the frontiers of British India. I.O.R. Home Miscellaneous, Vol. 660, Governor-General-in-Council to Select Committee of Court of Directors, 12 Aug. 1824.

³⁸ I.O.L. Amherst Papers, F140/81(a), J. Adam to Amherst, 7 Mar. 1824, 26 Mar. 1824, 1 July 1824.

³⁹ I.O.L. Amherst Papers, F140/74(a), Sir T. Munro to Amherst, 25 Feb. 1824.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 21 Mar. 1824.

⁴¹ Ibid., 8 May 1824.

⁴² The invasion of Java in 1811, which was an extension of the war in Europe, proved to be a poor guide in organizing the Burma campaign. In any case, the cost of a fully-equipped expedition seemed prohibitive in 1824. I.O.R. Home Miscellaneous, Vol. 660, Letter to Court of Directors, 18 May 1826, defending against the charge of sending out the expedition inadequately equipped.

⁴³ The losses in the Burmese War are frequently exaggerated by modern historians, who place them at 15,000. The actual loss in the Rangoon-Irrawaddy campaign, where the losses were by far the heaviest, was 5,070 killed, deceased and missing. I.O.L. Amherst Papers, F/140/126, Sir Archibald Campbell's return of casualties 11 May 1824 to 28 February 1826.

⁴⁴ The casualties were distributed (excluding attached natives and missing) by year in the following manner: 1824, 96 killed, 1,758 deceased (including died from wounds); 1825, 96 killed, 2,176 deceased; 1826, 33 killed, 483 deceased. These show that an inadequate knowledge of and treatment of disease were at least as detrimental to health of the troops as was the lack of sufficient food in the initial stages of the campaign.

⁴⁵ I.O.R. Bengal Secret Consultations, P/323, Consultation of 18 June 1824, J. Canning to G. Swinton, 20 May 1824, enclosing copies of letters to the King and his Council.

⁴⁶ Canning had been collecting stories of the stockpiles of silver bullion available to the King. Ibid.

⁴⁷ I.O.R. Bengal Secret Consultations, P/323, Consultation of 16 July 1824, J. Canning to G. Swinton, 19 June 1824.

⁴⁸ Captain Gibson was born in Madras, son of a commander in the Country Service. He had spent many years as a merchant in Burma, and appeared to know the country well. Though not completely reputable, and given to hard drinking, he provided the British forces with a great deal of information. I.O.R. Bengal Secret Consultations, P/323, Consultation of 19 Nov. 1824, H. Burney to R. Ibbetson, n.d. He died of cholera while accompanying the British army in 1825.

⁴⁹ I.O.R. Secret Consultations, P/323, Consultation of 16 July 1824, J. Canning to G. Swinton, 19 June 1824, enclosing Canning's diary of events in Rangoon.

⁵⁰ Ibid., Sir A. Campbell and J. Canning to G. Swinton, 23 June 1824.

⁵¹ I.O.R. Bengal Secret Consultations, P/324, Consultation of 6 Aug. 1824, Sir A. Campbell to G. Swinton, 10 July 1824.

⁵² Ibid., Consultation of 23 July 1824, G. Swinton to Sir A. Campbell and J. Canning, 23 July 1824.

⁵³ Munro had his own private correspondence from among the sizable Madras contingent in the invading force.

⁵⁴ I.O.L. Amherst Papers, F140/74(a), Sir R. Munro to Amherst, 7 June 1824.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 14 June 1824.

⁵⁶ I.O.L. Munro Papers, F151/61, Amherst to Sir T. Munro, 23 June 1824.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 10 July 1824.

⁵⁸ I.O.L. Amherst Papers, F140/74(a), Sir T. Munro to Amherst, 26 July 1824.

⁵⁹ Sir Archibald Campbell throughout seemed unduly complacent and reluctant to state the true needs of his army. As late as December he was writing of the “excellent salt provisions,” contrary to the evidence presented by other members of the expedition, and denying that lack of fresh food was a major cause of the high mortality. I.O.R. Bengal Secret Consultations, P/328, Consultation of 7 Jan. 1825, Sir A. Campbell to G. Swinton, 19 Dec. 1824.

⁶⁰ I.O.L. Amherst Papers F140/74(a), Sir T. Munro to Amherst, 23 Aug. 1824, 15 Sept. 1824, and 29 Dec. 1824.

⁶¹ I.O.R. Bengal Secret Consultations, P/325, Consultation of 17 Sept. 1824, Lord Amherst's Minute of 8 Sept. 1824.

⁶² I.O.R. Bengal Secret Consultations, P/326, Consultation of 26 Nov. 1824, G. Swinton to Sir A. Campbell, 26 Nov. 1824.

⁶³ I.O.R. Bengal Secret Consultations, P/324, Consultation of 6 Aug. 1824, Sir A. Campbell to G. Swinton, 10 July 1824.

⁶⁴ Ibid., Lord Amherst's Minute of 31 July 1824.

⁶⁵ Ibid., G. Swinton to Sir A. Campbell, 4 Aug. 1824.

⁶⁶ I.O.L. Amherst Papers, F140/74(a), Sir T. Munro to Amherst, 8 Sept. 1824.

⁶⁷ I.O.R. Bengal Secret Consultations, P/325, Consultation of 8 Oct. 1824. Lord Amherst's Minute of 4 Oct. 1824.

⁶⁸ Ibid., Resolution of Governor-General-in-Council, 8 Oct. 1824.

⁶⁹ Ibid., Consultation of 17 Sept. 1824, Minute of J. Fendall, 14 Sept. 1824, and Sir E. Paget, 14 Sept. 1824.

⁷⁰ Ibid., Consultation of 8 Oct. 1824, Lord Amherst's Minute, undated.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² I.O.R. Bengal Secret Consultations, P/328, Consultation of 7 Jan. 1825, Sir A. Campbell to G. Swinton, 16 Dec. 1824.

⁷³ Ibid., Consultation of 28 Jan. 1825, Sir A. Campbell to G. Swinton, 5 Jan. 1825. Campbell did not actually move until 13 Feb.

⁷⁴ Ibid., Consultation of 7 Jan. 1825, G. Swinton to Sir A. Campbell, 7 Jan. 1825.

⁷⁵ I.O.R. Bengal Secret Consultations, P/326, Consultation of 10 Dec. 1824, J. Nicol to Gen. Morrison, 24 Nov. 1824.

⁷⁶ Between May and September, 1825, Morrison's force lost 259 Europeans out of 1500, and 892 natives out of nearly 8,000. Half his force was in hospital. H. H. Wilson, Documents Illustrative of the Burmese War, p. 60 n.

⁷⁷ I.O.R. Bengal Secret Consultations, P/328, Consultation of 14 Jan. 1825, Lord Amherst's Minute of 3 Jan. 1825.

⁷⁸ I.O.R. Bengal Secret Consultations, P/330, Consultation of 20 May 1825, Lord Amherst's Minute of 16 May 1825.

⁷⁹ I.O.R. Bengal Secret Consultations, P/339, Consultation of 12 May 1826, Lord Amherst's Minute of 23 Apr. 1826.

⁸⁰ I.O.L. Munro Papers, F151/61, Amherst to Sir T. Munro, 30 Apr. 1825.

⁸¹ I.O.L. Amherst Papers, F140/74(b), Sir T. Munro to Amherst, 30 July 1825; and I.O.R. Bengal Secret Consultations, P/331, Consultation of 15 July 1825, Memorandum by Captain Snodgrass, 1 July 1825.

⁸² Campbell's proclamation could be read as offering more than it actually did, which was peace and security under an occupation administration. I.O.R. Bengal Secret Consultations P/239, Consultation of 18 Mar. 1825, Sir A. Campbell to G. Swinton, 3 Feb. 1825, enclosing copy of Proclamation.

⁸³ I.O.R. Bengal Secret Consultations, P/336, Consultation of 27 Jan. 1826, Minute by Mr. Robertson, 29 Dec. 1825.

⁸⁴ I.O.R. Bengal Secret Consultations, P/330, Consultation of 20 May 1825, G. Swinton to Sir A. Campbell, 20 May 1825.

⁸⁵ I.O.L. Munro Papers F151/61, Amherst to Sir T. Munro, 30 Oct. 1825.

⁸⁶ I.O.L. Amherst Papers F140/74(b), Sir T. Munro to Amherst, 11 Oct. 1825.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 31 Mar. 1825; 7 June 1825.

⁸⁸ Ibid., 29 Aug. 1825.

⁸⁹ I.O.R. Bengal Secret Consultations, P/332, Consultation of 26 Aug. 1825, Minute of Sir E. Paget, 1 Aug. 1825, Minute of J. Harington, 5 Aug. 1825, and Minute of J. Fendall, 7 Aug. 1825.

⁹⁰ Ibid., Lord Amherst's Minute of 15 Aug. 1825. Such instructions were in fact issued to Campbell on 26 Aug. 1825.

⁹¹ I.O.R. Bengal Secret Consultations, P/334, Consultation of 11 Nov. 1825, Sir A. Campbell to G. Swinton, 5 Oct. 1825.

⁹² This item was later dropped because it might be regarded as an unfriendly act by other nations, and because it might give the Burmese ideas. I.O.R. Bengal Secret Consultations, P/336, Consultation of 27 Jan. 1826, Resolution of the Commissioners, 3 Jan. 1826.

⁹³ I.O.R. Bengal Secret Consultations, P/334, Consultation of 9 Dec. 1825, Sir A. Campbell to G. Swinton, 29 Oct. 1825.

⁹⁴ Ibid., Lord Combermere's Minute of 6 Nov. 1825.

⁹⁵ Ibid., Minute of 6 Nov. 1825.

⁹⁶ Ibid., Lord Amherst's Minute of 8 Nov; 1825.

⁹⁷ The more so because the extent of his unpopularity with the Court of Directors was now being brought home to him in his correspondence with his friend, Lord Morley. British Museum, Add. MSS 48,255, Morley Papers, Amherst to Lord Morley, 26 Dec. 1825.

⁹⁸ I.O.R. Bengal Secret Consultations, P/334, Consultation of 9 Dec. 1825, Lord Amherst's Minute of 22 Nov. 1825.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., Mr. Harington's Minute of 28 Nov. 1825, and Mr. Bayley's Minute of 6 Dec. 1825.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., Consultation of 23 Dec. 1825, G. Swinton to Sir A. Campbell, 22 Dec. 1825.

¹⁰² Amherst wrote without the knowledge of his colleagues. I.O.L. Munro Papers, F151/61, Amherst to Sir T. Munro, 7 Jan. 1826. Munro declined the invitation. I.O.L. Amherst Papers, F140/74(c), Sir T. Munro to Amherst, 20 Jan. 1826.

¹⁰³ I.O.R. Bengal Secret Consultations, P/336, Consultation of 27 Jan. 1826, Sir A. Campbell, Sir J. Brisbane and T. C. Robertson to Lord Amherst, 3 Jan. enclosing copy of the treaty.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., Consultation of 10 Feb. 1826, Sir A. Campbell to G. Swinton, 20 Jan. 1826.

¹⁰⁵ British Museum, Add. MSS 48,225, Morley Papers, Amherst to Lord Morley, 13 Feb. 1826. “I certainly am aware that the prospect of annexation of territory will excite the alarm and perhaps draw upon me the censure of the Board of Control and the Court of Directors. But what am I to do? The last twelve months will show how unceasing my endeavours have been to bring the enemy to terms. The moderation of these terms I imagine no man will question. In fact I have looked to nothing beyond the security of our frontiers and have entertained no wish to reduce the power of the enemy beyond what was necessary for that object. There are many I know who think I have pushed this moderation too far, and that I ought before now to have invited the Peguers to revolt. I will not now enter into this argument. I have been unwilling till the last moment to close the door to negotiation. The enemy has refused all our overtures and leaves us no option but to throw him prostrate & keep him so if we can.”

¹⁰⁶ I.O.R. Bengal Secret Consultations, P/336, Consultation of 10 Feb. 1826, G. Swinton to Sir A. Campbell, 10 Feb. 1826.

¹⁰⁷ I.O.R. Bengal Secret Consultations, P/337, Consultation of 14 Apr. 1826, Minute of J. Crawford, 27 Mar. 1826.

¹⁰⁸ It has been presented as such by some writers. See for example Trager, Frank N., Burma: From Kingdom to Republic (London, 1966), pp. 32–35.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁹ Sir Edward Paget described the lack of preparation for such a war. “A period of nearly Seventy years has elapsed since war has been known in this part of India. All our views have been extended to the North and to the West. The consequence is that we are utterly unprepared for war in Bengal. Our Eastern Frontier has been totally neglected. Our arsenal of Fort William is almost destitute of mily Stores. In a word, all the means for the prosecution of war, even to musket cartridges and shot are to be collected Piecemeal from the Upper Provinces.” I.O.R. Bengal Secret Consultations, P/323, Consultation of 2 July 1825, Minute of the Commander-in-Chief, 21 June 1824.

¹¹⁰ I.O.L. Amherst Papers, F140/93, Sir Charles Metcalfe's notes on the Burman War, 8 June 1824.

¹¹¹ Banerjee, The Eastern Frontier of British India, chapter 1, establishes the basic economic unattractiveness at that time of such areas as Cachar, Jaintia, Manipur and Assam.

¹¹² I.O.R. Bengal Secret Consultations, P/330, Consultation of 20 May 1825, Lord Amherst's Minute of 16 May 1825.

¹¹³ The question of the final disposition of Tenasserim was left to the Court of Directors and the British Government. Here there was much debate, Wellington, for instance being for its retention, and Ellenborough against, before the decision was made to stay in the area. Correspondence in I.O.R. Home Miscellaneous, vol. 680.

¹¹⁴ I.O.R. Miscellaneous, vol. 668, Note by the Secretary, G. Swinton, 26 Apr. 1826, defending the annexation of Arakan by emphasizing the commercial possibilities of the province.

¹¹⁵ I.O.L. Amherst Papers, F140/74(b), Sir T. Munro to Amherst, 7 June 1825; F140/93. Sir Charles Metcalfe's notes on the Burman War, 8 June 1824.

¹¹⁶ Munro was the choice of both the Court of Directors and the British Government as a replacement for Amherst during the controversy over Amherst's recall in 1825. Philips, The East India Company, p. 258.

¹¹⁷ I.O.R. Bengal Secret Consultations, P/320, Consultation of 20 Feb. 1824, Lord Amherst's Minute of 14 Feb. 1824.

¹¹⁸ This correspondence with William Pitt Amherst and Frederick Amherst found in I.O.L. Amherst Papers, F140/168.

¹¹⁹ I.O.L. Amherst Papers, F140/122, Amherst to J. Canning. 25 July 1824.